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ABSTRACT

Highly automated vehicles or autonomous vehicles are projected to reform the
transportation system and improve transportation safety by eliminating drivers’
errors, as safety studies reveal humans contribute to more than 90% of the
crashes. This dissertation examines the full spectrum of automated vehicle topics,
including related literature, enacted state policies, and manufacturer-reported
crash and disengagements reports to understand more about this emerging and
transformative technology. First, an extensive review of safety-related literature
was conducted, followed by a text analysis to identify areas of research needed to
advance the knowledge of automated vehicles. California is the only transparent
state as the Department of Motor Vehicles requires permit-holding manufacturers
to publicly share automated vehicle safety performance data – crashes,
disengagements, and automated vehicle miles traveled – of the vehicles on the
public roadways. By harnessing this significant and emerging field data, associated
risk factors of crashes and disengagements were identified and quantified using
rigor statistical analyses. Contributing roadway, environmental, and vehicle factors
were modeled with the most frequent type of crash, rear-end, and stated injury
crashes. Disengagements, the transition from autonomous mode to conventional
mode, are considered near-miss crashes as the vehicle operator is mitigating the
likelihood of a crash by regaining control of the vehicle. These safety-critical events
iv

of disengagements were then identified and quantified by using the 5 W’s – who
(disengagement initiator), when (the maturity of automated driving system, where
(location of disengagement), what and why (the facts causing the disengagement).
The assessment of the effects of time on disengagement frequency at the
manufacturer- level was conducted. With the rapid technological advancements in
automated vehicles, the technology poses a threat to crafting legislation. By using
a novel approach of conducting a manual review and synthesis against the only
federal guidance available for states, USDOT Model State Policy, married with a
text mining analysis, insights on uneven research, development, and deployment
of automated vehicle technologies at the state level were revealed. Finally, the
implications of the findings and future research areas are discussed to a
comprehensive understanding of automated vehicle associated risk factors on the
transportation network.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1

Background

Whether it is by foot, horse and buggy, bicycle, motor vehicle, or transit,
transportation is necessary for people’s everyday lives. With the use of motor
vehicles for surface transportation for more than one hundred years, the assurance
of proper and safe operation of the vehicle by a human driver is nearly nonexistent,
as safety studies reveal human error contributes to more than 90% of
transportation crashes and death, with injury costs nearing $900 billion in the
United States alone. Government and private industries are committed to taking
initiatives to substantially reduce vehicle fatalities and serious injuries on the
roadway system in the United States, with many believing eliminating the driver
through automating motor vehicles is the path to drastically reduce fatalities and
injuries.

Automated vehicle technology was first introduced to the public in the General
Motors Pavilion’s Futurama exhibit at the 1939 World’s Fair in New York City by
Norman Bel Geddes. In his book, Magic Motorways, Norman Bel Geddes
explained his visions of the future - the development of a highway and connected
transportation network (which was before the creation of the Interstate Highway
System in 1956) and eliminating the human factor in driving through automation
(Geddes). Now, nearly 80 years later, Bel Geddes’ visions are becoming a reality
2

and are expected to transform the transportation realm.

The SAE International’s On-Road Automated Vehicle Standards Committee
crafted in 2014 (SAE On-Road Automated Vehicle Standards Committee, 2014)
and revised in 2018 (SAE On-Road Automated Vehicle Standards Committee,
2018) the Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to a Driving Automation
Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles. This standard has been adopted by
government officials, automated vehicle technology stakeholders, and research
and development. The standard defines and depicts the increasing levels of
automation – Level 0 (no automation) to Level 5 (full automation) – as illustrated
in Figure 1.1.


Level 0 (no automation): The driver is in complete control of the vehicle
by accelerating, deaccelerating, and steering. The vehicle does not have
any driver-assisted technologies but does provide features (i.e., blind-spot
warning, automatic emergency braking, and lane departure warning) to
warn and temporarily assist the driver. Vehicles with these capabilities are
regarded as automated vehicles and be equipped with advanced driver
assistance systems (ADAS).



Level 1 (driver assistance): The driver is in complete control of the vehicle
by accelerating, deaccelerating, and steering. The vehicle can support the
driver by controlling the speed or steering but cannot do both concurrently.
3

.
Figure 1.1 SAE J3016 Levels of Driving Automation (Source: (SAE On-Road Automated Vehicle Standards Committee,
2018))
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Vehicles with these capabilities are regarded as automated vehicles and be
equipped with ADAS.


Level 2 (partial automation): The driver, as needed, is in complete control
of the vehicle by accelerating, deaccelerating, and steering. The vehicle can
simultaneously support the driver by controlling the speed and steering.
Examples of these features include lane centering and adaptive cruise
control. Manufacturers with these technologies on the roadway include
Nissan (ProPILOT Assist), Tesla (Autopilot), Cadillac (Super Cruise), Volvo
(Pilot Assist). Vehicles with these capabilities are regarded as automated
vehicles and be equipped with ADAS.



Level 3 (conditional automation): Under the appropriate circumstances,
the vehicle can manage the dynamic driving task, including monitoring the
environment, and the system will request the driver to intervene when
needed. Vehicles with these capabilities are regarded as automated
vehicles and be equipped with an automated driving system (ADS).



Level 4 (high automation): Under the appropriate circumstances, the
vehicle can manage the dynamic driving task, including monitoring the
environment, and there is no oversight needed by a human. Vehicles with
these capabilities are regarded as autonomous vehicles be equipped with
ADS.



Level 5 (full automation): Under all circumstances, the vehicle can
5

manage the dynamic driving task, including monitoring the environment,
and there is no oversight needed by a human. Vehicles with these
capabilities are regarded as autonomous vehicles be equipped with ADS.

Motivation

Mass-produced vehicles equipped with Levels 1 and 2 of automation and are
presently on the transportation network throughout the United States. Highly
automated vehicles (Levels 3-5) have been challenged in simulation environments
and are diffusing into the network to be tested in complex environments. With the
emergence of innovative technologies brings new challenges to the transportation
industry. With such, the motivation of the dissertation is the four known U.S.
fatalities involving engaged ADAS or ADS during a crash.

The first known fatal crash of automation occurred in May 2016 involved a Level 2
Tesla Model S in Williston, Florida and a tractor-trailer (National Transportation
Safety Board, 2017). The tractor-trailer was on a limited-access highway and was
turning across traffic onto a side road when the Tesla struck the underride of the
trailer. The investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
determined the human operator had his hands on the wheel for only 25 seconds
of the Autopilot-engaged 37 minutes period. Investigators deemed the Autopilot
6

technology was not designed to identify lateral movements of vehicles, which
caused the Tesla not to engage the brakes. The Tesla driver was determined to
be over-relying on the Level 2 technology, which resulted in the lack of reaction to
the tractor-trailer.

Another fatal crash occurred in March 2018, involving a Tesla Model X in Mountain
View, California and a previous struck crash attenuator in a gore area while the
vehicle was engaged in Autopilot (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018c).
The NTSB investigation of this crash is still ongoing.

In March 2018, the first known fatality of an ADS occurred, making this the third
known crash of automation. The crash involved a pedestrian and Uber’s Level 3
testing vehicle in Tempe, Arizona (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018b).
The stock vehicle’s emergency braking maneuvers from Volvo’s City Safety were
disabled to prevent the opportunity of erratic vehicle behavior. The ADS of Uber
technologies were not able to recognize the pedestrian until 1.3 seconds before
impact. The NTSB investigation of this crash is still ongoing, and the final report is
expected to be published in late 2019. However, the Tempe Police Department
crash report found the Uber vehicle operator was streaming a television show and
not actively monitoring the surrounding environment (Tempe Police Department,
2018).
7

The fourth known fatality occurred in March 2019 in Delray Beach, Florida and is
similar to the Williston, Florida crash. A Tesla Model 3 engaged in Autopilot was
traveling on a state highway when a tractor-trailer began to traverse the highway
from a driveway to travel in the opposite direction. The Tesla struck the underride
of the trailer, shearing off the roof of the Tesla and killing the driver. According to
the NTSB preliminary report, the vehicle did not detect the operator’s hands on the
wheel 8 seconds prior to impact. The NTSB investigation of this crash is still
ongoing (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018d).

Framework

Vehicles equipped with ADAS technologies are already being sold to consumers
across the United States, while automakers are attempting to deliver autonomous
vehicles by testing conditional automation vehicles. Past literature has examined
automated vehicle safety through the use of simulations and test bed data, but
safety literature of public field testing data was scarce until the recent emergence
of California’s Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program.

The crash causation of conventional vehicles have been examined for nearly the
past 40 years with different traffic safety datasets (Singh, 2015; Treat et al., 1979).
The contributing factors of crash occurrence have been classified into three key
8

factors - human, roadway, and vehicle. Driving behavior of humans is found to be
the most prevailing contribution factor (more than 90%) of motor vehicle crashes
(Singh, 2015; Treat et al., 1979). Roadway and vehicle factors were determined to
be contributed to 34% and 13%, respectively.

Conceptually, as vehicles become equipped with higher levels of automation, the
contributing factors of crashes will drastically change (Figure 1.2). For example,
higher levels of automation will cause the ADS to manage the dynamic driving
task, including monitoring the environment, and there will be no oversight by the
operator. With humans having less of a role, it is expected that human contribution
to crashes will drastically decrease as more vehicles becomes fully automated. As
the vehicle is now responsible for the driving task in addition to the proper
functionality of the vehicle, contributing vehicle factors are expected to increase.
Likewise, autonomous vehicles will rely on infrastructure for operation, specifically
pavement markings, signals, and signs. These vehicles are later expected to
become connected and autonomous, where the vehicles will communicate with
other vehicles and infrastructure for the driving task. As such, roadway contributing
factors are expected to increase.

As is evident, the emergence of automated vehicles and later autonomous vehicles
will drastically transform the transportation realm. This key concept behind the
9

Note: Green arrows represent an increase in contribution, whereas red arrow represent a decrease.

Figure 1.2 Effects of automation on contributing factors of crashes
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dissertation is to understand the contributing factors (human, vehicle, and
roadway) of automated vehicle-crashes and disengagements using the recently
established California Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program data in addition to
examining existing safety literature and enacted state policies. Figure 1.3 outlines
the dissertation framework.

Contribution

Automated vehicles have the opportunity to revolutionize the transportation
industry and everyday life for most people. As higher levels of automation emerge,
humans will have less of a role in the dynamic driving task of the vehicle and will
allow humans to engage in other activities, such as sleep and work. But how will
these vehicles affect the safety of road users, and what triggers cause the
automation system to fail? This dissertation will explore the entire spectrum of
automated vehicle topics, including relevant safety literature, California field test
data (involved crashes, disengagements, and automated vehicle miles traveled),
and enacted state policies to fundamentally understand these vehicles through a
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach. A novel methodology of utilizing
machine learning techniques (specifically unsupervised learning), which uses a
natural language processing to derive meaningful insights of the text, was
performed on related safety literature, automated vehicle-involved crash
11

Figure 1.3 Framework of dissertation
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narratives, and enacted state policies. As California is the only transparent state
to publicly publish automated vehicle field testing data through the Autonomous
Vehicle Tester Program, rigor statistical analyses were performed on crash and
disengagement data on a comprehensive level. Further, the research has
implications for government official leaders on questions that should be answered
within in state policies, and automated vehicle safety data that should be collected
in state field test programs.

This dissertation also has broader impacts. Manufacturers are racing to be the first
company to develop and sell the first fully automated vehicle. As such,
manufacturers are keeping proprietary software and codes to themselves while
allowing road users to be their “guinea pigs” while testing on public roadways
throughout the United States. With the emergence of California’s field test data,
the insights obtained in this dissertation can be utilized for performance-based
measures to keep holding manufacturers accountable for safety while they are
chasing the pot of gold. Additionally, the findings illustrate the environments where
automated vehicles are performing optimally and can be used as graduated
markets before being introduced into more complex atmospheres.

13

Dissertation Structure

This dissertation is organized in a five paper journal format since the analyses have
led to papers that are in preparation for submittal, under-review, or forthcoming in
journals. The papers are as follows:
1. Shay, E., Khattak, A. J., and Boggs, A. M. Safety in the Connected and
Automated Vehicle Era: A U.S. Perspective on Research Needs.


Peer-reviewed

conference

paper:

Presented

at

the

98th

Transportation Research Board Meeting (2019) in Washington, D.C.


Journal article: Under-review in a transportation engineering journal



Central theme: safety research needs of connected and automated
vehicles

2. Boggs, A.M., Wali, B., and Khattak, A.J. Exploratory Analysis of Automated
Vehicle Crashes in California: A Text Analytics & Hierarchical Bayesian
Heterogeneity-Based Approach.


Peer-reviewed

conference

paper:

Presented

at

the

98th

Transportation Research Board Meeting (2019) in Washington, D.C.


Journal article: Forthcoming in Accident Analysis and Prevention



Central theme: contributing roadway and environmental factors of
automated vehicle-involved crashes

14

3. Boggs, A.M., Arvin, R., and Khattak, A.J. Exploring the Who, What, When,
Where, and Why of Automated Vehicle Disengagements


Peer-reviewed conference paper: Accepted for presentation at the
99th Transportation Research Board Meeting (2020) in Washington,
D.C.



Journal article: Under second-stage review in Accident Analysis and
Prevention



Central theme: associated disengagements risks

4. Boggs, A.M., Arvin, R., and Khattak, A.J. Analyzing On-Road Automated
Vehicle Disengagements by Manufacturer Over Time


Peer-reviewed conference paper: Accepted for presentation at the
99th Transportation Research Board Meeting (2020) in Washington,
D.C.



Journal article: In preparation to submit to a transportation
engineering journal



Central theme: analysis of disengagements over time

5. Boggs, A.M., Jerome, Z., Khattak, A. J., and Shay, E. Readiness for
Automation: A Synthesis and Implications of Automated Vehicle-Related
Enacted State Legislation.


Journal article: In preparation to submit to a transportation planning
journal
15



Central theme: state policy needs of testing, deployment, and
operation of automated vehicles

16

CHAPTER TWO
SAFETY IN THE CONNECTED AND AUTOMATED VEHICLE ERA:
A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON RESEARCH NEEDS

17

This chapter presents a modified version of a research paper by Elizabeth Shay,
Asad J. Khattak, and Alexandra M. Boggs. The paper (No. 19-01423) was
presented at the 98th Annual Meeting of Transportation Research Board in
Washington, D.C. The paper is under-review in a transportation engineering
journal.

Abstract

With crashes costing the U.S. nearly $1 trillion in death, injury, and property
damage annually, transportation safety is of profound concern to planners,
engineers, and public health professionals. The benefits promised by champions
of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) include enhanced safety and
dramatically fewer crashes, effected primarily through reducing or eliminating the
human errors that contribute to a majority of crashes. We discuss dominant
transportation safety concepts in light of the approaching transition to CAVs, with
an extensive review of the literature. Text analysis on research papers in the
CAVs/safety realm further supports articulation of research questions that merit
consideration, to advance debate and research on the safety impacts of CAV
technologies. Transportation planning and policy would benefit from identification
of leading indicators of driver or operator performance (e.g., biometrics or vehicle
kinematics) to inform corrective actions. Future research may address timely and
18

critical questions such as what errors (intentional or unintentional) drivers make,
or how CAVs may reduce or eliminate impaired driving or prevent crashes affecting
vulnerable road users.

Introduction

Safety is a deeply personal concern of travelers—whether by foot or bicycle,
private vehicle or public transit—as they make decisions about the mode, time,
and route for routine or one-off trips. In the aggregate, perceived and experienced
safety shapes travel demand and behavior, which then feed into analysis and
actions by planning departments, traffic engineers and transportation agencies.
Transportation safety failures exact a high cost in fatalities, injuries, property loss
and compromised quality of life, and keep safety high on personal and institutional
agendas.

Travel behavior is a complex expression of personal circumstances (residential
and work locations and the environments in which they are embedded, access to
vehicles or transit, household structure, travel needs), environmental and social
factors (road network, topography, weather, traffic, travel culture), government
(transit, parking, non-motorized travel support), and individual decisions and
preferences. Even a knowledgeable and motivated traveler cannot individually
19

exert complete control over travel conditions or assure absolute safety and
comfort. Travel safety is fraught with complex relationships and uncertainties,
touching on engineering and design, policy and law, socio-demographic
considerations, and human decision-making.

Safety is among the major dimensions of transportation policy receiving focused
attention in recent decades, as the mid-20th-century technocratic planning that
generated low-density single use development gave way to renewed interest in the
profession’s roots in design and social goals. By the early 21st century, the national
planning paradigm could fairly be described as compact urban form (including
village-like suburban centers and small urban places) featuring efficiency,
connectivity and urban legibility to promote active living and travel, efficiency,
equity—and safety. The objective of this paper is to discuss dominant
transportation safety concepts in light of the approaching transition to connected
and automated vehicles (CAVs) and to articulate research questions that merit
consideration. In the process we hope to advance debate and research on safety
impacts of CAV technologies. This review is timely, given the widespread interest
in CAVs and availability of extensive and growing literature. The work is original in
its application of text analysis—a useful and accessible but little-used method for
data reduction—on a large body of research to support a comprehensive review
of CAV safety impacts.
20

Safety at the Brink of the CAV Era
Against a backdrop of the general consensus that livable walkable communities
are good for people and for communities, planners and policy-makers are
preparing for the arrival of vehicles with varying levels of automation and
networking. As CAVs become more common and sophisticated, travelers of all
modes will need to adjust to a new travel landscape, while local governments
monitor impacts on congestion and safety, and transportation engineers and
planners respond to changes in how people drive and park, walk or cycle, and
access transit.

The debate among researchers, technology developers, policy-makers, and the
public on the potential benefits and possible dangers of widespread CAV use spills
across the research literature of planning, public health, engineering and
governance, and increasingly into mass media and public discourse. There are
extremes of heady CAV boosterism—claiming huge benefits in efficiency and
safety with nary a worry, and deep skepticism about cost, reliability, and
unintended consequences. Many views fall along a middle range and represent
wary but intrigued openness to the potential role of CAVs in a sustainable
transportation future that reduces death and injury, increases mobility, and
addresses equity, affordability, environmental responsibility and strong urban
design.
21

The literature and discourse on CAVs accommodate many perspectives: positive
affirmation that CAV technology is coming sooner and will perform better than
forecast; promises of radically reduced crash incidence that drive injury and death
to near zero; predictions of enormous gains in efficiency and possible liberation of
road space for other uses; and alarming scenarios of lost knowledge and skills,
growing demand swamping roads, and unintended consequences costing time,
dollars, health and lives.

Moderated views include cautious predictions of mixed but net-positive outcomes:


fewer crashes—lives saved, injuries reduced, medical costs and
productivity losses mitigated



more efficient use of roads, as vehicles occupy less space, and lanes
become narrower and flexible—and possibly unnecessary



changing streetscapes, with fewer driveways and changing curb regimes—
assuming a mix of shared mobility such as ride-hailing or CAV-sharing, and
owned CAVs



altered travel behavior responding to changes in the streetscape, which
might revert to other public uses—or induce more demand and different
kinds of trips



access to affordable mobility for all, including underserved populations, who
may use CAVs to access transit — or bypass transit and move directly from
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home to destination

We reviewed recent literature across several fields relevant for automated vehicles
and safety, including technology, transportation and land use planning and policy,
and health and safety. This review was grounded in the assumption that CAVs will
penetrate the travel landscape in the near future, albeit unevenly across
geographic regions, and will manifest differently in urban, small-town, and rural
settings, intertwining with economic and sociodemographic characteristics.

To manage the large volume of material and to delimit the enormously complex
questions at hand, we took a primarily U.S. perspective, while acknowledging
extensive work under way across the world in CAV engineering, policy and
planning, and health and wellness. We were motivated by the rapidly changing
transportation landscape, and the deep and nuanced discussions underway about
the potential for transportation automation and networked technology to improve
health, reduce injury and death, and connect people to each other and to their
essential destinations. Our goal was to examine the literature from several
disciplines to extract major extant and emerging themes, and sketch out a possible
research agenda.
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Methods

This study involved a literature review, followed by text analysis to identify key
concepts. The reviewed material comprises peer-reviewed research papers and
scholarly reports from reputable public sources. The data are valid insofar as they
came from the text in the compilation of studies, and were subjected to quality
control for errors and reasonableness. Our review was comprehensive, but not
exhaustive.

Literature Review
We reviewed literature on automated and connected vehicles and technology,
traffic safety, public health, and travel behavior, searching on a controlled list of 20
terms in five comprehensive bases (TRID, ScienceDirect, Web of Science,
PubMed, Google Scholar). Because of the rapidly changing technology and
accumulating 1 body of knowledge, only materials published since the year 2000
were considered. Of over 600 research papers, technical reports, book chapters
and reviews scanned, a subset comprising the most relevant published research
papers and technical reports was chosen for review and text analysis; news
stories, working papers, and discussions were excluded. The initial collection was
vetted for relevance and focus, prioritizing sources that discuss both CAVs and
safety. Papers and reports that are purely engineering or modeling were excluded,
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as were materials written only for a mass audience, without an academic or
professional tone. After this vetting, the collection included 180 research papers
and 68 technical reports. The literature contained lively discussions in several
major domains, described below.

Increasingly, visions of the future city include automated vehicles as a major
mobility component (Alessandrini, Campagna, Delle Site, Filippi, & Persia, 2015).
Metropolitan transportation systems are bracing for possible rapid and radical
change, which may manifest first and most deeply in freight and transit, although
“the timing, scale, and direction of the impacts are uncertain and the opportunities
to influence outcomes are limited” (Guerra, 2016). Computing, sensing, and
communication technology are

converging to

support large-scale

CAV

deployment, and radically transform traffic control, with “potential implications for
several dimensions of social justice, including safety, sustainability, privacy,
efficiency, and equal access” (Mladenovic & McPherson, 2016).

Litman (Todd Litman, 2018) anticipates near-term (2020s-2030s) mobility gains
will be limited to affluent non-drivers, and benefits like reduced congestion and
capacity needs, independent mobility for vulnerable populations, and safety,
energy savings, and pollution abatement delayed until AVs are affordable,
probably after 2040. Lari et al. (Lari, Douma, & Onyiah, 2015) also predict limited
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CAV availability in the 2020s, becoming more widespread in the 2040s.

Milakis et al. (Milakis, Van Arem, & Van Wee, 2017) describe policy and societal
implications from CAVs rippling out in several stages: 1st-order impacts on road
capacity, fuel efficiency, accident risk, and emissions are likely to be beneficial,
growing with automation and cooperation. Follow-on changes in vehicle
ownership/sharing, location choices and transport infrastructure may alter travel
demand; later benefits in safety, economy, public health and social equity remain
unclear.

With the advent of AVs, people will find themselves sharing physical space with
computer-controlled machines that direct their own movement. While most
machines with which people interact today are predictable, “The unrestricted,
computer-directed movement of AVs is an entirely novel phenomenon that may
challenge certain unarticulated assumptions in our existing legal structure” and
complicate conditions for ordinary travelers (Surden & Williams, 2016).

How will CAVs be used? The technology may co-evolve with other powerful
trends—shared use, multimodal trip-making, electric vehicles. Watkins (Watkins,
2017) suggests that CAVs may promote or hinder these models, raising questions
of ownership versus sharing, demand for door-to-door connection, driverless cars
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operating in pedestrian environments, and individual versus mass transport
systems. Shladover (Shladaver, 2016) cautions that CAVs may have been
overhyped by industry and media: “Simple road encounters pose huge challenges
for computers, and robotic chauffeurs remain decades away,” although we can
expect near-term automation for specific applications, such as auto-parking,
shuttles, freight, and freeway control.

Potential Impacts of CAVs
Although CAVs increasingly are seen as inevitable, the “long-term effects of this
technology are rarely considered and seldom examined in the literature” (Gruel &
Stanford, 2016).The potential impacts are both direct (safety, congestion, travel
time) and indirect (system efficiency, individual travel choices), positive and
negative: the “net effect in terms of societal benefit or harm is far from clear” (Gruel
& Stanford, 2016).

Safety is among the most compelling of the positive impacts ascribed to CAVs.
“Cars, which today kill about 33,000 Americans and 1.2 million people globally per
year, would be much safer if only humans were not behind the wheel” (Levinson,
2015); full deployment could reduce U.S. deaths by orders of magnitude. Other
potential benefits include lower costs for individuals as well as service providers,
efficiency of both travel lanes and parking (smaller vehicles more tightly packed in
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space), and equity—with new opportunities for low-mobility travelers who do not
drive and have limited or costly options (Alessandrini et al., 2015; Bagloee,
Tavana, Asadi, & Oliver, 2016). Noy et al. (Noy, Shinar, & Horrey, 2018) note the
dearth of research on automation, complexity, and systems resilience, and the
need for integration with human systems and social trust, if the promised benefits
of automated driving are to become a reality. Smart mobility, digital disruption and
AVs raise the possibility of “a new window of opportunity to tame congestion” (D.
A. Hensher, 2018); outcomes may depend on factors such as auto ownership and
shared mobility, institutional support and policies, and road pricing reform.

Public Health and Safety
Although scholars and practitioners have started to assess impacts and develop
policies and regulations for CAVs, the public health implications of widespread
adoption of fully autonomous vehicles have received scant attention. Crayton and
Meier (Crayton & Meier, 2017) call for a research agenda that considers “public
health implications of AV policy, as seen through existing evidence on road
casualties, environmental health, aging populations, non-communicable disease,
land use, and labor markets [that would support] public health participation in
transportation policy reforms.” Fleetwood (Fleetwood, 2017) argues for applying
the expertise and values of the public health community to the many complex
questions surrounding CAVs, calling them a portent of “the most significant
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advance in auto safety history by shifting the focus from minimization of post-crash
injury to collision prevention.”

Safety is a major selling point for AVs, but the changing travel landscape will
introduce new challenges even as some safety benefits are realized. Kalra and
Paddock (Kalra & Paddock, 2016) argue that given uncertainty about CAV safety,
“it is imperative that AV regulations are adaptive—designed from the outset to
evolve with the technology so that society can better harness the benefits and
manage the risks of these rapidly evolving and potentially transformative
technologies.” Although awareness of vision zero (a broadly shared social goal to
eliminate traffic deaths) is deep among professionals for whom road safety is
relevant, especially planners and engineers (Evenson, LaJeunesse, & Heiny,
2018; Riegelman & Garr, 2011), CAVs rarely appear in the research or practitioner
literature. The same is true in literature relating to safe systems.

Recent research has been concentrating on the performances of automated
driving systems, particularly the failures, in California’s Autonomous Vehicle Tester
Program which established in 2014. Findings from these studies include that
automated vehicles are frequently struck from behind by conventional vehicles at
intersections and low-speeds with the AV system hardly being faulted (F. M.
Favarò, Nader, Eurich, Tripp, & Varadaraju, 2017; Teoh & Kidd, 2017; Wang & Li,
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2019b). Teoh and Kidd (Teoh & Kidd, 2017) speculate that the AVs are
unexpectedly braking while operating, but the crash narratives do not confirm this
theory. Banerjee et al. (Banerjee, Jha, Cyriac, Kalbarczyk, & Iyer, 2018)
determined that AVs are 15 to 4000 times worse in crashes per cumulative miles
driven than conventionally driven vehicles. Findings also revealed that as the
automated vehicle miles traveled increases, the frequency of disengagements
decreases (V. V. Dixit, Chand, & Nair, 2016; F. Favarò, Eurich, & Nader, 2018; Lv
et al., 2017).

Safety literature also reveals the limitations of cameras and sensors. Farhadi et al.
(Farhadi, Tabrizi, Endres, & Forsyth, 2009) determined that sensors contend to
accurately identify vulnerable road users and poor weather conditions than
humans. The National Transportation Safety Board (National Transportation
Safety Board, 2017) revealed in the first known fatal crash of automation that the
Tesla Model S could not identify lateral movements due to the vehicle being
equipped with Doppler radars, which is a known handicap of these radars (Kellner,
Barjenbruch, Dietmayer, Klappstein, & Dickmann, 2013). Cyber-attacks, such as
the spoofing of the navigation systems and falsified messages in a connected
environment, can alter the control of the CAVs (Petit & Shladover, 2014). Lastly,
cameras require continuous attention as they cannot contend with coats of dirt and
grim and require frequent calibration (Wan, Huang, & Buckles, 2014).
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Vulnerable Road Users and Special Populations
The communication among road users necessary for an automated system to
manage movement and enhance safety is an important and understudied
component of roadway travel. “[R]oad users employ a variety of communication
methods that include gestures, facial expressions, and built-in vehicular devices,”
which are received in the context of culture and experience (Stanciu et al., 2018).
How will CAVs respond?

There has been limited analysis of how CAVs interact with other road users.
Millard-Ball (Millard-Ball, 2018) applied game theory to pedestrians’ reactions to
CAVs at crosswalks: “Because AVs will be risk-averse, the model suggests that
pedestrians will be able to behave with impunity, and AVs may facilitate a shift
toward pedestrian-oriented urban neighborhoods.” Hulse et al. (Hulse, Xie, &
Galea, 2018) found CAVs to be perceived as a relatively low-risk mode, with little
opposition to their use on public roads. Pedestrians and cyclists may become
increasingly comfortable with and positive about CAVs if they are exposed to the
vehicles on public roads (Penmetsa, Adanu, Wood, Wang, & Jones, 2019).

Traffic conditions (volume and speed) are known to affect non-motorized travelers,
but this dynamic in the CAV environment has been little studied (Blau, Akar, &
Nasar, 2018). Deb et al. (Deb et al., 2017) used scenario-based surveys to probe
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pedestrian intention and behavior around AVs. People who exhibited desirable
walking behavior also believed that automation will enhance travel safety, while
aggressive walkers who violate rules were more confident about crossing in front
of AVs.

How will AVs communicate with other road users in a mixed-traffic urban setting?
Pedestrians surveyed about interacting with AVs felt safer when separated from
vehicles in designated lanes rather than sharing space; most believed they had
priority over automated vehicles in the absence of infrastructure (Merat, Jamson,
Lai, & Carsten, 2012). All respondents valued receiving information about vehicle
behavior—particularly their visibility to the automated vehicles.

Shared-space models that eliminate barriers separating vehicles from pedestrians
are gaining traction as a way to calm traffic and enliven urban spaces. Although
this model seems potentially consonant with a CAV environment, “vulnerable road
users such as vision-impaired people do not share this enthusiasm [and] perceive
shared space as likely to bring them into increasing contact with motor vehicles,
and as compromising their safety and well-being” (Imrie, 2012).

Technology innovations are disrupting the status quo and reshaping travel
patterns, with new tools to improve safety and ease driving, and advance shared
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mobility and automation. “As vehicle technologies become more automated,
navigation around and interactions with pedestrians and bicyclists in complex
travel environments will determine their success” (Sandt & Owens, 2017). Broad
public adoption may not occur until bicycle and pedestrian safety improves—yet
non-motorized safety and health lag in AV discussions and research.

Attitude, Perceptions and Willingness to Adopt CAVs
Willingness to adopt CAVs will depend not only on technology and policy support,
but also on attitudes and perceptions of travelers. The content and type of
information provided to them, moderated by gender and nationality, may play a
role (Anania et al., 2018), as may education about the benefits of shared CAVs.
Psychology and innovation also may be relevant (König & Neumayr, 2017).

Bansal et al. (Bansal, Kockelman, & Singh, 2016) reported that survey
respondents identified fewer crashes as the primary benefit of automation, and
equipment failure their prime concern; stated willingness-to-pay for CAVs was
higher for full automation than for partial. In a study of attitudes about technology,
environment, and travel, Haboucha et al. (Haboucha, Ishaq, & Shiftan, 2017) found
general hesitation towards CAV adoption, with early adopters likely to be younger,
more educated people who spend more time in vehicles. Kyriakidis et al.
(Kyriakidis, Happee, & de Winter, 2015) found a preference for manual driving, and
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concerns about software hacking and data misuse, legal questions, and safety. A
review (Axsen & Sovacool, 2019) of the emerging state of knowledge about likely
patterns and space for uptake of new mobility technology noted large gaps in
understanding about decision behavior.

Nielsen and Haustein (Nielsen & Haustein, 2018) sorted Danish drivers by their
AV stance: skeptics (38%), indifferents (37%) and enthusiasts (25%). The
enthusiasts were typically male, young, highly educated urban dwellers, while
skeptics were older, car-reliant residents of less urban places. Their most-valued
features of CAVs align with other studies: free time and liberation from driving
duties, with some variation among the three profiles. Car ownership was preferred
to sharing. Nordhoff et al. (Nordhoff, De Winter, Kyriakidis, Van Arem, & Happee,
2018) identified attitudes relevant to CAV adoption, including thrill-seeking,
wanting manual control, supporting a car-free environment, and comfort with
technology.

Research into the cognitive underpinnings of CAV attitudes has yielded mixed
results. Sanbonmatsu et al. (Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, Yu, Biondi, & Cooper, 2018)
found that people with little knowledge or low trust in technology had more negative
views about CAVs. Consumers were both confident in their views of driverless
cars, and uninformed about them. Generational differences may be at play, with
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millennials responding differently (Woldeamanuel & Nguyen, 2018). The ‘betterthan-average’ effect, whereby most people consider themselves better-thanaverage drivers, may require a higher threshold for user uptake, when willingness
to accept CAVs is rooted largely in perceived safety (Nees, 2019).

The Transition to CAVs
Transformative travel technology is at hand, although the transition may be rocky
as we approach a period when CAVs impact driving, infrastructure and insurance
regimes in ways that are likely to be dramatic, disruptive—and uncertain. “Human
ingenuity overcomes these challenges in the long run, but rarely gets it right the
first time” (Narla, 2013).

Shladover (Shladover, 2018) distinguishes between connected (CV) and
automated vehicles (AV), and notes that CV systems have been a major
component of intelligent transportation system (ITS) technology development,
given the wide range of ITS applications CVs use and the opportunity to integrate
vehicles and infrastructure into effective transportation systems. The history of AVs
is longer and more turbulent, but “AV systems can improve transportation system
operations when they are combined with CV systems.”

Skepticism lingers around the potential for CAVs to improve safety and the driving
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experience; AVs still are perceived by many as unreliable and unsafe. In the runup to full automation, partially automated vehicles involve a hand-off function
between automated and human control that raises challenges, including situations
where “drivers who depend on autonomous control systems experience stress
upon switching to manual control after a system failure” (Arakawa, Hibi, & Fujishiro,
2018). Dixit et al. (V. V. Dixit et al., 2016) report that trust in automated systems
and comfort with disengagement (automated/human handover) may grow as use
and familiarity increase.

Despite general consensus that CAVs will substantially reduce crashes and
fatalities, the transition period carries risk of collisions with human-driven vehicles
(McMurry, Poplin, Shaw, & Panzer, 2018). At the intersection of driver behavior
and new technologies (Robertson, Meister, Vanlaar, & Hing, 2017), many drivers,
believing they would be released from attending to road conditions, may act in
ways that undermine safety goals, with implications for education, government
policy, and programs to increase the likelihood that promised CAV safety benefits
actually materialize.

Emerging technology offers not only new flexibility in transportation management
and control, but also big-data opportunities to more easily and inexpensively
collect, store, analyze, use, and disseminate data. “Given the benefits of a
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connected environment, it is crucial that we understand how the current intelligent
transportation system could be adapted to the connected environment” (Sumalee
& Ho, 2018).

Ethical and Legal Considerations
The same CAV technology that makes physical infrastructure safer and more
efficient also raises legal considerations involving product liability, enforcement
and regulation, privacy and security, and insurance regimes (Glancy, 2013, 2015).
The many deaths and injuries that may be saved by displacing human drivers
argue persuasively for policies that will promote the swift adoption of CAV
technologies. However, despite brisk technological progress in recent years, “there
is widespread concern that the rate of development is hampered by uncertainty
about manufacturer liabilities” for crashes (Geistfeld, 2017).

By relieving humans of the driving task, CAVs increase the exposure of
manufacturers’ product liability in ways that are hard for industry to quantify. This
may dampen the willingness of the public to accept certain safety risks from CAVs,
and slow their introduction to the market. “This is not necessarily a good thing if it
means that the introduction to the market of automated cars that are statistically
safer than human driven cars is delayed in order to reach a higher level of safety”
(Schellekens, 2015).
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In theory, fully autonomous cars would eliminate the human errors that cause the
vast majority of road crashes. In reality, automated cars rely on coding to respond
to road conditions, which are lacking ethics unless intentionally written in:
“technology is imperfect and often only as good as the humans either programming
it, feeding it information, or operating it” (Ravid, 2014). Drury et al. (Drury, Lucia, &
Caruso, 2017) call for ethics-grounded analysis before CAVs are integrated into
the larger transportation system. Goodall (Goodall, 2014) argues that AVs almost
certainly will experience crashes, in some cases following choices that have a
moral component even in the absence of a pathway for coding human morals into
the technology.

The expected reduction in accidents notwithstanding, CAVs will sometimes face
ethics-laden and death- or injury-inflicting choices in interactions with other
travelers. The daunting challenge of writing code to guide AVs is tied in with
attitudes about utilitarian (least total social harm) programming and willingness to
buy or use CAVs with various algorithms, with implications for the speed at which
life-saving technology may penetrate the market (Bonnefon, Shariff, & Rahwan,
2016).

Who should be liable for accidents involving CAVs? Responsibility for crashes in
the CAV environment concerns not only technology but also legal, moral and
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ethical considerations, user acceptance, and impacts on the transportation system
(Heinrichs & Cyganski, 2015; Hevelke & Nida-Rümelin, 2015; Keeling, 2018;
Sparrow & Howard, 2017). Gurney (Gurney, 2017) used four driver profiles to
consider potential liability of CAV manufacturers (distracted, diminished
capabilities, disabled, and attentive drivers), arguing that assignment of liability
should depend on the driver’s character and the extent to which the driver could
prevent an accident.

Are fatal crashes a necessary trade-off—the cost of the many promised benefits
of CAVs? JafariNaimi (JafariNaimi, 2018) argues that “an undue optimism and
enthusiasm about this technology is obscuring our ability to see what is at stake,”
and that we must move beyond the dominant utilitarian arguments and pursue both
ethical inquiry and innovative design as a point of departure for rethinking mobility
for people, communities, and the planet.

Renda (Renda, 2018) notes that missing from the ethics/AI discourse are
questions such as human control over machines, data governance and ownership,
algorithmic accountability and transparency, user empowerment within controlled
systems, tort rules, and ethical programming; with current legal structures illequipped to address these questions, “a mapping of outstanding ethical and policy
dilemmas is a useful starting point for a thorough overhaul of public policies in this
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ever-expanding domain.”

Governance and Policy
As disruptive technology, CAVs offer both dramatic opportunity and daunting
challenges for our transportation systems, impacting safety, congestion, costs, and
ultimately travel demand and behavior. Fagnant and Kockelman (Fagnant &
Kockelman, 2015) call for expanded federal research funding and a “nationally
recognized licensing framework for AVs, determining appropriate standards for
liability, security, and data privacy.” Khan et al. (Khan, Bacchus, & Erwin, 2012),
likewise, call for systematic and comprehensive policy to ensure that technology
development maximizes safety and other social benefits and accommodates
future uncertainties. “In just a few years, the prospect of commercially available
self-driving cars and trucks has gone from a futurist fantasy to a likely near-term
reality” (Guerra, 2016), and yet most transportation plans make little mention of
CAVs.

The consensus view: CAVs are on the way, and likely to “transform transportation
infrastructure, expand access, and deliver benefits to a variety of users” (Lari et
al., 2015). This transition will require governance and policy structure, and
research on technology and its regulation (licensing, testing, reliability, and
certification) as well as larger and intertwined goals and systems in public health,
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security, and law (Li, Sui, Xiao, & Chahine, 2018).

The U.S., with both high dependence on motorized travel and a poor safety record
among developed countries, is particularly invested in CAVs. “Public health and
the motor vehicle are inextricably linked. The personal auto has become essential
to modern life for hundreds of millions of households across the world [and] also a
threat to life and health” for vehicle occupants and others (Kelley, 2017).

In the CAV era, policymakers are alert to how people shifting from transit to ridehailing may help or hurt policy objectives. Proactive governments may reap
benefits in safety, mobility, efficiency and equity. Public policy will be needed to
shape and guide CAV technology, just as it did for earlier transportation revolutions
with the advent of railroad, streetcars, and auto: “Cities have a window of
opportunity to shape how the AV is used and must act now to define policies that
minimize risks and maximize the benefits” (Glus et al., 2017).

Policy development for CAVs may be long and difficult. “Today’s road and vehicle
policies are the product of 100 years of lessons learned [on] safety, efficiency,
mobility, convenience, and impact on the environment” (Straub & Schaefer, 2019).
The appearance of CAVs on public roadways raises new policy questions,
including incremental change versus regulatory overhaul, and possible
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unanticipated impacts on traveler safety and welfare. Dixit et al. (V. Dixit, Xiong,
Jian, & Saxena, 2019) note that emerging knowledge about how risk attitudes
impact willingness to accept AVs may offer useful information for developing
insurance, licensing, and design frameworks.

Text Analysis
Statistical pattern learning analysis performed with WordStat on the collection of
180 research papers generated major themes; proximity/conception distances
among them illustrate their interrelationships. Separate analysis of 68 technical
reports generated similar results; for clarity and conciseness, we focus here on the
collection of peer-reviewed research papers.

A frequency analysis was utilized to recognize shared keywords, and an inclusion
dictionary was created to categorize related words. An exclusion dictionary
identified common but non-instructive words (e.g., “table” or “figure”) to be omitted
from analysis. Natural language processing was used in conjunction with factor
analysis to enhance the collection inclusion dictionary. Table 2.1 presents the
results of the topic extraction, which generated topics that fall into in general
groupings related to:


vehicles



technology
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travel



safety



governance



attitude and perception

Results

Eigenvalues may be described as factors with the most extensive coverage, or
variance; higher Eigenvalues denote more important concepts. Values higher than
one (all those in Table 2.1) suggest topics that should be explored further (69). The
“automated vehicles” factor appears 39,079 times in 173 of the 180 research
papers in the collection, and has an Eigenvalue of 1.62 with a 0.59% variance. The
highest Eigenvalue was the “vehicle operator” (a person operating a “self-driving”
vehicle) factor with an Eigenvalue of 3.33, explaining 0.66% of the variance.
Notably, “public health” and “willingness to pay” factors were mentioned in 150
(94.94%) of the papers in the database.

Multidimensional scaling (MDS) produced a concept map to illustrate the proximity
of the keywords in Table 2.1 (Provalis). Theoretically, words closer together tend
to occur near one another in text, with the distance between two points indicating
coloring co-occur. Figure 2.1 illustrates the clustering of connected predominant
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Table 2.1 Results of topics extraction through factor analysis
Broader
Category
Vehicle-related

Topic
Shared
autonomous
vehicles

Product liability

Vehicle
dynamics

Automated
vehicles

Vehicle type

Technology

Vehicular
network
Collision
avoidance
Security and
privacy

Moral and ethics

Keywords
Mobility;
services;
sharing;
shared;
ownership;
private;
service;
demand; SAV
Liability;
product;
manufacturer;
defect; tort;
consumer
Lateral;
longitudinal;
volatility;
acceleration;
distance;
speed;
headway
Autonomous;
car; Google;
driving;
driverless;
vehicles;
automated;
connected
LLM;
conventional;
network;
electric
Ad hoc;
networks;
vehicular
Collision;
avoidance;
warning; rear
Security;
privacy;
attacks;
cybersecurity;
IOT, concerns
Necessity;
doctrine;
moral; killing;
killing; legal;
utilitarian;
problem;
harm
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Eigen
value
1.99

%
Variance
0.63

Freque
ncy
6217

Cas
es
163

%
Cases
90.56

1.96

0.64

2337

123

68.83

1.70

0.66

3768

166

92.22

1.62

0.59

39079

173

96.11

1.32

0.51

1721

131

72.78

2.21

0.79

1694

118

65.56

1.77

0.63

2139

135

75.00

1.84

0.60

2334

126

70.00

1.58

0.61

2097

139

77.22

Table 2.1. Continued.
Broader
Category

Topic
Wireless
communication

Perception and
planning

Failure

Internet of things

Impacts

Energy
consumption

Safety

Vehicle operator

Public health

Vulnerable road
users
Crashes

Smart cities

Keywords
Wireless;
communicatio
n; DSRC;
applications;
infrastructure
Sensors;
LIDAR;
localization;
GPS;
detection;
map;
perception;
sensor
Fault; tree;
failure;
probability
Internet;
things;
computing;
IOT; cloud;
devices; fog
Emissions;
energy;
congestion;
fuel; travel;
impacts;
demand
Task; driving;
automation;
workload;
vigilance;
performance;
level
Public; health;
transport;
policies; HAV
Crossings;
pedestrians;
behaviour
Fatalities;
injuries;
crashes;
severity;
police;
Google;
reported;
incidents
Urban;
planning;
areas; city;
parking;
smart
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Eigen
value
1.55

%
Variance
0.60

Freque
ncy
3611

Cas
es
148

%
Cases
82.22

1.42

0.56

2932

147

81.67

1.40

0.54

1034

115

63.89

1.37

0.60

1765

129

71.67

1.51

0.59

4631

157

87.22

3.33

0.66

18923

172

95.56

1.53

0.54

6246

168

93.33

1.47

0.54

3066

138

76.67

1.45

0.59

4306

165

91.67

1.35

0.57

4200

164

91.11

Table 2.1. Continued.
Broader
Category
Governance

Eigen
%
Freque
Cas %
Keywords
value
Variance ncy
es
Cases
Federal;
1.40
0.61
3121
159
88.33
regulatory;
tort; state;
law;
regulations
Attitude and
Acceptance
Age; gender;
1.72
0.59
3522
162
90.00
perception
male;
perceived;
risk;
passenger;
ratings
Vehicle testing
DMV;
1.65
0.61
2505
151
83.89
disengageme
nts;
California;
testing;
reported
Attitudes
Positive;
1.43
0.55
5634
165
91.67
attitude;
respondents;
automated
Innovation
Disruptive;
1.37
0.55
2988
158
87.78
technologies;
technological;
innovations
Market
Penetration;
1.36
0.57
1590
137
76.11
penetration
market;
capacity
Willingness to
WTP; income; 1.33
0.57
4282
168
93.33
pay
household;
respondents;
level
Modeling
Model; logit;
1.27
0.52
4593
166
92.22
simulation;
choice;
acceptance
Note: SAV – shared autonomous vehicle, LLM – low-speed, low mass, DSRC – dedicated short range
communications, LIDAR – light detection and ranging, IOT– internet-of-things, HAV – highly automated
vehicle, WTP – willingness to pay, DMV – department of motor vehicles
Topic
Regulation;
standards
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Figure 2.1 Concept map of words across key topics
47

words in the database. The most prevalent cluster is the AV keywords in the lower
left. Crash keywords are clustered adjacent to various vehicle technology
keywords, such as collision avoidance and location-based clusters. Interestingly,
the vehicle testing cluster serves as a bridge between product liability and
automated vehicles. The concept map is informative for identifying key topics
related to past research on CAV safety, and serves to complement but not replicate
analysis of the collection of documents. Topics scoring high include shared
mobility, smart cities, moral and ethics, product liability, security and privacy,
technology, and public health.

Discussion

The literature reveals several major themes, echoed by the text analysis. These
include uncertainty about the approaching CAV transition and implications for
safety; the need for new policy and governance structures, and liability and
insurance regimes; an array of interested parties and stakeholders who may not
all be coordinating or communicating; and the lagging discussion and action
among some relevant professional communities.

Research needs fall in several major domains: technical research to support
safety-relevant technology and applications with potential societal benefits; policy
48

research to assess regulatory, institutional, and legal challenges to adopting
automated vehicles and reaping safety gains; CAV adoption mechanisms that
engage stakeholders in data sharing and collaboration; and travel behavior and
safety in the CAV environment. Research needs include:

Technology
What are the safety claims for CAVs; who is making them; and who stands to gain
from the claims and their acceptance? How do CAV safety and health claims
accord with reality?

In the Big Data era, how can and should useful data generated by CAVs be
extracted, stored and used to advance safety?

How might automation and connectivity technologies (e.g., collision avoidance or
intersection movement assist enabled by V2V and V2I) impact human errors and
various types of crashes (e.g., roadway departures, rear-end, head-on)?

How might simulation and carefully designed field experiments help us generate
new knowledge needed to reduce uncertainties associated with CAV impacts on
safety?
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With increasing vehicle automation, which safety countermeasures will become
less important (e.g., rumble strips) and which ones may gain salience (e.g., lane
markings)?

Can technology be made adaptive—to evolve along with changing expectations
and human behavior?

Fundamental research on technologies, including sensors and artificial
intelligence, should continue, although these are out of scope for this review.

Policy
What policy issues and guidelines need to be implemented in order to facilitate a
smooth and orderly transition to CAVs? How might federal policy and guidance
intersect with other governance structures?

What is the level of public knowledge and expectations about “driverless cars” now,
and how might it change in the future? How could knowledge about public
perception and behavior be used to accelerate CAV deployment?

CAV Adoption and Acceptance
To what extent is the pace of CAV acceptance hindered by resistance from a wary
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public, concerned about safety and privacy?

To what extent is the pace of CAV acceptance hindered by the uncertain legal
landscape and industry concerns about liability?

Travel Safety and Health
What safety problems do CAVs solve? What new safety challenges do CAVs
raise?

Whose safety will be prioritized? Might different algorithms privilege different
travelers, e.g., CAV occupants, non-motorized?

If CAVs encourage freeform street-crossing and reduce on-street parking, will
walking become more attractive? Or might door-to-door service dampen walking?

What unintended consequences will CAVs introduce? Might extreme efficiency
produce overly smooth and compact CAV platooning that makes it harder for
pedestrians to travel?

For complex urban environments where CAVs interact with human-driven
vehicles, pedestrians and bicyclists, is there a critical mass or threshold required
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to realize the benefits of CAVs?

Conclusion

This paper integrated and synthesized research on the safety impacts of CAVs,
expanding on a literature review with text analysis. The resulting meta-analysis
contributes to the field by identifying major themes, highlights gaps in the literature,
and points to needed research directions—representative but not exhaustive. This
review may be useful for not only researchers, but also practicing planners,
engineers, and public health experts. The analysis conducted in this paper is
replicable, with search terms and knowledge bases customized to specific needs.
The output necessarily reflects a synthesis of the inputs; that is, the search terms
employed affect the themes and frequencies generated. Using other search terms
and

other

rules

for

selecting

literature

will

affect

the

output.

Our review of the literature suggests that substantial reductions in crashes, injury
and fatalities may be anticipated with deep penetration of CAVs, but not
necessarily the extreme gains (>90% crash reduction) projected by some writers.
Evolving technology and regulatory landscapes, and human behavioral
adjustments in response to them, may produce unintended consequences that
amplify or dampen the projected gains at levels difficult to estimate. The unfolding
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and intertwined evolution of technology, policy and social accommodations are
likely to produce substantially safer—but not risk-free—conditions for travelers.
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CHAPTER THREE
EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF AUTOMATED VEHICLE
CRASHES IN CALIFORNIA: A TEXT ANALYSIS &
HIERARCHICAL BAYESIAN HETEROGENEITY-BASED
APPROACH
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This chapter presents a modified version of a research paper by Alexandra M.
Boggs, Asad J. Khattak, and Behram Wali. The paper (No. 19-05567) was
presented at the 98th Annual Meeting of Transportation Research Board in
Washington, D.C. The paper is forthcoming in Accident Analysis and Prevention.

Abstract

Automated vehicles (AVs) represent an opportunity to reduce crash frequency by
eliminating driver error, as safety studies reveal human error contributes to the
majority of crashes. To provide insights into the contributing factors of AV crashes,
this study created a unique database from the California Department of Motor
Vehicles 124 manufacturer-reported Traffic Collision Reports and was linked with
detailed data on roadway and built-environment attributes. A novel text analysis
was first conducted to extract useful information from crash report narratives. Of
the crashes that could be geocoded (N = 113), results indicate the most frequent
AV crash type was rear-end collisions (61.1%; N = 69) and 13.3% (N = 15) were
injury crashes. These noteworthy outcomes and a small sample size motivated us
to rigorously analyze rear-end and injury crashes in a Full Bayesian empirical
setup. Owing to the potential issue of unobserved heterogeneity, hierarchicalBayes fixed and random parameter logit models are estimated. Results reveal that
when the automated driving system is engaged and remains engaged, the
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likelihood of an AV-involved rear-end crash is substantially higher compared to a
conventionally-driven AV or when the driver disengages the automated driving
system prior to a crash. Given the AV-involved crashes, the likelihood of an AVinvolved rear-end crash was significantly higher in mixed land-use settings
compared to other land-use types, and was significantly lower near public/private
schools. Correlations of other roadway attributes and environmental factors with
AV-involved rear-end and injury crash propensities are discussed. This study aids
in understanding the interactions of AVs and human-driven conventional vehicles
in complex urban environments

Introduction

The government and private sector industries are committed to taking initiatives to
reach zero motor vehicle fatalities and serious injuries on the United States
roadway system. In 2016, there were 37,461 fatalities, a 5.6 percent increase since
2015 (National Center for Statistics and Analysis, 2017). Economically, the death
and injury costs per year neared $871 billion and congestion costs approached
$160 billion per year (Blincoe, Miller, Zaloshnja, & Lawerence, 2015). While there
is wide uncertainty on the exact benefits of automation (Shay, Khattak, & Boggs,
2019; Shay, Khattak, & Wali, 2018), many scholars believe vehicle automation will
provide a potential solution to transportation-related issues in safety, efficiency,
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mobility, and energy consumption (De Winter, Happee, Martens, & Stanton, 2014;
Fagnant & Kockelman, 2015; Todd Litman, 2014; Merat, Jamson, Lai, Daly, &
Carsten, 2014; Milakis et al., 2017; Shladover, 2018). Given that human error
contributes to more than 90 percent of crashes (Singh, 2015), the automation of
vehicles represents an opportunity to significantly mitigate the main contributing
factor and increase transportation safety. Studies have mixed forecasts on the
safety benefits of highly automated vehicles, SAE International Levels 3-5, as
human adaptation, increased vehicle miles traveled, and software and hardware
vulnerabilities could adversely outweigh the benefits (Fagnant & Kockelman, 2015;
Todd; Litman, 2017; Wadud, MacKenzie, & Leiby, 2016). Road and intersection
capacities are projected to increase as higher levels of cooperation will increase
through the advanced technology (Fagnant & Kockelman, 2015). Mobility is
expected to increase as shared automated vehicles have the possibility to
decrease vehicle ownership and provide transportation for underrepresented
users (Johnson & Walker, 2016; Keeney, 2017). Energy consumption caused by
vehicle automation is expected to lower nitrogen oxide (NOx), carbon monoxide
(CO), and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions through platooning, mitigating
congestion, increasing the presence of electric vehicles, and improving crash
avoidance (Anderson et al., 2014; Arbib & Seba, 2017; Berry, 2010; Wadud et al.,
2016).
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As of early 2019, federal government leaders in Congress and Senate have not
passed legislation for these emerging vehicles, but have developed similar legal
frameworks in the House of Representatives’ Safely Ensuring Lives Future
Deployment and Research in Vehicle Evolution (SELF DRIVE) Act and the
Senate’s American Vision for Safer Transportation through Advancement of
Revolutionary Technologies (AV START) Act (115th Congress, 2017a, 2017b). In
the meantime, the United States Department of Transportation has provided
guidance while the majority of the states have enacted legislation and/or signed
executive orders (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2018; U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2018). With the enactment of California Senate Bill
1298 ("SB-1298 Vehicles: Autonomous Vehicles: Safety and Performance
Requirements," 2012), the State of California required the Department of Motor
Vehicles (DMV) to adopt regulations that set forth the operation of testing
automated vehicles (AVs). California began, in September of 2014, allowing
permit-holding companies and manufacturers to test AVs on the roadways,
including freeways, highways, and local streets (State of California Department of
Motor Vehicles). When AVs are involved in a crash, companies are required to
submit a Traffic Collision Involving an Autonomous Vehicle Report (OL 316) with
the corresponding information and a narrative describing the event (State of
California Department of Motor Vehicles). The requirements state, “The
manufacturer shall identify on the form, by name and current address, if available,
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all persons involved in the collision, and a full description of how the collision
occurred."

Road safety is a complex issue and is affected by an array of risk factors, e.g.,
driver, environment, and vehicle factors. AVs, especially at varying levels of
automation, will play a prominent role in transportation safety. Given the
uncertainties of AVs on safety, this study utilizes the publicly available Traffic
Collision Reports of AV crashes in California to quantify the pre-crash and location
factors that affect rear-end and injury AV-involved crashes. Thus, this study
contributes to the literature by aiding transportation professionals to more
accurately assess the safety performance of AVs in complex urban environments.

Literature Review

Despite the fact there are many potential benefits of automated fleet on roadways,
there are also possible adverse effects. Offsetting behavior, where drivers take
risks due to a sense of security, and rebound effects, where travel is less expensive
and less time consuming, may become more apparent resulting in more vehicular
traffic and a volatile road environment (Todd Litman, 2014) (Kockelman et al.,
2016). The Literature also reveals that drivers may use their travel times to
accomplish leisure activities (Gucwa, 2014) can potentially cause drivers to
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impede the visual monitoring of their surrounding environment, inhibiting their
anticipation of possible events (Barnard & Lai, 2010; Carsten, Lai, Barnard,
Jamson, & Merat, 2012; Metz, Schömig, & Krüger, 2011). Jamson et al. (Jamson,
Merat, Carsten, & Lai, 2013) investigated drivers’ behavior in AVs with varying
traffic conditions and found a larger traffic density resulted in more alert drivers
when compared to a smaller traffic density. Changing from autonomous mode to
conventional mode, also called vehicle takeover, has been thoroughly investigated
in the human factors realm. Depending on the scenario, repossessing the authority
of the vehicle could transpire up to 40 seconds, increasing the likelihood of serious
incidents (Merat et al., 2014). This lengthy response time could be associated with
cognitive underload, where drivers have minimal effort in the driving experience
(Young & Stanton, 2002).

Apparent safety issues of AVs have arisen within the past years in the literature.
Identifying pedestrians and poor weather conditions are more harder for AVs
sensors than human drivers (Farhadi et al., 2009). Interactions between human
beings and AVs have occurred mostly on test bays, and more recently, they are
being performed on open roadways with an experienced engineer foreseeing
possible failure events (Banks & Stanton, 2016; Llaneras, Salinger, & Green, 2013;
Walker, Stanton, & Salmon, 2011). The fatal crash of the Level 2 Tesla Model S in
Williston, Florida triggered the interest of not only manufacturers and policymakers,
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but also the attention of the public as seen in Figure 3.1 (Google). Investigators in
this crash determined the automated system was not designed to identify the
lateral movement of the tractor-trailer, causing the vehicle not to engage the
brakes. Instead, the driver was stated to be over-relying on the automation of the
vehicle and utilizing the advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) in the incorrect
operational design domain (ODD) (National Transportation Safety Board, 2017).
More recently, the fatal pedestrian crash by Uber’s Level 3 testing vehicle in
Tempe, Arizona illustrated the inability of the automated driving system (ADS) to
recognize the pedestrian until 1.3 seconds before impact. The emergency braking
maneuvers from Volvo’s City Safety were disabled due to the vehicle being in
autonomous mode to prevent the possibility of unpredictable vehicle behavior
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2018b). Tempe Police Department recently
released its report on the crash and concluded the vehicle operator was streaming
a television episode through a personal mobile device and not properly monitoring
the environment (Tempe Police Department, 2018).

Recent application of the publicly available California AV dataset has included
researchers conducting largely exploratory data analysis of the limited crash
samples (F. M. Favarò et al., 2017; Sivak & Schoettle, 2015; Teoh & Kidd, 2017).
One of these studies (Sivak & Schoettle, 2015) compared conventional vehicle and
AV crashes by assuming the distribution of unreported conventional crash types
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Note: The search interest is based on the maximum point of the time period, where an interest of 100 is peak popularity, and a 50 is half as popular.

Figure 3.1 Keyword searches on Google Trends (Google)
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have the same distribution as low-severity AVs even though the majority of AVs
are rear-ends (N = 8 out 11 crashes studied) compared to nearly half of
conventional vehicles. Nevertheless, the authors determined that AVs may
potentially not be safer than the ordinary human driver as the crash rates are more
than twice than that of conventional vehicles, but not statistically significant.
Additionally, as the penetration rate of automated vehicles increase, it may
increase the total number of crashes due to the integration of the two
configurations of vehicles. Teoh and Kidd (Teoh & Kidd, 2017) determined that the
crash rates of automated vehicles were lower than baseline vehicles even though
it was not statistically significant. The authors believe that since Google cars are
frequently struck from the rear, the system might cause the vehicles to brake
unexpectedly even though there is not any confirmation in the police reports.
Favarò et al. (F. M. Favarò et al., 2017) examined 26 of the AV-involved crashes
by describing the driver engagement pre- and post-crash, the relative speed of
involved vehicles, crash locations, and makes of the involved vehicles. Further,
more recent studies have recognized the most frequent type of crashes was rearends predominantly AVs being struck by a conventional vehicle (Arvin, Kamrani,
Khattak, & Rios-Torres, 2018b; Arvin, Khattak, & Rios Torres, 2019b; V. V. Dixit et
al., 2016; F. M. Favarò et al., 2017; Wang & Li, 2019a). Additionally, these crashes
commonly occur at intersections.
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A key gap in the literature is a thorough and rigorous understanding of AV crashes
and associated risk factors. Given this gap, this study aims to examine and quantify
an array of AV crash characteristics (roadway characteristics, built-environment,
and pre-crash behavior), by dissecting the crash narratives in the Traffic Collision
Reports and modeling the most frequent type of crash, AV-involved rear-end, and
the occurrence of an injury. By doing so, it will help in creating a more complete
picture of AV crashes and aid in understanding the implications of these vehicles.

Data Preparation

Data Sources
The DMV in California allowed for AV manufacturers to test the automated systems
on the transportation network by establishing an Autonomous Vehicle Tester
Program in 2014 (State of California Department of Motor Vehicles, 2018b). In
accordance with California Vehicle Code Section 38750, permit holders are
obligated to meet California DMV requirements and apply to be a part of the
program. The two primary requirements of the program are manufacturers must
report all AV crashes through the OL 316 form and must fully retain all the details
of the disengagement of the ADS. Notably, AVs in conventional mode are still
required to submit reports to the DMV, and each manufacturer must submit a
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disengagement report by the first of each year that dissects each disengagement
and automated vehicle miles traveled (AVMT) by month. These types of vehicles
are considered to be conditional automation (Level 3) where the system is
performing the driving task, but the driver is expected to take over manual control
if there is a foreseen incident. As of November 30, 2018, a total of 124 AV crashes
in Contra Costa, Santa Clara, and San Francisco counties were publicly published
on the online database, with a total of 55 permit holders. Examples of
manufactured-reported OL 316 forms in the database can be seen in Figure 3.2
(State of California Department of Motor Vehicles, 2018b). Notably, the DMV
revised the OL 316 forms in 2017, and manufacturers began using the revised
form in April 2018. For this study, 59 crashes utilized the revised OL 316 form,
which provided more insights on the damage location and severity of the AV,
weather, lighting, roadway surface, pre-crash vehicle movements, and other
associated factors.

To obtain a deeper understanding of roadway attributes and built-environments on
AV crashes, explanatory variables are obtained through Caltrans California
Highway

System

(https://caltrans.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html),

TransBASE:

Linking Transportation Systems to Our Health (http://transbasesf.org/transbase/),
and Google Earth (https://www.google.com/earth). Significant efforts were
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a)

b)
Note: Page 2 of the revised report in b) is omitted due to space limitations and font requirements

Figure 3.2 Examples of a) Original (1023) and b) Revised (2/2017) Report of Traffic
Collision Involving an Autonomous Vehicle (OL 316) (State of California
Department of Motor Vehicles, 2018b)
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conducted when manually extracting features from these databases and linking
them to the crash sites. Roadway features include speed limit, street width, slope,
number of lanes along segment, number of lanes at crash site, street classification,
one-way street, divided median, marked pavement centerline, conditions of
pavement markers, bike lanes, on-street and off-street parking, traffic calming
devices, sidewalks, street lights, metro stop along segment, number of driveways,
and trees. To understand the role of the surrounding environment on the crashes,
variables were collected including land-use, count of parks within a quarter-mile,
and count of schools within a quarter-mile.

Text Mining of Narrative for Data Creation and Structuring
AVs are expected to improve traffic safety through the amount of real-time data
collected, processed, and stored by the systems. While these data are not publicly
accessible, the 124 Traffic Collision Report narratives generated and submitted by
the manufacturers from the inauguration of the California Autonomous Tester
Program in September 2014 to November 2018 were used to holistically
understand the AV-involved crash events before manually extracting information
from individual manufacturer-submitted crash reports. As the AVMT at the vehicle
level is not provided, we could not compare the exposure of the different AVs
involved in the crashes. The AVMT of the individual AVs in the related crashes
vary; therefore, the direct comparison of keywords may not be fully appropriate.
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However, with the data available, the text analysis still informs the subsequent data
collection process in a helpful way.

Through the utilization of WordStat, statistical content analysis was performed on
the collision narratives from the reports. To identify shared words among the
reports, frequency analysis of the keywords and key phrases was generated, as
shown in Figure 3.3. Results of the text analytics allow the conceptualization of two
binary logit model specifications: rear-end crash versus other types of crash and
stated injury versus no stated injury. Phrases like “rear bumper”, “front bumper”,
and “rear ended” provide insight on the frequent type of crash, and “injuries
reported at the scene”, “sustained minor”, and other variations illustrated the
presence or absence of injuries.

Further, the results of the frequency analysis assisted in the information collected
during the manual extraction of crash narratives. Manufacturers who are frequently
involved in crashes include Waymo/Google and GM Cruise according to Figure
3.3. El Camino Real and Mountain View are locations of recurrent crashes, with
the majority occurring at intersections. The reoccurring degree of driver
engagement is when the ADS is engaged rather than being in conventional mode,
as seen in the expression “operating in autonomous mode.” Vehicles making a left
turn appear to be involved in repeated crashes, as it is a common term. In
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Figure 3.3 Phrases and keyword frequency in crash narratives using text mining
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summary, the frequency analysis illustrated the following variables can be
collected from the crash reports: manufacturer, mode of AV engagement, crash
location, type of crash, reported injuries, speed, turning movement, and vehicle
damage. Further details of the information extracted is to follow.

After text mining the Traffic Collision Reports narratives, the documents were
manually examined. Approximate latitude and longitude for each crash were
obtained and plotted in ArcGIS. As previously mentioned, manufacturers selfreport the incidents and seldom provide adequate crash details. Of the 124
crashes, 11 crashes could not be precisely geocoded due to this reason. Not
providing the cross street, direction of travel, and intersection information were the
primary causes of insufficient location details. As seen in Figure 3.4, the heat map
of AV crashes allows the visualization and the distribution of the crashes among
the counties. While the crash clusters illustrated can be a function of where the AV
manufacturers are testing rather than the risk of the roads, we assume the vendors
are operating in fluctuating roadway conditions and built-environments in these
urban areas as these vehicles will presumably operate throughout the United
States in the future. Therefore, the roadway characteristics and built-environments
of the crashes will further be analyzed.

In addition to geocoding the crashes, significant factors were noted and placed into
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Figure 3.4 Heat map analysis of AV crashes analyzed in this study (N=113)

a database of the 113 crashes. The data that describes each AV crash includes
the temporal crash features (date, time, etc.), location (street, city, county, state),
pre-crash factors (automated system engaged/disengaged, state of vehicles,
intersection, making a turning movement, etc.), severity of crash (injury, property
damage only, and crash characteristics (number of vehicles, type of crash, etc.).
Table 3.1 illustrates the information obtained from this process. The information
was aggregated by the vehicle mode during the collision: fully automated before
impact and system remained engaged, fully automated and driver disengaged
before impact, and conventional mode. By doing so, it allowed more insights of the
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of crashes as provided in OL 316
Variable
Category

Permit
Holder

County

Test Year

Time of Day

AV Code

Conventional
Vehicle Code

AV State
Other Vehicle
State

Variable
Apple, Inc.
Aurora
Innovation
Delphi
Automotive
Drive.ai, Inc.
GM Cruise
LLC
Jingchi Corp
Nissan
Toyota
Research
Institute
UATC LLC
(Uber)
Waymo LLC
Zoox, Inc
Contra Costa
San Francisco
Santa Clara
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Daytime
Nighttime
Unknown
Compact/
Sedan/
Prototype
Van/Minivan
SUV
Compact/
Sedan
Van/Minivan
SUV
Truck/box
truck/bus
Others
Unknown
Stopped
Moving
Stopped
Moving
Other

Fully Auto,
Engaged
N
%
1
50.0%

Vehicle Mode
Fully Auto,
Disengaged
N
%
0
0.0%

Conventional
N
%
1
50.0%

N
2

Total
%
1.8%

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

1

100.0%

1

0.9%

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

1

100.0%

1

0.9%

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

1

100.0%

1

0.9%

39

67.2%

5

8.6%

14

24.1%

58

51.3%

1
0

100.0%
0.0%

0
0

0.0%
0.0%

0
1

0.0%
100.0%

1
1

0.9%
0.9%

1

100.0%

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

1

0.9%

0

0.0%

1

33.3%

2

66.7%

3

2.7%

26
1
1
40
28
0
7
8
17
37
49
15
5

66.7%
20.0%
100.0%
60.6%
60.9%
0.0%
77.8%
53.3%
60.7%
61.7%
62.0%
57.7%
62.5%

5
0
0
6
5
0
2
2
5
2
6
4
1

12.8%
0.0%
0.0%
9.1%
10.9%
0.0%
22.2%
13.3%
17.9%
3.3%
7.6%
15.4%
12.5%

8
4
0
20
13
1
0
5
6
21
24
7
2

20.5%
80.0%
0.0%
30.3%
28.3%
100.0%
0.0%
33.3%
21.4%
35.0%
30.4%
26.9%
25.0%

39
5
1
66
46
1
9
15
28
60
79
26
8

34.5%
4.4%
0.9%
58.4%
40.7%
0.9%
8.0%
13.3%
24.8%
53.1%
69.9%
23.0%
7.1%

46

66.7%

5

7.2%

18

26.1%

69

61.1%

10
13

62.5%
46.4%

2
4

12.5%
14.3%

4
11

25.0%
39.3%

16
28

14.2%
24.8%

33

61.1%

6

11.1%

15

27.8%

54

47.8%

4
10

57.1%
71.4%

1
0

14.3%
0.0%

2
4

28.6%
28.6%

7
14

6.2%
12.4%

7

70.0%

1

10.0%

2

20.0%

10

8.8%

6
9
33
36
0
66
3

37.5%
75.0%
70.2%
54.5%
0.0%
67.3%
37.5%

2
1
1
10
2
8
1

12.5%
8.3%
2.1%
15.2%
28.6%
8.2%
12.5%

8
2
13
20
5
24
4

50.0%
16.7%
27.7%
30.3%
71.4%
24.5%
50.0%

16
12
47
66
7
98
8

14.2%
10.6%
41.6%
58.4%
6.2%
86.7%
7.1%
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Table 3.1. Continued.
Variable
Category
Intersection
AV Turning
Movement
No. of
Vehicles
Involved

Type of
Crash

Stated Injury
Total

Variable
No
Yes
No
Left
Right
1
2
3
Rear-End
Broadside
Side-swipe
Head-on
Other
No
Yes

Fully Auto,
Engaged
N
%
12
40.0%
57
68.7%
45
59.2%
7
53.8%
17
70.8%
3
33.3%
64
62.7%
100.0
2
%
51
73.9%
1
16.7%
14
50.0%
0
0.0%
3
42.9%
59
60.2%
10
66.7%
69
61.1%

Vehicle Mode
Fully Auto,
Disengaged
N
%
4
13.3%
7
8.4%
9
11.8%
1
7.7%
1
4.2%
1
11.1%
10
9.8%

Conventional
N
%
14
46.7%
19
22.9%
22
28.9%
5
38.5%
6
25.0%
5
55.6%
28
27.5%

N
30
83
76
13
24
9
102

Total
%
26.5%
73.5%
67.3%
11.5%
21.2%
8.0%
90.3%

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

2

1.8%

4
0
6
0
1
9
2
11

5.8%
0.0%
21.4%
0.0%
14.3%
9.2%
13.3%
9.7%

14
5
8
3
3
30
3
33

20.3%
83.3%
28.6%
100.0%
42.9%
30.6%
20.0%
29.2%

69
6
28
3
7
98
15
113

61.1%
5.3%
24.8%
2.7%
6.2%
86.7%
13.3%
100%

provide insights regarding the vehicle-at-fault like typical police reports. In the
majority of the crashes, the vehicle was fully automated (61.1%), but in 11 (9.7%)
of the crashes, the vehicle was disengaged by the vehicle operator. There were
83 crashes located at intersections, with 37 occurring when the AV was making a
turning motion. The most common type of collision was rear-ends (61.1%),
followed by side-swipe (24.8%). AVs were struck by a conventional vehicle in all
rear-ends except three occurrences when the AV was manually driven in
conventional mode: twice the AV struck a conventional vehicle and once when the
AV was in reverse rather than drive and attempting to leave a parking stall. Of the
113 crashes, 15 resulted in a stated injury by the involved party members. It was
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clear from the narratives that in one case the ADS was faulty (0.9%) and
contributed to the crash. Hit-and-runs were characterized in 15 (13.2%) of the
incidents, as one of the involved vehicles did not stop to exchange vehicle and
insurance information. As directly reported in the narratives, the AV occupants
called the police 17 times, with the police responding to the crash scene six
instances. Generally, if the crash lacked injured occupants, the police declined to
respond. There were five police reports filed - Traffic Collison Report #14-5925,
#l70989746, and three reports that were not available at the time of the OL 316
filling.

Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of roadway and built-environment
variables used in this study. For the discrete variables, the categories, frequency,
percent, and cumulative percent are provided to visualize the distribution of the
variables. Additionally, the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation are
provided for the continuous variables. The majority of the crashes were located on
arterial roadways. The mean speed limit on these segments was 30 miles per hour
(mph), and the number of lanes ranged from one to six. The slope of roadways
widely varied from 0 to 16% and was dependent on the city as San Francisco has
steeper terrain than the other cities with crashes. Given these areas are highly
urbanized, over 92% (N = 104) of the crashes were located on segments that have
sidewalks on both sides of the roadway and are within a quarter-mile proximity of
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Table 3.2 Description of explanatory variables and descriptive statistics
Variable

Description

Roadway Attributes
Street Classification

One-Way
Divided Median
Marked Centerline
Pavement
Conditions

Markings

Interstate,
freeway, or
expressway
Arterial
Collector
Local
No
Yes
Absence
Presence
Absence
Presence
Poor

Adequate
Absence
Presence
On-street Parking
Absence
Presence
Off-street Parking
Absence
Presence
Traffic Calming
Absence
Presence
Sidewalk
Absence or oneside of segment
Both sides of
segment
Street lights
Absence
Presence
Street width
Width of street in
feet
Speed
Speed limit of
roadway in mph
Slope
Slope in
percentage of
roadway
Driveway
Count of
driveways along
segment
Segment Lanes
Number of lanes
along segment of
travel
Crash Lanes
Number of lanes
at crash site
Environmental Attributes
Metro Stop
Absence
Presence
Trees
Absence
Presence
Bike Lane

Mean/
Percent

S.D./
Frequency

Min

Max

2.7

2.7

1

4

60.2
15.9
21.2
70.8
29.2
69
31
16.8
83.2

62.9
78.8
100
70.8
100
69
31
16.8
100

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

4
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
2

21.2

21.2

1

2

78.8
59.3
40.7
31
69
57.5
42.5
92.9
7.1

100
59.3
100
31
100
57.5
100
92.9
100

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

8

8

1

2

92

100

1

2

7.1
92.9

7.1
100

1
1

2
2

44.34

12.67

20

91

27.96

7.10

15

65

2.59

3.16

0

16

4.17

5.33

0

36

2.57

0.97

1

6

2.65

1.08

1

5

61.9
38.1
8
92

61.9
100
8
100

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
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Table 3.2. Continued.
Variable

Description

Land Use

Commercial
Industrial
Mixed-use or
public
Residential
Count of public
and private
schools within a
quarter-mile
Count of parks
within a quartermile
Unknown*
Clear
Cloudy
Fog/Visibility

Schools

Parks

Weather

Mean/
Percent

S.D./
Frequency

Min

Max

20.4
11.5
36.3

20.4
31.9
68.1

1
1
1

4
4
4

31.9
1.43

100
1.19

1
0

4
5

1.33

1.15

0

5

56.6
38.9
3.5
0.9

64
44
4
1

1
1
1
1

4
4
4
4

Vehicle Speed
AV speed

AV impact speed
3.35
6.67
0
40
in mph**
Conventional vehicle
Conventional
8.30
7.74
0
30
vehicle impact
speed in mph**
Notes: N = 113; (*) initial version of OL 316 did not require manufacturers to indicate the weather conditions
at the time of the collision (see Figure 3.2), (**) crashes without speed values for AVs and conventional
vehicles were noted as unknown and replaced with the mean speed for analysis purposes.

a public or private school and park. Further, approximately 41% (N = 46) were on
segments with a defined bike lane or shared use lane. Thus, illustrating these
locations are used by a high percentage of vulnerable road users. The distribution
of the land-use is distributed almost evenly among commercial, industrial, mixeduse/public, and residential areas.

As previously mentioned, 83 crashes were located at an intersection. Of these, 61
intersections had a signalized traffic control device, and 20 had a partial or all-way
stop. The other two intersections had a yield as a traffic control device. More than
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half of the intersections had multi-directional movement lanes compared to having
lanes only.

Statistical Methodology

As stated earlier, this study focuses on examining the propensity of AV crashes,
injury outcomes given a crash, and its associations with key roadway and
environmental explanatory variables. As seen in Table 3.1, the most prominent AV
crash type was rear-ends, with 69 of the 113 crashes (61.1%). In all cases, except
three manually-driven AV crashes, the AV was rear-ended by a conventional
vehicle. The striking driver is considered to be at least partially or fully negligent in
almost all rear-end collisions. Given this, it was decided to model rear-end
collisions versus other types of collisions in the data. Thus, a detailed empirical
analysis is conducted to understand the correlates of AV involved rear-end
crashes. Additionally, injury crashes (N = 15) are essential in developing the
understanding of characteristics in these crashes. Thus, an in-depth statistical
analysis is conducted for modeling propensity of injury crashes as a function of key
correlates (as outlined in Table 3.1).

Since both rear-end propensity and injury crash propensity are binary response
outcomes, a natural and widely used approach is to use binary logit or probit
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models. A traditional binary logit model has a formulation of the logistic equation
which models the relationship between a dichotomous response outcome, and the
explanatory variables such as crash, roadway geometry, and built-environment
variables. From a modeling standpoint, the frequentist and Bayesian methods can
be used as described next.

Frequentist Binary Logit Models
Let Yi∗ be the latent rear-end crash propensity of an AV (or the injury crash
propensity), i, and that the propensity is unobserved with a specification as follows
(K. E. Train, 2009; Wali, Khattak, & Karnowski, 2018):

Yi∗ = Xi β + ui

(3.1)

Where: Xi is a vector of the crash or AV-specific explanatory variables, β
represents a vector of parameter estimates, and ui is a random disturbance term
(Tay, 2016; K. E. Train, 2009; Wali, Khattak, & Karnowski, 2018). In this case, the
observed response outcome is a dichotomous variable, such that, Yi = 1
represents AV-involved rear-end crash (or injury crash), and Yi = 0 represents no
rear-end crash (or no injury crash), and the observed response outcome is mapped
to the latent representation (Equation 3.1) through the following structural model:
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1 if Yi∗ > 𝟎
Yi = {
0 otherwise

(3.2)

The probability of an AV, i, getting involved in a rear-end crash (or injury crash)
then becomes:
Pi = prob[Xi β + ui > 0]

(3.3)

Pi = prob[ui > (Xi β)]
Pi = 1 − F(−Xi β)

Where: F is the cumulative density function of u. With the assumption that u is
logistically distributed, and with some algebraic manipulations of the probability
statements in Equation 3.3, we get the following succinct, closed-form expression
(Tay, 2016):

P (y = 1, AV − involved rear end crash or injury crash) =

eβo +βX
1 + eβo +βX

(3.4)

Owing to the convenient closed-form, Equation 3.4 can be used to calculate the
expected probability that y = 1 for a given set of values of explanatory factors, X.
The mathematical exposition in Equation 3.1 through 3.4 refers to a traditional
frequentist approach to logistic modeling, which treats the estimable parameters
(β′s in this case) as fixed unknown constants, and the data is considered as
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random (as reflected in the sampling distribution/theory).

Unobserved Heterogeneity in Binary Logit Model
A variety of factors can influence the rear-end and injury crash propensity of an
AV. It is evident that not all factors that may be correlated with rear-end and injury
crash propensity of AVs be observed in any dataset, especially for AV crashes, as
data are rarely available, and when available, it only provides information about a
few key factors. The presence of such unobserved factors can influence the
correlations between observed exogenous variables (such as AV mode of
operation) and observed endogenous variables (such as rear-end and injury crash
propensity). Subsequently, this may be reflected through the possibility of potential
variation in the effects of observed exogenous/explanatory variables on observed
endogenous/dependent variables1(Chand & Dixit, 2018; Hasan, Mesa-Arango, &
Ukkusuri, 2013; Sadri, Ukkusuri, & Murray-Tuite, 2013; Wali, Khattak, & Khattak,

1

Note that when we use causal language to describe the relationship between exogenous variables

and crash propensity, or when we later describe posterior parameter estimates, 𝛽′𝑠, it is only for
heuristic purposes and/or for ease of interpretation. Thus, terminology such as “influence,” “effect,”
“contribution,” or “impact” is used to refer to predictive or correlational relationships, and not causal
dependencies per se. All the findings originating from this study imply correlations only and not
causation of any type or structure.
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2018b). This variation in the effects of observed factors is likely an outgrowth of
possible

systematic

variations

in

the

unobserved/omitted

factors.

This

methodological issue is typically referred to as unobserved heterogeneity in the
literature (F. L. Mannering, Shankar, & Bhat, 2016; K. E. Train, 2009; Wali,
Khattak, & Khattak, 2018b; Wali, Khattak, Waters, Chimba, & Li, 2018b). In the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, reliable and unbiased correlations
between rear-end AV crash propensity (or injury crash propensity) and other
factors cannot be established (F. L. Mannering & Bhat, 2014; Quddus, 2008; Wali,
Ahmed, & Ahmad, 2017). Along these lines, if important factors known to be
correlated with rear-end and injury crash propensity are omitted from the statistical
models, it is possible that observed associations between key factors (such as AV
mode of operation) and rear-end and injury crash occurrence may be an outgrowth
of those omitted factors and not the true association between observed factors (AV
mode of operation) and rear-end crash (injury crash) propensity. Given these
important methodological issues, we account for unobserved heterogeneity by
allowing the model parameters (β's) to vary across sampled crashes in the binary
logit model as:

𝑃 (𝑦 = 1,

𝐴𝑉 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ; 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)
=

𝑒 𝛽𝑖,𝑜 +𝛽𝑖,1 𝑋𝑖1+𝛽𝑖,2𝑋𝑖2 +𝛽𝑖,3 𝑋𝑖3+⋯+𝛽𝑖,𝑁 𝑋𝑖𝑁
1 + 𝑒 𝛽𝑖,𝑜 +𝛽𝑖,1𝑋𝑖1+𝛽𝑖,2 𝑋𝑖2 +𝛽𝑖,3𝑋𝑖3 +⋯+𝛽𝑖,𝑁 𝑋𝑖𝑁
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(3.5)

Where: 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 ~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝛽𝑗 , 𝜎𝑗2 ) for 𝑗 = 0, 1, 2, … , 𝑁, and subscript 𝑖 indicates that the
𝛽′𝑠 are now crash-specific and not constant for the entire data. Regarding
distributions tested for 𝛽𝑖 and the hierarchical parameters, (𝛽𝑗 , 𝜎𝑗2 ), see a detailed
discussion on prior distributions below and the effect of informative/uninformative
priors, especially on the dispersion (variance, standard deviation) terms
associated with random parameters. And similarly, y=1, if the crash involves injury
and 0 otherwise. For further details regarding mathematical exposition in Equation
3.5 and the corresponding multidimensional integral evaluation, see (Dong,
Clarke, Yan, Khattak, & Huang, 2014; El-Basyouny & Sayed, 2009; Wali, Khattak,
Bozdogan, & Kamrani, 2018).

Parameter Estimation – Full Bayesian Inference
To better understand the mechanisms leading to AV-involved rear-end and injury
crashes, we employ a full-Bayesian inference framework for the estimation of fixed
and random parameter logit models. Compared to the traditional frequentist
approach, the full-Bayes estimation technique fuses prior beliefs (in the form of
prior distributions) with the evidence from data at hand (through likelihood function)
to construct posterior distributions of estimable parameters which are then used to
generate inferences. Such technique has several advantages, such as estimation
of discrete outcome models with smaller sample sizes, allowing hierarchies in the
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modeling framework, and more profound insights through parameter distributions
and credible intervals2 (Ahmed, Franke, Ksaibati, & Shinstine, 2018; Boggs,

2

The sample size of AV crashes is small when compared to the ubiquitously available police-

reported conventional vehicle crash data. Despite the small sample, the novel AV crash data still
provides an indispensable opportunity to understand the contributing factors of AV crashes.
Application of traditional frequentist methods in small sample data could lead to biased parameter
estimates. From an estimation standpoint, we avoid the problematic power and biasedness
implications of asymptotic theory arising from the application of frequentist estimators in a small
sample data. To circumvent the asymptotic constraints to the best extent possible, this study
employed a Bayesian modeling framework that does not rely on asymptotic theory making the
Bayesian estimators better equipped to model data with small sample sizes (McNeish, 2016).
Several methodological papers and Monte Carlo simulation studies have noted the advantages of
Bayesian methods (especially in multilevel modeling contexts as is the case in the present study)
over frequentist maximum likelihood estimators in small sample data (Baldwin & Fellingham, 2013;
Gelman, 2006). In addition, the use of carefully specified information priors (discussed later in
detail) further alleviates the power and biasedness issues one would encounter in a frequentist
application or even in a Bayesian application with uninformative priors (as is often the case in the
safety literature) (Gelman et al., 2013; Van De Schoot, Broere, Perryck, Zondervan-Zwijnenburg,
& Van Loey, 2015). While the proposed method is better equipped to deal with the small sample
issue than the traditional frequentist approach, we acknowledge the context-dependency of prior
elicitation (discussed later). With more AV crash data becoming available in future years, the
Bayesian methods and the support for informative priors on heterogeneity scale terms can be better
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Hezaveh, & Cherry; Dong et al., 2014; El-Basyouny & Sayed, 2009; Wali, Khattak,
Bozdogan, et al., 2018). We briefly describe the key elements of Bayesian
parameter estimation, i.e., prior distributions and simulation, below.

Prior Distributions – A case for informative priors on scale parameters:
The Bayesian posterior distributions are derived from likelihood and prior
distributions. As such, it is essential to specify prior distributions for the key crashspecific regression parameters, 𝛽𝑖 , and the hierarchical parameters characterizing
unobserved heterogeneity, 𝛽𝑗 and 𝜎𝑗2 . Three different types of prior distributions
can be used (Ntzoufras, 2011): (a) strong informative prior distributions based on
expert knowledge or previous literature, (b) weak informative priors that do not
dictate the posterior distribution significantly but are adequate to guard against
inappropriate inferences, and (c) non-informative (vague) or uniform priors that
allow the evidence from the data (likelihood) to be interpreted probabilistically
(Ahmed et al., 2018; Dong et al., 2014; El-Basyouny & Sayed, 2009; Wali, Khattak,
Bozdogan, et al., 2018). For estimable parameters in Equation 3.1, i.e., fixed
parameter logit model, we use flat or non-informative priors (giving results similar
to the traditional frequentist technique). For random parameter logit models, as in

generalized and calibrated. Until that time, the choice is between imperfect information and no
information.
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Equation 3.5, we use a normal prior for 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 , i.e., 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 ~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝛽𝑗 , 𝜎𝑗2 ), where the
hierarchical location parameters 𝛽𝑗 are distributed as 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,1000). Regarding
the hierarchical scale parameter (𝜎𝑗2 ), several noninformative prior distributions are
typically suggested in the context of hierarchical models. In the majority of the
transportation literature, 𝜎𝑗−2 is assumed to be distributed as 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (𝜀, 𝜀), where
𝜀 is typically set to a low value such as 1, 0.01, or 0.001. Subsequently,
𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.001, 0.001) or 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (1, 0.001) priors on the inverse-variance
(precision) parameters are widely used (Ahmed et al., 2018; Dong et al., 2014; ElBasyouny & Sayed, 2009; Guo, Li, Liu, & Wu, 2019; Wali, Khattak, Bozdogan, et
al., 2018). One of the key motivations behind the use of inverse-gamma priors on
𝜎𝑗2 (for generating inferences on standard deviations of random parameters) is its
conditional conjugacy property in the sense that if 𝜎𝑗2 is assumed to be inversegamma

distributed,

then

the

‘conditional’

posterior

distribution

of

𝜎𝑗2 ,

𝑝(𝜎𝑗2 |𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠), is also distributed as inverse-gamma.

Notwithstanding the conditional conjugacy property of inverse-gamma distribution
and which suggests more flexible mathematical properties (Fink, 1997), there are
serious issues with using this family of uninformative proper prior distributions. One
issue with using inverse-gamma prior distribution for modeling scale of random
parameters is that it leads to improper posterior density when 𝜀 is really small (see
the seminal paper by (Gelman, 2006)), and when 𝜀  0 (theoretically) the posterior
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becomes improper despite using a ‘proper’ prior distribution. This issue has
implications for Bayesian model specification in the context of transportation
literature in that statistical inferences about heterogeneity would become very
sensitive to the choice of the limits of inverse-gamma distribution (𝜀) for datasets
in which low values of heterogeneity (as captured by standard deviations
associated with random parameters) are likely – in fact a very likely possibility in
the context of transport datasets, e.g., see the posterior estimates of heterogeneity
in relevant work (Anastasopoulos & Mannering, 2009; El-Basyouny & Sayed,
2009; Guo et al., 2019; Hasan et al., 2013; Wali, Khattak, Greene, & Liu, 2019;
Wali, Khattak, Waters, Chimba, & Li, 2018a) and the references therein. A
subsequent consequence of using inverse-gamma prior on 𝜎𝑗2 for generating
posteriors of standard deviations (associated with random parameters) is that the
prior distributions hardly looks ‘noninformative’, i.e., the marginal likelihood for the
standard deviation parameter is concentrated around zero with the height of sharp
peak near zero increasing as 𝜀 gets small (such as, 𝜀 = 0.001). See the compelling
examples provided in (Gelman, 2006). Eventually, this is where the frequentist and
Bayesian inferences of random parameters models will differ vastly by setting the
variance parameters in the limits of  0 (see the comparison of diffuse prior
distributions in terms of bias and interval coverage behavior in the context of
frequentist and Bayesian random effects logit models in (Browne & Draper, 2006)).
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Due to the previously stated issues and following recommendations by (Gelman,
2006), we, as an alternative, take a relatively simple approach to the estimation of
variance components of random parameters in the context of AV-involved crashes.
In particular, we specify carefully crafted uniform informative priors for the standard
deviations of random parameters (and not the variance or precision terms). Recall
that the standard deviations of random parameters capture the between crash
heterogeneity in the effects of exogenous variables on rear-end and injury crash
propensity. By doing so, we still retain the conditional conjugacy attractiveness
offered by alternative inverse-gamma distributions since a simple multiplicative
reparameterization of the standard multilevel model eventually expands the family
of conditional conjugate prior distributions in the broader class of half-t
distributions, and which includes uniform densities put directly on standard
deviations as well as the typically used inverse-gamma on the variance term as a
special case3 (Gelman et al., 2013). Also, a uniform prior on the standard deviation
of a random parameter leads to a desirable finite integral near the limit of 0 (thus
avoiding the likely sharp peaks around zero observed when the scale of random
parameters is specified directly through variance terms using an inverse-gamma
density). Also, specifying the variance components at the standard deviation level

3

From this perspective of conditional conjugacy, the use of inverse-gamma density for variance

(or the gamma density for precision 𝜏, 𝜏 = 1⁄𝜎 2 ) has no special features to offer.
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can be more intuitive since it directly relates to the interpretation of heterogeneity
in AV (or conventional) safety modeling. Having said this, the Bayesian random
parameter models for AV rear-end crash propensity and injury crash propensity
estimated in this study are based on two specifications: (1) (seemingly)
uninformative inverse-gamma priors (inverse gamma (1,1)) specified directly on
the variance terms of random parameters (𝜎𝑗2 ), and (2) carefully crafted weakly
informative uniform densities (𝑈(0, 𝐴)) specified for the standard deviations (𝜎) of
random parameters4 (where 𝐴 defines the upper range of the uniform density) (see
below).

However, specifying uniform densities for the standard deviation terms requires
that the analyst is explicit about the upper scale (indicated by 𝐴) on which the
uniform density is defined. To avoid numerical overflow or convergence issues, the
uniform density on standard deviation should be specified as a limit of the broader
uniform density with a range between 0 and A, where A being a large number such

4

In the first case where inverse-gamma priors are used for the variance terms of random

parameters, the variance terms are directly sampled from the inverse-gamma density whereas the
posteriors for standard deviations of random parameters in each MCMC iteration are simply
obtained from the corresponding variance estimates. In the second case (uniform priors put directly
on standard deviations), the posteriors for standard deviations are sampled directly and are not
“derived” estimates of standard deviations as in the first case.
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as 100 or 1000. For example, if the true spread (standard deviation) of a random
parameter is small (such as a standard deviation of 1.5) then specifying a uniform
density for the corresponding random parameter in the range of 0 and 100 will lead
to convergence issues since sampling standard deviations from a uniform density
with (unrealistically) wider support will be meaningless. In other words, in many
contexts, there needs to be some level of informativeness in specifying the uniform
density for standard deviations. Alternatively, this suggests that the specification
of the range of uniform density must be selected keeping in view the plausible
ranges of the explanatory variables heterogeneous effects of which are sought to
be estimated (Gelman, 2006; Gelman et al., 2013). As is evident, this is a tedious
task requiring careful attention. To arrive at reasonable supports for the uniform
densities corresponding to specific random parameters, our strategy is as follows.
We set the upper range (indicated by A) of the uniform density for standard
deviations as much smaller (say a standard deviation of one) that is guaranteed to
yield a well-identified model. Next, we carefully increase in small increments until
the estimation fails to converge or the corresponding information criterion for the
Bayesian model with increased A does not improve. This strategy is successfully
applied elsewhere in the context of prior-posterior predictive p-values (Asparouhov
& Muthén, 2017). Overall, in the current application, the supports for uniform
densities for standard deviations of random parameters lies in the range of (0, 10).
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Finally, a regression parameter was considered random if the posterior estimates
of both mean and variance parameters were statistically significant, or only the
variance parameters were statistically significantly greater than zero. In the latter
case, information-based criteria were compared for the model with a random
parameter with statistically significant variance term and a model treating the same
variable as fixed (Wali, Khattak, & Karnowski, 2018). The parameter was retained
as a random parameter if the information criteria of the earlier were smaller than
the latter. Finally, all the 95% credible intervals for mean and variance parameters
are constructed using the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of corresponding posterior
distributions.

Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods:
The traditional fixed parameter Binary logit framework shown in Equation 3.1
through 3.4 can be estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation method.
However, the random parameter binary logit model (as shown in Equation 3.5)
requires integration of the binary logit probability statement over all possible values
of unobserved factors. Stated this way, the probability of an AV-involved rear-end
crash is an integral, specifically an integral of an indicator switch for the outcome
of the safety process (in this case rear-end and injury crash occurrence) over all
possible values of unobserved factors (K. E. Train, 2009). To do this, among
several other methods, we employ Markov Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) methods
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to approximate the integral function in a random parameter binary logit framework.
We consider a Metropolis-Hastings and Gibbs sampler algorithms to generate
draws from a transition kernel such that the draws from the transition kernel
eventually converge to pre-specified target distribution (K. E. Train, 2009). To
address the issue of poor mixing (where the Markov chain especially M-H
algorithm may stay in the tails of the posterior distribution for long time periods),
which typically arises in hierarchical random parameter models, we employ
blocking techniques. This method involves the variance terms of random
parameters being placed in separate blocks, and M-H updates are produced
separately for each variance block and the rest of the regression parameters
(Gamerman, 1997). However, since Gibbs sampler leads to more efficient
samples, we base the descriptive statistics of all posterior distributions based on
Gibbs sampler. For estimation, the sampled draws are divided into the burn-in
sample (used for monitoring convergence) and MCMC sample (used to summarize
parameter estimates, construct credible intervals). Finally, for comparing
competing models, Deviance Information Criteria (DIC) is used (Dong et al., 2014;
El-Basyouny & Sayed, 2009). A difference of 5 to 10 between the two competing
models’ DICs are substantial, and a model with a lower DIC between the two will
be a relatively best-fit model. The likelihoods for estimable models are coded and
evaluated in Stata’s MATA language, and MCMC Gibbs sampling is performed in
WinBUGS software which provides efficient tools for complex Bayesian.
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Modeling Results

The Bayesian analysis presented focuses on investigating the associations of
different explanatory factors with AV-involved rear-end crash propensity and injury
crash propensity, given the AV-involved crash. Two sets of Bayesian statistical
models are estimated for AV-involved rear-end crash propensity and injury crash
propensity. Within each set, different model specifications in a Full Bayesian setup
are tested. Overall, the statistical models under each set can be categorized into
the following categories; (1) Bayesian fixed parameter logit model with flat/uniform
priors (Model 1), (2) Bayesian fixed parameter logit model with weak uninformative
priors (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,1000)) (Model 2), (3) Bayesian fixed parameter logit model with
relatively strong uninformative priors (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,10)) (Model 3), (4) Bayesian
random parameter logit model with seemingly uninformative inverse-gamma priors
put directly on the variance terms of random parameters (Model 4), and (5)
Bayesian random parameter logit model with informative uniform priors put directly
on the standard deviations of the random parameters. Specific to Model 5, the
uniform priors are specified in a careful manner (as discussed earlier). In particular,
the Bayesian random parameter logit models (Model 4 and 5) for rear-end and
injury crash propensity account for unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable
bias that may be present in the AV crash data (as discussed in methodology). All
the models are derived from a systematic process to include the most important
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variables on the basis of statistical significance, specification parsimony, and
intuition. From a Bayesian estimation convergence perspective, two parallel
MCMC chains were initiated for each model with a total of 60,000 Gibbs sampler
iterations (in two updates of 30,000 each) in each chain. To remove the influence
of starting values of Gibbs sampler on posterior estimates, pooled and within-in
chain variance and interval widths were monitored for the two chains.
Subsequently, based on the Gelman Rubin statistic, 20,000 starting iterations in
each chain were dropped as burn-in, whereas, the remaining 40,000 iterations in
each chain were used for generating the descriptive statistics for posterior
estimates. In summary, the posterior estimates are based on 80,000 MCMC
iterations (40,000 in each of the two chains). As discussed later, the ratio of pooledand within-chain interval widths was around 1, indicating that the MCMC chains
have reasonably converged (Gelman et al., 2013). The results of the two sets of
models for rear-end and injury crash propensity are presented next.

Bayesian Estimation Results of AV-involved Rear-end Crash Propensity
For AV-involved rear-end crash propensity, Bayesian fixed parameter logit models
(Equation 3.1) are first developed in which the parameter estimates are
constrained to be fixed across all observations (Model 1A to 3A). After testing all
the variables shown in Table 3.1, a total of 11 explanatory factors related to the
autonomous driving mode, AV movement, built-environment, and roadway
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geometrics and markings related factors are included in the final model
specifications for Model 1A to 3A. As mentioned earlier, three different prior
specifications are tested, ranging from flat priors to weak uninformative priors to
relatively strong uninformative priors. The summary and goodness of fit statistics
of fixed parameter logit models with flat, weak uninformative, and strong
uninformative priors are presented in Table 3.3. The Bayesian logit model with flat
priors is equivalent to the traditional frequentist logit model. To see how
uninformative priors can change the parameter estimates, uninformative weak
(Model 2A), and strong priors (Model 3A) are used to estimate the posterior
distributions in Equation 3.1 (Table 3.3). In terms of goodness-of-fit, the models
based on flat priors and weak uninformative normal priors are similar, as indicated
by the DIC values (Table 3.3). Incorporating strong uninformative normal priors led
to some differences in coefficients, but the improvement of DIC was not substantial
compared to Model 1A and 2A (i.e., a one-unit decrease in DIC for Model 3A) (see
Table 3.3). This is intuitive as both flat and uninformative priors give no or very little
weight to prior beliefs (Dong et al., 2014; Gelman et al., 2013; Wali, Khattak,
Bozdogan, et al., 2018).

Finally, to account for unobserved heterogeneity, Table 3.3 shows the goodnessof-fit statistics for Bayesian random parameter logit models (Model 4A and 5A). In
particular, a total of five explanatory variables were found to be normally distributed
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Table 3.3 Goodness of fit statistics for Bayesian fixed and random parameter models for AV-involved rear-end crash
propensity
Model 1A Bayesian Fixed
Parameter Logit
with Flat Priors

Model 2A Bayesian Fixed
Parameter Logit
with Weak Normal
Priors

Model 3A Bayesian Fixed
Parameter Logit
with Strong
Normal Priors

Model 4A - Bayesian
Random Parameter
Logit with
Hierarchical Priors Specification 1 (A)

Model 5A - Bayesian
Random Parameter
Logit with Hierarchical
Priors - Specification 2
(B)

Sampling Scheme

Gibbs Sampler

Gibbs Sampler

Gibbs Sampler

Gibbs Sampler

Gibbs Sampler

Number of chains

2
60000 (in 2
updates of 30K
each)
40,000

2

2

2

2

60000 (in 2 updates
of 30K each)

60000 (in 2 updates
of 30K each)

60000 (in 2 updates of
30K each)

60000 (in 2 updates of 30K
each)

40,000

40,000

40,000

40,000

80,000

80,000

80,000

80,000

80,000

≡ 1.0

≡ 1.05

≡ 1.02

≡ 0.998

≡ 1.05

113

113

113

113

113

136.795

136.787

135.23

116.525

96.972

Item

MCMC iterations per
chain
Burn-in per chain
MCMC sample size
Convergence Check
Gelman Rubin
Statistic*
N
DIC

124.42
124.414
123.48
75.372
56.258
Dbar
Dhat
112.044
112.041
111.73
34.22
15.543
12.375
12.373
11.75
41.152
40.715
pD
Notes: Model 1A – based on flat priors; Model 2A – based on weak uninformative normal priors 𝛽 ~ 𝑁(0,1000); Model 3A – based on strong uninformative
normal priors 𝛽 ~ 𝑁(0,10); Model 4A (Specification 1A) based on 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 ~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝛽𝑗 , 𝜎𝑗2 ), where 𝛽𝑗 ~ 𝑁(0,1000) and variance of random parameters specified to
have an inverse-gamma density; Model 5A (Specification 2A) similar to Model 4A but with a data-driven uniform informative density on standard deviations of
random parameters; (*) calculated as the ratio of pooled- and within-chain intervals widths – ratio closer to one indicates acceptable convergence of MCMC
chains; DIC is Deviance Information Criteria; Dbar is the posterior mean of the unstandardized deviance of the model, 𝐷, and Dhat is the point estimate obtained
by substituting Dbar in 𝐷; N is sample size.
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random parameters, suggesting that the effects of these variables on AV-involved
rear-end crash propensity vary across the crash observations. Subsequently, the
goodness of fit in terms of DIC for Model 4A significantly improved compared to
the fixed-parameter counterparts. In particular, incorporating heterogeneity in the
random parameter logit model based on uninformative inverse-gamma prior on
variance terms of random parameters led to a substantially improved DIC of 116.5
(a reduction of 18.7 units in DIC compared to DICs of fixed parameter
counterparts) (Table 3.3). This finding suggests the presence of substantial
heterogeneity in the AV-crash database and that accounting for such
heterogeneity can lead to deeper insights. As discussed earlier in detail, Model 4A
is based on the widely used approach of assuming uninformative inverse-gamma
priors on variance terms. Given the issues related to the use of inverse-gamma
density for scale parameters, Model 5A is based on a relatively simple (yet more
appropriate) approach of estimating the variance components of random
parameters by specifying carefully crafted uniform informative priors directly on the
standard deviations of random parameters. As can be seen in Table 3.3, doing so
led to a further substantial improvement in DIC – DIC of 96.9 for Model 5A
compared to a DIC of 116.5 for random parameter model based on inverse-gamma
priors for scale parameters (Model 4A), i.e., a decrease of 19.6 units (Table 3.3).
This finding provides compelling evidence that for two competing random
parameter models with the exact same specification of exogenous variables,
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carefully specified informative uniform priors on scale parameters can lead to
significant improvements in capturing the heterogeneous contours of effects
associated with exogenous variables. This finding also validates the conceptual
discussion regarding the prior specification for scale parameters5.

Table 3.4 shows the estimation results of fixed parameter logit models (Model 1A
to Model 3A) whereas Table 3.5 shows the estimation results of random parameter
logit models with different prior elicitations on scale parameters (Model 4A and 5A).

5

Overall, this important finding emphasizes the benefit of using carefully specified uniform priors

on standard deviations of random parameters and that the typically used approach of using inversegamma density may not be the most appropriate. We, however, explicitly note that this important
conclusion is data specific (as is any Bayesian analysis) and should be validated in other contexts.
In addition to the need of careful attention in specifying informative uniform priors (section 4.3.1),
the choice of informative priors on standard deviations (as well as variance) is further complicated
by the fact that prior elicitations are sample (sample size) dependent. The support for uniform prior
on scale parameters that has worked for the current AV-crash database might not be suitable for
another dataset with different characteristics and larger sample size since with increase in sample
size to infinity the influence of prior is lost in Bayesian modeling philosophy.
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Table 3.4 Bayesian fixed parameter logit models with flat, weak, and strong uninformative priors for AV-involved rearend crash propensity
Variables

Constant

Bayesian Fixed Parameter
Logit with Flat Priors – Model
1A
95% EqualMean MCSE
tailed CI
-2.31

Bayesian Fixed Parameter
Logit with Weak Normal
Priors – Model 2A
95% EqualMean MCSE
tailed CI

Bayesian Fixed Parameter
Logit with Strong Normal
Priors – Model 3A
95% EqualMean MCSE
tailed CI

0.053

-6.01

1.22

-2.30

0.052

-5.99

1.21

-1.67

0.038

-4.68

1.25

0.006

0.85

3.15

1.96

0.005

0.85

3.14

1.81

0.004

0.76

2.90

Autonomous driving mode
Fully autonomous driving mode (no
1.96
system disengagement)
Autonomous vehicle/movement related factors
No turn indicator

-1.33

0.007

-2.57

-0.14

-1.33

0.007

-2.57

-0.14

-1.29

0.006

-2.47

-0.15

Vehicle state - stopped indicator

-1.79

0.005

-2.98

-0.68

-1.79

0.005

-2.98

-0.68

-1.68

0.005

-2.83

-0.61

Vehicle year (2016 or earlier)

-0.93

0.006

-2.37

0.46

-0.93

0.006

-2.37

0.47

-0.84

0.005

-2.21

0.49

0.92

0.005

-0.19

2.10

0.92

0.004

-0.19

2.09

0.81

0.003

-0.24

1.92

-0.47

0.002

-0.94

-0.03

-0.47

0.002

-0.94

-0.03

-0.46

0.002

-0.91

-0.04

Intersection indicator

0.75

0.010

-0.54

2.07

0.74

0.010

-0.54

2.06

0.66

0.008

-0.53

1.87

One-way street indicator

1.36

0.006

0.12

2.67

1.36

0.006

0.12

2.67

1.23

0.005

0.04

2.47

Speed limit (mph)

0.10

0.001

0.01

0.20

0.10

0.001

0.01

0.20

0.08

0.001

0.00

0.17

Marked centerline

0.45

0.011

-1.12

2.12

0.45

0.011

-1.13

2.11

0.33

0.009

-1.16

1.87

Built-Environment
Mixed land use
Schools (count of public/private school
within a quarter-mile)
Roadway factors/markings

Poor lane markings
1.28
0.010
-0.19
2.86
1.28
0.010
-0.19
2.86
1.08
0.007 -0.29
2.50
Notes: MCSE is Monte-Carlo Standard Error; All of the 95% credible intervals for location and shape parameters are constructed using the 2.5th percentiles
and the 97.5th percentiles of the corresponding posterior distributions
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Table 3.5 Bayesian hierarchical random parameter logit models for AV-involved
rear-end crash propensity

Variables

Bayesian Random Parameter
Logit with Hierarchical Priors
– Specification 1(A) – Model
4A
95% EqualMean MCSE
tailed CI

Bayesian Random Parameter
Logit with Hierarchical Priors
– Specification 2(B) – Model
5A
95% EqualMean MCSE
tailed CI

Mean Effects (Location
Parameters)
-3.80

0.109

-9.96

1.81

-4.14

0.137

-11.72

2.75

2.89

0.035

1.03

5.01

3.76

0.046

1.21

6.35

1.63

0.031

-0.90

4.30

-2.94

0.028

-5.84

-0.23

-2.86

0.017

-5.10

-0.93

-3.76

0.021

-6.50

-1.25

-1.42

0.037

-3.96

0.94

-1.78

0.043

-4.99

1.41

1.36

0.015

0.50

3.40

1.70

0.016

0.71

4.24

-0.54

0.012

-1.47

0.34

-0.83

0.015

-1.86

0.23

Intersection indicator*

1.58

0.043

-0.59

3.86

1.82

0.049

-0.85

4.74

One way indicator

2.22

0.020

0.06

4.65

3.12

0.027

0.36

6.19

Speed limit (mph)

0.16

0.002

0.03

0.32

0.19

0.003

0.03

0.38

Marked centerline*

0.32

0.051

-2.49

3.05

0.51

0.058

-2.80

3.96

Poor lane markings
Unobserved Effects
(Scale Parameters)
Schools (count of
public/private school
within a quarter-mile)
Fully autonomous driving
mode (no system
disengagement)
Vehicle year (2016 or
earlier)

1.63

0.031

-0.90

4.30

2.22

0.038

-0.98

5.57

0.91

0.015

0.17

1.90

0.85

0.014

0.09

1.47

1.12

0.018

0.20

2.32

1.40

0.032

0.05

2.47

0.92

0.009

0.18

1.97

1.58

0.023

0.07

2.93

Intersection indicator

1.17

0.018

0.24

2.41

2.17

0.023

0.44

2.98

Constant
Autonomous driving
mode
Fully autonomous driving
mode (no system
disengagement)*
Autonomous
vehicle/movement
related factors
No turn indicator
Vehicle state - stopped
indicator
Vehicle year (2016 or
earlier)*
Built-Environment
Mixed land use
Schools (count of
public/private school
within a quarter-mile)*
Roadway
factors/markings

1.49
0.020
0.38
2.81
2.51
0.012
1.22
2.99
Marked centerline
Notes: MCSE is Monte-Carlo Standard Error; (*) indicates normally distributed random parameters; Model 4A
(Specification 1A) is based on 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 ~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝛽𝑗 , 𝜎𝑗2 ), where 𝛽𝑗 ~ 𝑁(0,1000) and variance of random parameters
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specified to have an inverse-gamma density; Model 5A (Specification 2A) is similar to Model 4A but with a
data-driven uniform informative density on standard deviations of random parameters; All of the 95% credible
intervals for location and shape parameters are constructed using the 2.5th percentiles and the 97.5th
percentiles of the corresponding posterior distributions.

Bayesian Estimations Results of Injury Crash Propensity
The estimation results of the second set of fixed and random parameter models
for injury crash propensity are presented next. Similar to AV-involved rear-end
crash propensity, three fixed parameter Bayesian models (with flat, weak
uninformative, and strong uninformative priors) were estimated for injury crash
propensity where the estimable parameters were held fixed across all observations
(Model 1B to 3B). A total of nine exogenous variables related to the travel speed
of the conventional vehicle, built-environment, roadway factors, roadway
markings, and environment-related factors are included in the final model
specifications. The goodness of fit statistics for Bayesian fixed parameter logit
models are shown in Table 3.6. As can be seen, the three Bayesian fixed
parameter models are statistically indifferent as indicated by approximately similar
DIC statistics for Model 2B to 3B (see Table 3.6).

Next, a Bayesian random parameter logit model with hierarchical prior elicitation
was estimated where an uninformative inverse-gamma density was specified for
the variance terms of the random parameters (Model 4B in Table 3.6). In doing so,
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Table 3.6 Goodness of fit statistics for Bayesian fixed and random parameter models for injury crash propensity
Item

Sampling
Scheme
Number of
chains
MCMC iterations
per chain
Burn-in per chain
MCMC sample
size
Convergence
Check
Gelman Rubin
Statistic*
N
DIC
Dbar
Dhat
pD

Model 3 - Bayesian
Fixed Parameter
Logit with Strong
Normal Priors

Model 4 - Bayesian
Random Parameter
Logit with
Hierarchical Priors Specification 1 (A)

Model 5 - Bayesian
Random Parameter
Logit with
Hierarchical Priors Specification 2 (B)

Gibbs Sampler

Gibbs Sampler

Gibbs Sampler

Gibbs Sampler

2
60000 (in 2 updates
of 30K each)
20000

2
60000 (in 2 updates
of 30K each)
20000

2
60000 (in 2 updates
of 30K each)
20000

2
60000 (in 2 updates
of 30K each)
20000

2
60000 (in 2 updates
of 30K each)
20000

80,000

80,000

80,000

80,000

80,000

≡ 0.998
113
93.619
83.256
72.893
10.363

≡ 0.997
113
93.614
83.263
72.912
10.351

≡ 1.001
113
93.332
83.754
74.175
9.578

≡ 1.054
113
84.254
63.987
43.719
20.267

≡ 1.001
113
55.835
33.156
10.478
22.679

Model 1 - Bayesian
Fixed Parameter
Logit with Flat
Priors

Model 2 - Bayesian
Fixed Parameter
Logit with Weak
Normal Priors

Gibbs Sampler

Notes: Model 1B – based on flat priors; Model 2B – based on weak uninformative normal priors 𝛽 ~ 𝑁(0,1000); Model 3A – based on strong uninformative
normal priors 𝛽 ~ 𝑁(0,10); Model 4B (Specification 1A) is based on 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 ~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝛽𝑗 , 𝜎𝑗2 ), where 𝛽𝑗 ~ 𝑁(0,1000) and variance of random parameters specified
to have an inverse-gamma density; Model 5B (Specification 2A) is similar to Model 4B but with a data-driven uniform informative density on standard deviations
of random parameters; (*) calculated as the ratio of pooled- and within-chain intervals widths – ratio closer to one indicates acceptable convergence of MCMC
chains; DIC is Deviance Information Criteria; Dbar is the posterior mean of the unstandardized deviance of the model, 𝐷, and Dhat is the point estimate obtained
by substituting Dbar in 𝐷; N is sample size
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the possibility of heterogeneous effects of exogenous variables on injury crash
propensity due to systematic variations in unobserved factors is accounted. Out of
the nine exogenous variables, three variables (clear weather, arterial indicator,
collector indicator) were found to be normally distributed random parameters the
possibility of heterogeneous effects of exogenous variables on injury crash
propensity due to systematic variations in unobserved factors is accounted. Out of
the nine exogenous variables, three variables (clear weather, arterial indicator,
collector indicator) were found to be normally distributed random parameters
suggesting that the effects of these variables vary significantly across the injury
crashes. Incorporating unobserved heterogeneity led to substantially improved
DIC statistic for Model 4B – DIC of 84.2 versus a DIC of 93.3 for the fixed
parameter Bayesian counterparts. Recall that a difference of 5 to 10 between two
competing models’ DICs are substantial, and a model with lower DIC between the
two is a relatively best-fit model. Finally, to examine the important issue related to
prior elicitation for scale parameters, a Bayesian hierarchical random parameter
logit was estimated where the scale parameters (capturing heterogeneous effects)
were modeled through informative uniform priors on standard deviations of random
parameters (Model 5B in Table 3.6). Similar to the conclusion for AV-involved rearend crash propensity, specifying carefully specified uniform priors for standard
deviation terms in Model 5B led to a further improvement in DIC compared to DIC
of Model 4B (random parameter logit model with the typical inverse-gamma density
102

for scale parameters). In particular, compared to Model 4B, a reduction of 28.4
units in DIC was observed for Model 5B, underscoring the importance of capturing
heterogeneous effects through carefully specified informative uniform priors on
standard deviations of random parameters and that the typical approach of using
inverse-gamma density on variance parameters may not be the most appropriate.
These findings are in agreement with the conclusions made in (Gelman, 2006) and
highlight the need for further validating the utility of this approach in other transport
contexts. Finally, for injury crash propensity, the estimation results of fixed
parameter logit models (Model 1B to Model 3B) are shown in Table 3.7 whereas
the estimation results of Bayesian hierarchical random parameter logit models with
different prior elicitations on scale parameters of random parameters (Model 4B
and 5B) are shown in Table 3.8.

Discussion

In this section, the key findings emerging from statistical analysis for AV-involved
rear-end and injury crash propensity are discussed. Since Bayesian hierarchical
random parameter logit models (Models 5A and 5B) with informative uniform priors
on standard deviations of the random parameters resulted in best-fit, the
discussion of the key findings is based on the results of Models 5A and 5B. To
better interpret the results of the best-fit Bayesian random parameter logit models,
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Table 3.7 Bayesian fixed parameter logit models with flat, weak, and strong uninformative priors for AV-involved injury
crash propensity
Bayesian Fixed Parameter Logit
with Flat Priors
95% EqualMean
MCSE
tailed CI

Bayesian Fixed Parameter Logit
with Weak Normal Priors
95% EqualMean
MCSE
tailed CI

Bayesian Fixed Parameter Logit
with Strong Normal Priors
95% EqualMean
MCSE
tailed CI

-11.76

0.145

-19.86

-4.85

-11.80

0.144

-19.84

-4.97

-5.05

0.054

-9.08

-1.16

0.21

0.002

0.06

0.39

0.21

0.002

0.06

0.39

0.15

0.001

0.03

0.29

1.42

0.019

-0.29

3.45

1.42

0.019

-0.29

3.46

0.65

0.008

-0.74

2.15

On street parking
1.44
Roadway, road markings, &
environmental factors
Intersection
indicator
2.22
Arterial
4.13

0.021

-0.30

3.39

1.44

0.021

-0.28

3.39

0.49

0.009

-0.90

1.97

0.028
0.043

0.24
1.13

4.69
7.75

2.23
4.13

0.028
0.041

0.26
1.15

4.71
7.71

1.11
2.12

0.010
0.016

-0.34
0.05

2.78
4.35

Collector
Speed limit
Number of lanes
Marked centerline
Clear weather

0.046
0.003
0.008
0.041
0.006

0.89
-0.01
-1.45
-7.21
-2.75

8.29
0.37
0.34
-0.77
0.46

4.24
0.18
-0.51
-3.71
-1.06

0.045
0.003
0.008
0.039
0.006

0.91
0.00
-1.45
-7.19
-2.75

8.25
0.37
0.35
-0.80
0.47

1.96
0.04
-0.37
-2.02
-0.84

0.015
0.002
0.006
0.016
0.004

-0.40
-0.10
-1.20
-4.20
-2.32

4.36
0.17
0.37
0.13
0.50

Variables
Constant
Travel Speed
Speed of
conventional
vehicle
Dummy for
missing speed
BuiltEnvironment

4.23
0.18
-0.51
-3.71
-1.06

Notes: MCSE is Monte-Carlo Standard Error; All of the 95% credible intervals for location and shape parameters are constructed using the 2.5th percentiles
and the 97.5th percentiles of the corresponding posterior distributions.
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Table 3.8 Bayesian hierarchical random parameter logit models for AV-involved injury crash propensity
Variables

Bayesian Random Parameter Logit with
Hierarchical Priors - Specification 1 (A) –
Model 4B
95% Equal-tailed
Mean
MCSE
CI

Bayesian Random Parameter Logit
with Hierarchical Priors Specification 2 (B) – Model 5B
95% Equal-tailed
Mean
MCSE
CI

Mean Effects (Location Parameters)
Constant
Travel Speed

-13.84

0.196

-24.41

-5.32

-25.23

0.371

-43.67

-9.82

0.27
1.86

0.003
0.030

0.08
-0.33

0.51
4.51

0.52
3.80

0.006
0.066

0.18
-0.22

0.93
8.73

On street parking
1.75
Roadway, road markings, & environmental factors

0.030

-0.48

4.29

3.24

0.061

-0.97

7.86

Intersection indicator
Arterial*
Collector*
Speed limit
Number of lanes
Marked centerline
Clear weather*
Unobserved Effects (Scale Parameters)

0.034
0.094
0.106
0.004
0.014
0.088
0.033

0.26
1.24
0.96
-0.01
-1.95
-10.01
-3.80

5.51
9.80
10.67
0.47
0.44
-1.36
0.36

4.92
8.92
9.67
0.45
-1.46
-10.78
-3.90

0.068
0.156
0.161
0.009
0.034
0.152
0.056

0.86
2.03
2.06
0.05
-3.87
-19.02
-8.32

10.10
17.11
18.53
0.87
0.66
-3.87
-0.24

Speed of conventional vehicle
Dummy for missing speed
Built-Environment

2.60
4.91
5.17
0.22
-0.66
-5.04
-1.57

Clear weather
0.98
0.012
0.19
2.04
2.96
0.048
0.23
4.93
Arterial
1.59
0.020
0.34
2.89
4.51
0.007
3.30
4.99
Collector
0.89
0.008
0.16
1.91
2.55
0.037
0.14
4.88
Notes: MCSE is Monte-Carlo Standard Error; (*) indicates normally distributed random parameters; Model 4B (Specification 1A) based on 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 ~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝛽𝑗 , 𝜎𝑗2 ),
where 𝛽𝑗 ~ 𝑁(0,1000) and variance of random parameters specified to have an inverse-gamma density; Model 5B (Specification 2A) similar to Model 4B but
with a data-driven uniform informative density on standard deviations of random parameters; All of the 95% credible intervals for location and shape parameters
are constructed using the 2.5th percentiles and the 97.5th percentiles of the corresponding posterior distributions.
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the odds ratios can be calculated by exponentiating the coefficients corresponding
to specific explanatory factors (𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜, 𝑋 = 𝑒 𝛽 ). The interpretation is that for
a dummy variable switching from 0 to 1, the odds of an AV-involved rear-end crash
occurrence increases/decreases by a factor of 𝑋. For continuous variables (such
as speed limit and count of public/private schools within a quarter-mile), the
interpretation is that a one-unit increase in the corresponding explanatory variable
will lead to X factor increase/decrease in the odds of an AV-involved or injury crash.
The key findings for AV-involved rear-end crash propensity and injury crash
propensity are discussed next.

Key Findings for AV-involved Rear-end Crash Propensity (Model 5A)
Autonomous Driving Mode
The best-fit Bayesian random parameter logit model for AV-involved rear-end
crash propensity quantifies the associations between a total of 11 explanatory
factors (including autonomous driving mode, AV movement, built-environment,
and roadway geometrics and markings related factors) and AV-involved rear-end
crash propensity. Related to the autonomous driving mode, the best-fit Bayesian
hierarchical random parameter logit model (Model 5A) reveals an important result.
Compared to conventionally-driven AV (human in full control) or vehicle where the
driver disengages the ADS prior to the crash, the results reveal a higher likelihood
of AV-involved rear-end crash when the ADS is engaged by the driver. In
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particular, with a β estimate of 3.76 (Table 3.5), the odds of an AV-involved rearend crash occurrence were surprisingly higher by a factor of 42.7 (e3.76) if the ADS
is not disengaged by the driver (see Table 3.5). Importantly, the traditional
Bayesian fixed parameter logit model (Model 1A) severely underestimates the
strength of association (odds ratio of only 7.07) (see Table 3.4). Furthermore, the
fully autonomous driving mode related variable is found to be a normally distributed
random parameter with a (posterior) mean of 3.76 and (posterior) standard
deviation of 1.40 (see Table 3.5) - revealing substantial heterogeneity in the
magnitudes of associations across the sampled rear-end crashes. Figure 3.5
presents the Bayesian posterior distributions of the heterogeneous β effects for
the best-fit random parameter rear-end crash propensity model. Referring to the
posterior distribution for fully autonomous driving mode in Figure 3.5, while the
direction of association is consistently positive (indicating higher likelihood of rearend crash), the magnitudes of associations vary widely with a 95% equal-tailed
credible interval of [1.21, 6.35] (Table 3.5) – suggesting that with ADS being
engaged the odds of an AV-involved rear-end crash can increase by a factor as
low as 3.35 (e1.21) and as high as 572.4 (e6.35). This substantial heterogeneity is
reflective of the several factors that may influence the likelihood of AV-involved
rear-end collision but are unobserved in the data at hand. As is evident, such
deeper insights cannot be provided by the traditional fixed parameter Bayesian
logit model.
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Figure 3.5 Bayesian posterior distributions of random parameters for AV-involved rear-end crash propensity based on
best-fit hierarchical Bayesian random parameter logit with uniform priors specified on standard deviations of random
parameters (Model 5A)
Notes: Posterior β estimates plotted on X-axis; The small vertical blue bars above the X-axis (the “rug”) represents the sample across the continuous range
of posterior β estimates; The vertical dotted line represents the directional heterogeneity point – i.e., parameter densities to the left of 0 represent negative
association and vice versa.
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Conceptually, the above fully autonomous driving mode related findings is
important in the sense that a fully activated ADS can be unsafe keeping in view
the current traffic mix, i.e., the majority of the vehicles are human-driven. Notably,
this finding does not necessarily imply that AVs are unsafe or were at-fault. Rather,
it reflects the situations where the AVs were rear-ended by other vehicles with the
striking vehicle likely at fault, and the AV system was not capable of anticipating
the unsafe action by the human-driven vehicle. Given the fact that AVs cannot
“learn” and “predict” all the different driving actions, a driver in the AV disengaging
the ADS when a rear-end collision is anticipated can be beneficial. This scenario
also points out to developing systems to ensure the vehicle operator continuously
monitors the surroundings and take appropriate actions (such as disengaging the
autonomous system) if an unsafe outcome is expected.

Built-Environment Factors
The best-fit model also sheds light on the associations between (proxy) builtenvironment and AV-involved rear-end crash propensity. Compared to other landuse types, the likelihood of AV-involved rear-end crash increased in mixed landuse types (posterior β = 1.70) (see Table 3.5). In particular, when compared to
other land-use types, the odds of AV-involved rear-end crash increased by a factor
of 5.47 in mixed land-use settings (Table 3.5). This finding seems intuitive since
mixed land-use patterns typically exhibit diverse land-use types leading to complex
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roadway layouts. Coming to the presence of public/private schools within a
quarter-mile, the results reveal on-average a lower likelihood of AV-involved rearend crashes at places with higher counts of public/private schools (posterior β = 0.83 or subsequently an odds ratio of 0.43) (Table 3.5). This finding seems intuitive
– one possible explanation could be that school zones typically have smoother
traffic flows and higher enforcement, leading to overall safer movements of
vehicles (especially conventional vehicles). However, this variable is found to be a
normally distributed random parameter with a mean of -0.83 and posterior
standard deviation of 0.85 suggesting that the associations between the count of
public/private schools and AV-involved rear-end crash propensity vary in
magnitude as well as in direction (see Figure 3.5). Referring to the Bayesian
posterior distribution for this variable in Figure 3.5, with a mean and standard
deviation of -0.83 and 0.85, respectively (Table 3.5), the association is negative
for 83.5% of the observations, whereas positive for the rest. Again, such deeper
insights cannot be obtained from Bayesian fixed parameter counterparts.

Roadway Markings & Geometrics
Several roadway markings related factors are also found correlated with AVinvolved rear-end crash propensity. Coming to road segments with marked
centerlines, the odds of AV-involved rear-end crash is on-average higher by a
factor of 1.66 (posterior mean β estimate of 0.51 – Table 3.5). Ignoring the driving
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errors of conventional vehicle drivers for a moment, this finding at its face value
seems unintuitive since roads with centerline markings would be relatively safer
for the AV’s to traverse (given that AV’s video and radar sensors can better sense
roadways with markings). This common intuitive is captured by the best-fit
Bayesian random parameter model (Model 5A), which reveals that the centerline
marking variable is normally distributed random parameter with a mean of 0.51
and a relatively high posterior standard deviation of 2.51 (see Table 3.5).
Subsequently, this translates to a substantial heterogeneity not just in the
magnitudes of associations but direction as well (see the posterior distribution for
this variable in Figure 3.5). In particular, the association is positive for 58% of the
observations, whereas negative for 42% of the sampled crashes compared to the
finding from the fixed parameter counterpart (Model 1A), which suggests that the
association is positive for 100% of the crashes. This is another compelling case in
which ignoring unobserved heterogeneity not just hides important information
embedded in data but leads to misleading inferences. The posterior distributions
constructed using Full Bayesian inference provides rich insights regarding the
contours of heterogeneous correlations between AV-involved rear-end collisions
and key factors. Regarding the quality of road markings, while the likelihood of AVinvolved rear-end crash was higher on roadways with poor markings, the
association is statistically insignificant (Table 3.5).
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Related to road geometry, the results indicate that the probability of an AV-involved
rear-end collision is on-average higher at intersections compared to other locations
(posterior β = 1.82 – Table 3.5). This result indicates that compared to other
locations, the odds of an AV-involved rear-end collision at an intersection is higher
by a factor of 6.14 (𝑒 1.82 = 6.14); whereas, the Bayesian fixed-parameter logit
(Model 1A) underestimates the strength of association by almost a factor of 4 (odds
ratio of 2.10). Overall, the positive association between intersections and
probability of AV-involved rear-end crash occurrence is intuitive as intersections
typically have more complex movements, and as such, the likelihood of either a
conventional vehicle driving error or the failure of the ADS to anticipate an unsafe
situation is high correctly. However, the posterior estimates for intersection
indicator are found normally distributed random parameters with a mean of 1.82
and standard deviation of 2.17 (see the entire support of heterogeneity in Figure
3.5) – suggesting that the association is positive for around 80% of the
observations and negative for the rest. This heterogeneity in the direction of
associations is likely an outgrowth of all unobserved factors that can influence AVinvolved crash propensity since an intersection itself would increase the likelihood
of a crash due to complex layouts. The modeling results also reveal the chances
of an AV-involved rear-end collision is higher on one-way streets/roads than
bidirectional (see positive parameter estimate for the one-way indicator in Table
3.5). Finally, roadway segments with higher speed limits had an on-average higher
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likelihood of AV-involved rear-end crashes (see the posterior estimates for the
speed limit in Table 3.5).

Autonomous Vehicle/Movement Factors
Related to vehicle movement-specific indicators, the results of the best-fit
Bayesian random parameter logit model (Model 5A) suggest a negative correlation
between AVs proceeding straight (no turn indicator) and AV-involved rear-end
crash occurrence. That is, with a posterior β estimate of -2.94 (95% credible
interval: -5.84, -0.23), the odds of AV-involved rear-end crash are around 94% less
(true population effect between 99.7% and 20.63%) when the AV is proceeding
straight compared to other movement types (see Table 3.5). If the AV is stopped
(vehicle state – stopped indicator), the odds of an AV-involved rear-end crash
occurrence are lower (see parameter estimates in Table 3.5). The modeling results
also show a correlation between the AV vehicle year (2016 or earlier) and AVinvolved rear-end crash propensity. AVs with a model year 2016 or earlier had onaverage lower likelihood of rear-end crash occurrence but with substantial
heterogeneity in the magnitude and direction of association as is reflected through
a normally distributed random parameter with a posterior mean of -1.78 and
posterior standard deviation of 1.58 (see Table 3.5 and posterior distribution of this
random parameter in Figure 3.5).
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Key Findings for AV-involved Injury Crash Propensity (Model 5B)
The best-fit Bayesian random parameter logit model for AV-involved injury crash
propensity (Model 5B) quantifies the associations between a total of nine
explanatory variables (including travel speed, built-environment, roadway
geometrics, markings, and environmental factors) and injury crash propensity
(Table 3.8). The key findings are discussed next.

Travel Speed & Built-Environment
The positive association between the travel speed and (injury) crash risk is widely
reported in the literature (Rosen, Stigson, & Sander, 2011). For the Californiabased automated vehicles data, our results reveal a positive statistically significant
correlation between the travel speed of the conventional vehicle and injury crash
propensity (β estimate of 0.52) (Table 3.8). That is, with each unit increase in the
speed of the conventional vehicle, the odds of AV-involved injury crash increases
by 68% (odds ratio of 1.68). Compared to the best-fit random parameter logit
model (Model 5B), the fixed parameter logit underestimated the association
between conventional vehicle speed and injury crash propensity – an odds ratio of
1.16 (𝑒 𝛽 = 𝑒 0.15 = 1.16) (see Table 3.7). We tested the travel speed of the AV but
found no statistically significant association with injury crash propensity (results not
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presented)6. No statistically significant association was found between on-street
parking and injury crash propensity (see Table 3.8).

Roadway, Road Markings, & Environmental Factors
Several roadway geometrics, markings, and environmental factors are found
correlated with AV-involved injury crash propensity. Compared to no roadway
centerlines, the likelihood of AV-involved injury crash is substantially lower at
roadways with marked centerlines (statistically significant posterior β = -10.78)

6

Notes: The speed information for conventional vehicle was missing in 71 crashes out of 113

crashes. Likewise, travel speeds of AVs were missing in 62 out of 113 crashes. For the crashes
with conventional vehicle speed information available (N = 42), the mean speed was 8.3 mph (min
and max of 0 and 30, respectively). As such, to utilize the available information on key operational
variables without losing significant data, injury crashes with missing data on speed were replaced
with mean speed of non-missing data and an indicator variable for missing data was subsequently
created which is 1 if the response time is missing and zero otherwise. Finally, both the meanimputed speed variable and the indicator variable for missing speed data are included in the same
model specification (see Table 3.7 and 3.8). A statistically significant parameter estimate on the
indicator variable for missing speed will reveal that the speed data are perhaps not missing at
random and that the missing (or unobserved) speeds influence injury crash propensity statistically
significantly. However, as can be seen in Table 3.8, the posterior β estimate on the indicator
variable for missing speed data is statistically insignificant revealing that there is no obvious
correlation between the missing speeds and injury crash propensity
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(Table 3.8). Contrarily, the fixed parameter Bayesian counterpart led to a
statistically insignificant association for centerline marking variable (see Table 3.7).
Interestingly, despite capturing unobserved heterogeneity, the Bayesian random
parameter logit counterpart (with uninformative inverse-gamma prior on ‘variance’
of random parameters – Model 4B) underestimated the association between
centerline markings and injury crash propensity by almost half (posterior β’s of 5.04 and -10.78 for Model 4B and 5B, respectively) (Table 3.8).

Related to

environmental factors, clear weather is intuitively found associated with a lower
likelihood of AV-involved injury crash propensity. However, this variable was found
normally distributed random parameter with a posterior mean of -3.90 and
posterior standard deviation of 2.96 – revealing substantial heterogeneity in
magnitudes of association (see the posterior distribution for this random parameter
in Figure 3.6). Again, the clear weather indicator was found statistically insignificant
in the fixed parameter Bayesian counterpart (see Table 3.7).

Regarding roadway geometric related factors, the results of the best-fit random
parameter Bayesian model (Model 5B) reveal a substantially higher likelihood of
AV-involved injury crashes at intersections (β = 4.92 – see Table 3.8). In particular,
compared to non-intersections, the odds of AV-involved injury crash increased by
a factor of 137 (𝑒 𝛽 = 𝑒 4.92 ). This finding is generally in agreement with the literature
on conventional vehicle injury outcomes at intersections (Lee & Abdel-Aty, 2005;
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Figure 3.6 Bayesian posterior distributions of random parameters for AV-involved injury crash propensity based on bestfit hierarchical Bayesian random parameter logit with uniform priors specified on standard deviations of random
parameters (Model 5B)
Notes: Posterior β estimates plotted on X-axis; The horizontal vertical blue bars above the X-axis (the “rug”) represents the sample across the continuous
range of posterior β estimates; The vertical dotted line represents the directional heterogeneity point – i.e., parameter densities to the left of 0 represent
negative association and vice versa.
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Retting & Kyrychenko, 2002). Importantly, note that while the Bayesian random
parameter logit counterpart (with uninformative inverse-gamma prior on ‘variance’
of random parameters – Model 4B) generally captures the heterogeneous
correlations embedded in the data, it significantly underestimates the association
between intersection indicator and AV-involved injury crash (posterior β of 2.60 for
Model 4B vs. posterior β of 4.92 for Model 5B). The modeling results also reveal a
higher likelihood of AV-involved injury crash at arterials and collector roadway
types (see positive posterior estimates in Table 3.8). However, both of these
variables are found to be normally distributed random parameters revealing
significant heterogeneity in the associations (see Figure 3.6). Again, the collector
indicator was found statistically insignificant in the fixed parameter Bayesian
counterpart (see Table 3.7).

Limitations

This paper and its outcomes extensively depend on the accuracy of the information
provided in the manufacturer-reported crash narratives in the California DMV
database and the roadway and built-environment database. It is possible that
reporting and handling errors may be present in the study. However, careful
consideration was taken to error-check the data before the analysis. It should be
noted that ADS are persistently and rapidly advancing. The rate of testing in
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California is not uniform over time as more companies are becoming permit
holders to test their vehicles on roadways. Therefore, the results have the potential
to be biased by examining “older” and “newer” technology. The California DMV
could potentially enhance the data being collected by requiring manufacturers to
state the vehicle identification number in a crash report (OL 316) in order to identify
the AVMT (in the disengagement report) of the involved-AV prior to a crash.

Finally, while the sample size of 113 crashes poses a major challenge to
understand the implications of test vehicles fully, this limitation was minimized to
the extent possible by using a rigorous analysis (Bayesian inference) approach. In
addition to the rigorous treatment of unobserved heterogeneity and prior elicitation
for scale parameters, the use of MCMC techniques allows more plausible
inference by sampling estimable parameters from relevant densities. As AVs
become more abundant on the roadways throughout the United States, the sample
size will increase, allowing more profound and generalizable insights. Another way
to minimize this challenge of scarce data is for federal and state policymakers to
mandate in every state that AV collisions should be reported with an elaborate
narrative to government officials to aid researchers in understanding these
vehicles and the interaction between the vehicle configurations.

119

Conclusion

While AVs in California have only reported over three and a half million miles of
AVMT from 2014-2018, these vehicles continue to learn from encountering risky
situations, experimenting in challenging conditions, and vetting their existing
capabilities in real-world driving. The data obtained from the crash reports provide
insightful information that allowed the analysis to be completed. This study created
a unique database from Traffic Collision Reports. Then by text mining, the
manufacturer-reported narratives more variables were added about roadway and
built-environment characteristics. Unlike human-driven vehicle crashes, AVs were
involved in a substantially smaller proportion of broadside crashes, but many AVs
were rear-ended (61.1%). The AV technology was at-fault once in 113 crashes
(0.88%), and during this occurrence, the vehicle operator did not disengage the
technology and take over manual control. The study empirically focused on
understanding the correlates of AV-involved rear-end and injury crashes in a Full
Bayesian setup, given the small sample size. Owing to the potential issue of
unobserved heterogeneity, hierarchical-Bayes fixed and random parameter logit
models are estimated for each crash type.

Several important insights are obtained from the analysis, while noting that the
analysis relates to “given the AV-involved crashes” and not their risk of getting
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involved in a crash. The empirical results reveal a substantially higher likelihood of
AV-involved rear-end crash when the ADS is engaged by the driver, compared to
human-driven AV (conventional system) or vehicle where the ADS is disengaged
by the driver prior to the crash. The built environment can likely influence the AVinvolved crash propensity since it captures land-use patterns of varying layouts
and complexity. Compared to other land-use types, results reveal a significantly
higher likelihood of AV-involved rear-end crashes in mixed land-use settings. AVinvolved rear-end crash propensity was significantly lower at locations with a
higher concentration of public/private schools. Regarding AV-involved injury crash
propensity, the results reveal a positive statistically significant correlation between
travel speed of conventional vehicle and injury crash propensity and a lower
likelihood of AV-involved injury crash at roadways with marked centerlines.
Likewise, clear weather was intuitively found associated with a lower likelihood of
AV-involved injury crash propensity. Methodologically, substantial heterogeneity is
observed not just in the magnitudes of the correlations but direction as well and
ignoring it can lead to misleading and inaccurate inferences. Subsequently, the
random parameter Bayesian logit models outperformed the fixed parameter
Bayesian counterparts.

In the Bayesian heterogeneity-based transportation literature, prior elicitation for
scale terms of random parameters (which captures the contours of unobserved
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heterogeneity) is typically based on an uninformative inverse-gamma density on
the variance terms. This study presented a case for using carefully crafted
informative uniform priors specified directly on the standard deviations of the
random parameters as opposed to the commonly used approach of applying
uninformative inverse-gamma priors on the variance terms of scale parameters.
From a prior elicitation standpoint, the conclusion is that carefully specified
informative uniform priors on standard deviations of random parameters can lead
to even further gains in model goodness of fit and that the typically used approach
of using inverse-gamma density may not be the most appropriate. Despite
capturing unobserved heterogeneity, the Bayesian random parameter logit
counterparts (with uninformative inverse-gamma prior on ‘variance’ of random
parameters) in some cases underestimated the associations between exogenous
variables and injury crash propensity. As part of future work, a fruitful
methodological avenue would be to validate further the benefits of using an
informative uniform prior densities for scale (standard deviations) parameters in
other transportation safety contexts, given the non-negligible gains in model
goodness of fit obtained from informative uniform densities observed in the current
study.

The results of the study have several practical implications. Potential solutions
include better anticipation of rear-end collisions by AVs and AVs behaving in a
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more naturalistic way. Recently, in December 2017, twenty automakers, whose
representation exceeds 99% of the US automobile market, voluntarily vowed to
equip all new passenger vehicles by September 1, 2022 and all new trucks by
September 1, 2025 with a low-speed automatic emergency braking (AEB) system
that entails forward collision avoidance (National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 2018a). As conventional vehicles are primarily the striking vehicle
in the dataset, this increasing penetration of AEB systems are expected to
drastically mitigate the front-to-rear crashes with conventional and AVs.

Future Research

From a vehicle kinematics perspective, future research in AV crashes should also
examine the acceleration and deceleration (i.e., driving volatility) of each
classification of vehicle, AV and conventional, to determine the potential
implications that might arise due to the differences in vehicle kinematics.
Automation offers new opportunities to record pre-crash data beyond the required
minimal fields in conventional vehicle event data recorders (EDRs). Potential new
data from the vehicle operator, connected and automated vehicle, roadway, and
environment include the degree of driver engagement, cognitive state, biometrics,
ADS system version, system engagement, alerts and warnings, tracking of
vulnerable road users and wildlife, operational design domain, atmospheric
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conditions, and obstructions. While AVs are still in the testing phase of its system
approach, there is a favorable opportunity to standardize the pre-crash data
available to transportation professionals before the full deployment in which it will
be more challenging to make changes. Manufacturers are racing for superiority in
the development of the first fully (Level 4 and 5) AV while keeping the software
and codes proprietary. These rich datasets of AVs can aid in future crash
reconstruction by learning more about these vehicles’ flaws and provide guidance
on preventing similar incidents from occurring again.

Methodologically, this research highlighted and addressed an important issue
related to prior elicitation for scale parameters tracking contours of unobserved
heterogeneity in a Bayesian paradigm, which is an important methodological issue
and has been largely neglected in the transport literature. Several extensions,
however, are in order as part of future work. First, we acknowledge that the AV
technologies are evolving rapidly, and which could lead to changing reactions of
drivers to AVs over time. Using more than four years of AV crash data capture
these rapid evolutions in technology over time. However, note that using such a
long time period could potentially be problematic in that the rapidly evolving AV
technology coupled with changing reactions of drivers to AVs can lead to
significant temporal heterogeneity in the modeled relationships. For literature
explaining such possible temporal variations, see (Alnawmasi & Mannering, 2019;
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Behnood & Mannering, 2019; F. Mannering, 2018). The present study assumed
the effects of explanatory factors to be stable over time. As part of future work, the
proposed methodology in this study should be extended to account for potential
temporal heterogeneity in the effects of key covariates. Along these lines, from a
model specification perspective, we believe the effects of potential temporal
heterogeneity on informative prior elicitation scheme should also be explored.

Second, while accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the form of random
parameters, the study assumed homogenous means and variances for randomheld parameters at times when a portion of modeled unobserved heterogeneity
could be explained as a function of exogenous variables. That is, a nested
regression layer can be added to model the means and variances of random
parameters as a function of observed explanatory factors. Such an extension
would provide new insights regarding how a confluence of observed factors can
help explain some of the unobserved heterogeneity. Several recent studies have
provided compelling evidence regarding the deeper insights and substantial gains
in goodness of fit provided by random parameter models with heterogeneity in
means and/or variances (Behnood & Mannering, 2017a, 2017b; Seraneeprakarn
et al., 2017; Wali, Khattak, & Karnowski, 2018; Wali, Khattak, & Khattak, 2018a;
Xin, Guo, Wang, Lu, & Lin, 2017).
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Third, the present study is based on a continuous representation of unobserved
heterogeneity in a discrete outcome framework. In particular, the continuous
representation is approximated by a discrete number of support points and
probability masses. In our context, continuous representation of unobserved
heterogeneity, leading to random parameter models, is appealing since individual
(crash) level parameter estimates could be obtained and which aligns well with the
fact that AV crashes exhibit unique patterns. However, the estimates of the random
parameter models with continuous distributions could be sensitive to the assumed
distribution for randomly held parameters. A compelling alternative for capturing
unobserved heterogeneity is to use discrete mixture distribution of the parameters
leading to finite mixture models (Park & Lord, 2009) and Markov switching models7
(Khattak & Wali, 2017; Xiong, Tobias, & Mannering, 2014). Finite mixture models
can be applied in a cross-sectional setting, whereas unobserved regime-based
Markov switching models typically necessitate panel (Xiong et al., 2014) or time
series setups (Khattak & Wali, 2017). These models are conceptually appealing
since they connect well to the safety theories of exposure segmentation and the

7

While empirical Bayes methods can be used to obtain individual level estimates from discrete

mixing distribution-based heterogeneity models, however, the individual-level estimates in finite
mixture or Markov switching models are typically constrained to lie in the convex skeleton of classlevel estimates.
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models appear to identify useful and distinct data generation processes. However,
identifying segments or safety regimes cannot fully account for unobserved
heterogeneity if the underlying structure of heterogeneity is continuous in nature
and can lead to inconsistent parameter estimates, i.e., the assumption of withingroup homogeneity in discrete heterogeneity models may not fully track the
contours of unobserved heterogeneity driven by individual-level unobservables. To
this end, random parameter and finite mixture/Markov switching models can be
integrated to simultaneously harness the advantages offered by the discrete and
continuous representation of unobserved heterogeneity (Xiong & Mannering,
2013). Thus, an interesting future research avenue could be to simultaneously
examine discrete and continuous representations of unobserved heterogeneity in
AV crash data. However, advanced Markov switching and random parameter
Markov switching based estimation techniques are data-hungry methods (Khattak
& Wali, 2017; Xiong & Mannering, 2013; Xiong et al., 2014), and limited datasets
(such as the one in this study) do not allow estimation of such granular models.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EXPLORING THE WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, AND WHY OF
AUTOMATED VEHICLE DISENGAGEMENTS
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This chapter presents a modified version of a research paper by Alexandra M.
Boggs, Ramin Arvin, and Asad J. Khattak. The paper (20-01865) was accepted for
presentation at the 99th Annual Meeting of Transportation Research Record in
Washington, D.C. The paper is under second-stage review in Accident Analysis
and Prevention.

Abstract

Automated

vehicles

are

emerging

on

the

transportation

networks

as

manufacturers test their automated driving system (ADS) capabilities in complex
real-world environments in testing operations like California’s Autonomous Vehicle
Tester Program. A more comprehensive understanding of the ADS safety
performances can be established through the California Department of Motor
Vehicle disengagement and crash reports. This study comprehensively examines
the safety performances (159,840 disengagements, 124 crashes, and 3,669,472
automated vehicle miles traveled by the manufacturers) documented since the
inauguration of the testing program. The reported disengagements were
categorized as control discrepancy, environmental conditions and other road
users, hardware and software discrepancy, perception discrepancy, planning
discrepancy, and operator takeover. An applicable subset of disengagements was
then used to identify and quantify the 5 W’s of these safety-critical events: who
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(disengagement initiator), when (the maturity of the ADS), where (location of
disengagement), and what/why (the facts causing the disengagement). The
disengagement initiator, whether the ADS or human operator, is linked with
contributing factors, such as the location, disengagement cause, and ADS testing
maturity through a random parameter binary logit model that captured unobserved
heterogeneity. Results reveal that compared to freeways and interstates, the ADS
has a lower likelihood of initiating the disengagement on streets and roads
compared to the human operator. Likewise, software and hardware, and planning
discrepancies are associated with the ADS initiating the disengagement. As the
ADS testing maturity advances in months, the probability of the disengagement
being initiated by the ADS increases when compared to human-initiated. Overall,
the

study

contributes

by

understanding

the

factors

associated

with

disengagements and exploring their implications for automated systems.

Introduction

The concept of self-driving vehicles is evolving as manufacturers are pursuing to
develop the first fully automated vehicle (AV) to sell to consumers. Mass-produced
vehicles with advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS), Levels 1 and 2 of
driving automation, are surfacing on the transportation networks. The prevailing
ambitions for the automotive industry to produce highly automated vehicles
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(Bhavsar, Das, Paugh, Dey, & Chowdhury), Levels 3-5 of driving automation, are
the radical reduction in crashes, decreased emissions, and increased mobility for
underrepresented users (Arvin, Kamrani, Khattak, & Rios-Torres, 2018a; Arvin,
Khattak, & Rios Torres, 2019a; Fagnant & Kockelman, 2015; Milakis et al., 2017;
Shladover, 2018; Wadud et al., 2016; Yang, Ozbay, & Ban, 2017). To
manufacturer the first Level 4 and 5 vehicles, companies are testing their
automated driving system (ADS) in challenging simulation environments and then
are progressing on to public roadways. One of these states includes California,
which in September 2014, established the Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program to
authorize permit-holding companies to test HAVs on public infrastructure (State of
California Department of Motor Vehicles). Currently, vehicles restricted from
testing on public roadways include trailers, motorcycles, vehicles with operating
authority, vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of greater than 10,001 pounds, and
hazardous vehicles (State of California Department of Motor Vehicles). One of the
principal requirements for program participants, as delegated in California Code of
Regulations Section 227.50, is to preserve data related to disengagements during
the year and submit a disengagement report (OL 311) by the first of each year to
the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) (State of California Department
of Motor Vehicles). The other requires manufacturers to self-report a collision (OL
316) involving their vehicles within ten days (State of California Department of
Motor Vehicles). As noted in the 2016 California Assembly Bill No. 1592 (2016),
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disengagements are the deactivation of the ADAS or ADS during the event of a
detected failure of the driving system or when the vehicle operator is needed for
the safe operation of the vehicle. Recently adopted regulations on February 26,
2018, amended the text of the 2014 regulations to allow companies to test AVs
without a driver inside the vehicle provided that a list of requirements are satisfied.
At this time, Waymo is the only manufacturer that is authorized to test driverless
vehicles (State of California Department of Motor Vehicles Office of Public Affairs,
2018).

Testing AVs are presently regarded as conditional automation (Level 3), also
known as driver-initiated automation, in which the vehicle operator has the
authority to dictate the instances of engagement and disengagement of the system
(Banks & Stanton, 2016; Society of Automotive Engineers On-Road Automated
Vehicle Standards Committee, 2018). While the system performs the longitudinal
and lateral control of the vehicle, the vehicle operator is obligated to monitor the
driving environment and must be prepared to take over the driving tasks in a
foreseen occurrence. Given the vehicle operator has been actively overseeing the
driving environment, the transition to manual control is expected to occur
instantaneously and in a safe manner. These events have the potential to induce
a crash with other roadway users or objects if there is a delay in reaction time of
the takeover. As a result, disengagements can be considered “near-miss” crashes
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as the vehicle operator is mitigating the likelihood of a crash by regaining control
of the vehicle.

This study takes advantage of the California DMV manufacturer-reported
disengagement and crash reports of AVs from the establishment of the program in
September 2014 to November 2018 and develops a unique and comprehensive
database to thoroughly understand the safety performances of the ADS. While the
trip data on successes (no disengagements) is unobtainable, it is possible to
identify and quantify the 5 W’s (who, what, when, where, and why) of the
disengagements to more precisely evaluate the safety characteristics of these
vehicles. A more thorough understanding of the initiator of disengaging the system
(who), the cause for the disengagement (what and why), the maturity of the system
(when), and the location of the AV of the transition (where) can be obtained through
the analysis of the comprehensive and unique database.

Literature Review

The principal and compelling rationale for the advancement of AVs is the potential
to immensely reduce fatalities and injuries (Fagnant & Kockelman, 2015), as more
than 90% of the collisions are contributed to human error (Singh, 2015). However,
the ADS of the AVs would depend on the coding of the system, which is subject to
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human error during program creation, data supplication, and system operation
(Ravid, 2014). Society’s perception, acceptance, and trust of these emerging
technologies demand the need for research on automation, sociotechnical
intricacies, and resilience of the system (Motamedi, Wang, Zhang, & Chan, 2019;
Noy et al., 2018; Sheng et al., 2019).

As more vehicles with low-level automation emerge on the transportation network
throughout the United States, there has been an increase in the fatal collisions
involving these vehicles. Through the reconstruction of the crashes, a more
thorough understanding of the limits and failures of ADAS and ADS, and drivers’
usage of these systems are acknowledged. The first known fatality involving an
AV occurred in 2016 in Williston, Florida, in which a Level 2 Tesla Model S struck
the side underride of a tractor-trailer and sheared the roof of the Tesla (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2017). From the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) investigation, Tesla’s AutoPilot could not detect crossing-path
traffic, and the driver over-relied on the ADAS in the incorrect operational design
domain (ODD), which refers to the locations and conditions in which the ADS is
specifically designed to operate (SAE On-Road Automated Vehicle Standards
Committee, 2014). Examples of these constraints include the roadway
classification, weather, speed limit, and other manufacturer-defined conditions
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2017). More recently, in 2019, a similar
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crash sequence with the same vehicle classifications as Williston, Florida (Tesla
vehicle engaged in AutoPilot under riding the side of a tractor-trailer making a turn
occurred in Delray Beach, Florida (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018d).
In 2018, a Tesla Model X engaged in AutoPilot, collided with a previously struck
attenuator at a high velocity with the driver’s hands not detected on the steering
wheel for the 6 seconds prior to impact (National Transportation Safety Board,
2018c). In 2018, a pedestrian was fatally struck in Tempe, Arizona, by Uber’s Level
3 test vehicle when illegally crossing the road at midblock. Identified in the Tempe
Police crash report and NTSB preliminary report, the professionally-trained vehicle
operator was determined to be distracted on a personal mobile device and not
adequately overseeing the driving task with the ADS struggling to classify the
pedestrian (initially identified as an unknown object, then as a vehicle, and then as
a bicycle) and with a varying expected direction of travel (National Transportation
Safety Board, 2018a; Tempe Police Department, 2018).

Given the contributing factors in the above AV crashes, the literature also reveals
the constraints of cameras, sensors, and the human adaptation of the automated
driving task. Sensors are able to more correctly identify other vehicles (due to the
reflectance of the vehicle body) in poor weather conditions (i.e., rain, fog, sun glare,
twilight) (Hussain & Zeadally, 2018; Wei et al., 2013) compared to pedestrians
(Farhadi et al., 2009). Cameras lenses have potential drawbacks as they can be
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coated with dirt and grime, have a limited angle of view, lens distortion may occur,
and they may require constant calibration (Wan et al., 2014). Further, AV sensors
will need to be resilient against cyber-attacks, including spoofing of the navigation
systems and the introduction of falsified messages into the communication system
(Petit & Shladover, 2014). With the incorporation of these messages into a
connected environment, these messages can alter the longitudinal control of
vehicles, inordinately affecting the stability of traffic flow and increasing the
likelihood of rear-end collisions (Amoozadeh et al., 2015) while increasing energy
expenses (Gerdes, Winstead, & Heaslip, 2013; Milakis et al., 2017).

Further, the transition of a human from a conventionally-driven vehicle to an AV
requires the driver to be promoted to a supervisor of ADS (Merat et al., 2012). The
two necessary responsibilities of the operator in the new role are continuously
overseeing the ADS to ensure the system is functioning correctly and being ready
to take control of the vehicle when the ADS strays from anticipated behavior
(Bainbridge, 1983; Eriksson & Stanton, 2017). A state of limited interaction
between the system and a human (Endsley & Kiris, 1995), referred to as out-ofthe-loop performance, is characterized by a diminished capability of intervening
and regaining control of the system. While humans are not entirely removed from
the driving task, previous studies reveal that the likelihood of humans being
inadequately trained and improperly supervising may offset the expected benefits
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of automation (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). As one of these benefits of
automation, overall safety is diminished as humans have cognitive limitations when
monitoring the system (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993) and regaining control
of the vehicle (Strand, Nilsson, Karlsson, & Nilsson, 2014; Young & Stanton, 2007).

Reaction times and the effects of workload and situational awareness for
automation failures of Level 2 AVs have been studied throughout human factors
literature (Gold, Damböck, Lorenz, & Bengler, 2013; Jamson et al., 2013; Merat et
al., 2012; Radlmayr, Gold, Lorenz, Farid, & Bengler, 2014). As the level of
automation increases (Level 1 to Level 2), Young and Stanton (Young & Stanton,
2007) reported the brake reaction time increases by nearly a half of a second which
agrees with the findings of Strand et al. (Strand et al., 2014). Jamson et al. (Jamson
et al., 2013) reported that AV operators were less responsive in lighter traffic
volumes when compared to heavier traffic. Lastly, a study in 2014 (Merat et al.,
2014) determined that vehicle takeover has the potential to last for up to 40
seconds. An online survey study discovered that a majority of respondents stated
that in Level 3 vehicles, they would not have to focus on the driving environment
and would participate in activities that would negatively affect safety (Robertson et
al., 2017).

More recently, researchers utilized the California DMV AV crash and
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disengagement reports to explore the characteristics of crashes and the causes of
disengagements. Dixit et al. (V. V. Dixit et al., 2016), Favaro et al. (F. Favarò et
al., 2018), and Lv et al. (Lv et al., 2017) examined the relationship between crashes
and the autonomous vehicle miles traveled and categorized the disengagement
causes into broader areas. Dixit et al. (V. V. Dixit et al., 2016) and Wang and Li
(Wang & Li, 2019a) both investigated the reaction times of human operators as
they regain authority of the vehicle. Dixit et al. (V. V. Dixit et al., 2016) qualitatively
examined two of the six companies’ reaction times from the first disengagement
report (September 2014 to November 2015) and determined the average reaction
time to be 0.83 seconds. Wang and Li (Wang & Li, 2019a) utilized 503
disengagements from a selection of manufacturers between August 2016 and
November 2017 to quantify the take-over time and cause of disengagements by
using the number of sensors on the vehicle and roadway type through statistical
analysis. Given that there have been only a few studies with a limited number of
disengagements, there is an evident gap in the literature that disengagements
have not been comprehensively and systematically examined. Therefore, this
study aims to explore the disengagements occurring from 2014 to 2018 to
methodologically quantify the initiator of the ADS disengagement with an array of
contributing attributes such as the disengagement location, cause for the
disengagement, and the ADS system maturity. Thus, this paper contributes to
literature by obtaining a more comprehensive understanding of the
139

disengagements and the implications of these critical safety events.

Methodology

Data Collection
With the creation of the Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program, permit-holding
manufacturers are required to submit an annual report at the first of each year that
summarizes

the

disengagements.

The

reports

provide

the

details

on

disengagements from December 1 to November 30 for the following year. The
reports

are

then

examined

by

DMV

officials

and

published

to

https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/testing for the public to
view. Notably, in 2017, the DMV introduced a revised Annual Report of
Autonomous Vehicle Disengagement (OL 311R) to standardize the reporting
method among manufacturers. Permit-holding companies were required to utilize
this form for the 2018 disengagement reports. The noteworthy revisions included
separation of disengagements by vehicle identification number (VIN), whether the
vehicle is capable of operating without a driver, the initiator of the disengagement,
and whether the driver was present. In the preceding years, manufacturers were
required to state the automated vehicle miles traveled (AVMT) by month, but
additionally required the AVMT to be specified by the VIN in 2018.
140

For this study, disengagements occurring in September 2014 to November 2018
were used to create a unique database which contains the manufacturer, date of
disengagement, initiator of disengagement, cause for disengagement, location of
disengagement, VIN (for the year 2018), time of day (if available), environmental
conditions (if available), and time to takeover (if available). As of January 2019,
there were 62 Autonomous Vehicle Testing Permit holders consisting of
technology businesses, ride-hailing companies, tier-1 companies, and car
manufacturers. A total of 159,840 disengagements among 36 permit-holding
companies of the ADS were recorded and examined for this study. The composed
database is an exhaustive database on AV disengagements in California.
Manufacturers that had an active permit but did not test or were authorized for
testing after January 1st are required to submit a disengagement report the
subsequent year (i.e., companies approved after January 1st, 2018 are required to
submit disengagements in 2018 in the 2019 disengagement report) (State of
California Department of Motor Vehicles). As a result, there is a difference between
the number of companies who submitted a report and the number of active permit
holding manufacturers.

As stated previously, manufacturers must report a collision involving their vehicles
to the DMV within ten days. By utilizing crash data in this study, the safety
performances of the ADS, the number of disengagements, and miles traveled in
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autonomy. Table 4.1 presents the performances of the ADS from the inauguration
of the program on September 16, 2014 to November 30, 2018. In total, AVs have
traveled 3,669,472 miles and have disengaged 159,840 times resulting in an
average of 4.35 disengagements per 100 AVMT. Notably, over 72% of these miles
traveled are by Waymo vehicles. As the 2018 disengagement reports required the
VINs of the vehicles testing, we know there were a total of 464 vehicles being
tested on California roadways. The year, make, and model were determined
through the VIN, and the vast majority of the vehicles used are Lincoln MKZ
sedans. However, Waymo is utilizing Chrysler Pacifica vans, whereas Apple and
Uber are using Lexus RX and Volvo XC 90 sport utility vehicles, respectively. While
124 crashes have occurred, 11 crashes (9.7%) occurred when the driver
disengaged the system and manually took control of the vehicle before a crash
transpired (Boggs, Wali, & Khattak, 2019). Given that the at-fault vehicle is not
provided in the OL 316, from context, only one crash was recorded as occurring
due to the ADS.

An often-used safety performance measure in transportation safety, crashes per
100 vehicle miles traveled, can be used to evaluate disengagements and crashes
in this study. Examining the performance measures in Table 4.1, it is observed
Waymo, GM Cruise, and Zoox disengage on average less than once per 100
AMVT even though these manufacturers have the most frequent crashes. Apple
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Table 4.1 ADS performances of manufacturers per calendar year
2014

2015

2016

2017

2018*

Total

Company AVMT Diseng Crash AVMT Diseng Crash AVMT Diseng Crash AVMT Diseng Crash AVMT Diseng Crash AVMT Diseng Crash
AIMotive
AIpod
Apple
Aurora
AutoX
Baidu
BMW
Bosch
93
CarONE
Delphi
3,591
Drive.ai
Ford
GM Cruise
Honda
Mercedes
743
Nissan
479
Nullmax
Nuro
NVIDIA
Phantom
PlusAI
Pony.ai
Qualcomm
Roadstar.ai
SAIC
SF Motors
Telenav
Tesla
-

126
189
513
39
-

0
1
0
0
-

843
13,538
285
594
2,049
-

499
243
135
511
72
-

0
0
0
0
0
-

37
6
638
1
1,132 1,537
2,622
151
557
59
509
3
12,678 157
673
336
3,547
24
454
9
550
182

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
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1,559 11,101
3,406
72
5,340
966
3,089
62
1,305
503
272
79
1,820
81
6,130
96
143,105 103
1,149
957
5,156
28
942
90
8,325
18
505
109
146
32
5,768
103
1,585
4
287
0
1,371
49
-

2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
22
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-

3,903
17
32
16
79,024 65,482
29,452
307
22,102
108
16,939
69
41
9
189
46
287
0
4,502
51
433,243
80
168
77
1,633
1,079
4,833
22
2,893
65
24,438
23
4,143
206
4,003
168
9,618
193
16,213
16
240
21
7,252
19
634
526
2,562
222
29
5
-

0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
36
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-

3,903
17
32
16
80,583 76,583
32,858
379
27,442 1,074
20,065
137
679
10
3,372
2,665
461
125
21,858
664
11,189
206
590
3
589,312
475
168
77
4,792
3,396
16,064
185
3,835
155
32,763
41
4,648
315
4,149
200
15,386
296
17,798
20
240
21
7,539
19
634
526
2,562
222
1,854
63
550
182

0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
59
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 4.1. Continued.
2014

2015

2016

2017

2018*

Total

Company AVMT Diseng Crash AVMT Diseng Crash AVMT Diseng Crash AVMT Diseng Crash AVMT Diseng Crash AVMT Diseng Crash
Toyota
381
150
TuSimple
662
56
0
Uber
18,826 49,931
3
8,075 23,234
Valeo
103
26
0
471
189
0
Volkswagen 12,718 242
0
2,228
18
0
Waymo
53,428 85
0 409,759 258
9 654,627 133
13 334,661 55
3 1,216,267 111
3,811
176
1
15,122
74
WeRide.ai
Zoox
2,883
14
1
30,126
16
Total
71,051 1,194
1 429,296 1,736
9 678,128 2,624
15 552,573 64,874 32 1,938,343 92,412
Notes: *December 2018 data not reported, AVMT = automated vehicle miles traveled, AVMT rounded to the nearest mile
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1
0
21
1
6
68

381
150
1
662
56
0
26,901 70,165
3
574
215
0
14,946
260
0
2,668,742 642
46
18,933
250
1
33,009
30
7
3,669,472 159,840 124

and Uber are on the opposite end of the spectrum, disengaging 95 and 261 times
for every 100 AVMT, respectively. Notably, Waymo has logged over two and a
half-million miles traveled in autonomous mode within the Autonomous Vehicle
Tester Program, which accumulates to approximately 72% of all AVMT in the
dataset. GM Cruise and Waymo have been involved in nearly 85% of the crashes,
which is likely due to the higher exposure (AVMT) on the roadways.

Data Cleaning and Categorization
As previously mentioned, the DMV revised the required information for
manufacturers to submit in the disengagement reports to aid in the standardization
of reports among companies. By requiring such information, manufacturers are no
longer required to submit time to takeover but are now obliged to provide the
initiator of the disengagement: ADS, test driver, remote operator, or passenger. To
determine the initiator in the previous years, disengagements with a vehicle
takeover of “0” or “N/A” seconds were noted to be a human.

The data collected from the California Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program were
cleaned to ensure the disengagement data reported by manufacturers were in
linewith the provided definition of a disengagement. Recall that the California
Assembly Bill No. 1592 defines a disengagement as an unanticipated and
unplanned transition from autonomous to conventional mode (2016). Therefore,
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the causes of disengagements that were recorded as planned testing and
validation of new features were removed from the dataset (N = 5,411) as they do
not reflect the definition. Disengagements that occurred in a parking facility or were
reported as indeterminable by the manufacturer were also removed. Observations
with an indeterminable initiator were eliminated. Disengagements caused by the
vehicle being outside the ODD, locations in which the ADS is specifically designed
to function (SAE On-Road Automated Vehicle Standards Committee, 2014), were
discarded from the database for consistency, as some manufacturers did not
report these in their reports. In total, 6,576 disengagements were cleaned,
resulting in 153,264 remaining disengagements for the analysis.

The California DMV does not provide predefined categories for the manufacturers
to enter on the submitted disengagement reports. Instead, each disengagement
report has a field for manufacturers to describe the facts causing a disengagement
by using a phrase, sentence, or sentences. There is a substantial variation in the
provided details by each company due to the lack of predefined standards. To
illustrate, Delphi provided the cause of “stock vehicle failure” for a disengagement
in April 2015 and did not provide any additional details of the failure of the retrofitted
vehicle. Drive.ai reported a disengagement on December 5, 2017 that was caused
by a “false perception of traffic light caused AV to proceed at red light.” The
apparent variation among companies and years indicates the need to group the
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causes of disengagements into broader categories.

In March 2019, the California Department of Motor Vehicles published a memo
requiring manufacturers to submit the disengagement description in “plain
language with enough detail that a non-technical person can understand the
circumstances triggering the disengagement” (California Department of Motor
Vehicles, 2019). After the submission of the 2017 disengagement reports, the
California Department of Motor Vehicles contacted eight companies - Baidu,
Delphi, Drive.ai, GM Cruise, Nissan, Telenav, Waymo, and Zoox – to provide
supplementary information on their disengagement reports, especially the
provided causes for disengagements. As requested, the companies provided the
DMV

the

requested

information

and

provided

examples

of

types

of

disengagements. This information was made publicly available and allowed the
recording of the disengagements causes to be accomplished. Additionally, some
companies that were not asked for supplemental information (e.g., WeRide)
published causes for disengagement categories and examples in their
disengagement reports. By aggregating the supplementary information, examples
from disengagement reports, and past literature (F. Favarò et al., 2018; Pendleton
et al., 2017; Wang & Li, 2019a), the causes for the transition into the conventional
mode were categorized using the keywords in the cause.
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As illustrated in Figure 4.1, six groups of disengagements were developed: control
discrepancy, environmental and other road users, hardware and software
discrepancy, perception discrepancy, planning discrepancy, and operator
takeover. In summary, disengagements caused by control discrepancies are
irregularities in the control system, which regulates the vehicles’ acceleration and
deceleration, steering, gear shift, and turn signal. Environmental conditions and
other road user discrepancies occur when the vehicle encounters areas of
construction, road debris, poor lane markings, emergency vehicles, blocked lanes,
or unlawful other road users. Hardware and software disengagements are caused
by discrepancies in the communications, software, system, hardware, or the stock
vehicle. Perception issues include inappropriate detection of traffic signals,
vehicles, and other objects. Planning discrepancies involve anomalies in the
system that estimates the location of the vehicle and determines the route of the
AV trajectory. The last category of disengagements is operator takeover, which
can occur when the AV does not satisfy the driving task requirements or the
operator is distressed. Figure 4.1 also illustrates commonly worded causes of
disengagements provided by the companies and the methodology used to group
causes into the appropriate category. The thicknesses of the recorded
disengagement causes (on the left of the figure) represent the approximate
percentage of the grouped category. For example, discrepancies with the AV’s
cruise control system were denoted as control issues as the control system
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Figure 4.1 Categorization of disengagements causes
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manages the acceleration and deceleration. Notably, disengagement records
labeled with the grouped cause for disengagement were not included in this figure.
For example, the manufacturer Aurora reported 22 disengagements with the cause
“control discrepancy,” since this category was named as the grouped category, it
was not included in the causes for illustration purposes.

Resulting Database
The data utilized in this study are the result of manually extracting records from
disengagement reports submitted by permit-holding manufacturers in California’s
Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program. The information collected includes the
initiator of the ADS disengagement, the location of the disengagement, and the
cause of the disengagement. Given that manufacturers began testing their AVs at
varying times, a variable was needed to represent the testing maturity of their
system. As time advances, companies are able to assess the proficiency of their
system in real-world environments versus simulated environments and revise their
system

accordingly.

Therefore,

for

each

disengagement

record,

the

manufacturer’s month of testing was noted to account for the maturity of their
system. Companies with more months of testing are expected to disengage less,
as the defects of the system are modified and the vehicle operators trust the
system. Moreover, manufacturers were required to identify the location of the
disengagement, which led to the generation of three groups: freeway/interstate,
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highway, and street/road. The last variable noted was the cause of the
disengagement as discussed previously.

As the objective of this study is to explore the 5 W’s by examining the relationship
of environmental surroundings, disengagement cases, and maturity of the testing
system with the initiator of disengagement, we utilized a subset of the
disengagement records which had a variation in the initiator. As seen in Table 4.2,
Apple and Uber lack a variation among human-initiated disengagements as all
were noted as “operator takeover” while the ADS-initiated disengagements were
due to a control, perception, planning, or hardware/software discrepancy. Unlike
Apple and Uber, other manufacturers had a variation in the initiator of the
disengagement cause. Additionally, “operator takeover” replicates the dependent
variable (initiator of the disengagement) and is not truly a cause (reason) for a
disengagement. Thus, records with this cause were not used in the analysis. By
using a subset of the records which has a variation in the initiator, we are able to
model the contributing factors of the disengagement initiator.

Modeling Approach
As previously stated, the objective of this study is to examine the initiator of the
disengagement

and

the

initiator’s

relationship

with

the

environmental

surroundings, disengagement causes, and maturity of the testing system. As a
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Table 4.2 Distribution of disengagement initiators from Apple and Uber
Apple (N= 76,503)
Disengagement
Cause

ADS
N

Control
35,457
discrepancy
Perception
2
discrepancy
Planning
840
discrepancy
Hardware/Software
3,900
discrepancy
Operator Takeover
0
Total

40,199

Uber (N = 70,100)

Human
%

N

%

ADS
N

Human
%

N

%

46.35

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

1.10

0

0.00 3,554

5.07

0

0.00

5.10

0

0.00 1,916

2.73

0

0.00

0.00

36,384

47.56

0

0.00 64,630

92.20

52.55

36,384

47.56 5,470

7.80 64,630

92.20

result of the revision of OL R311, disengagement observations were required to
determine the initiator of the takeover, whether it was the ADS, test driver,
passenger, or remote operator. Prior to the modification in the 2018
disengagement report, initiators of the disengagements were depicted as human
or ADS. To maintain the initiator coding throughout the reports, observations were
described either as human or ADS in this study. Such human-initiated
disengagements were contributed to the test driver, passenger, or remote
operator.

Given the dichotomy of the outcome variable (human or ADS), an extensively used
approach in the literature is the binary logistic regression (Mokhtarimousavi,
Anderson, Azizinamini, & Hadi, 2019; Nazari, Rahimi, & Mohammadian, 2019). To
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meet the requirements of the binary model, the observed response outcome,
“disengaged by” was developed where the response variable Y, is disengaged by
the ADS (Y=1), or by the human (Y=0). The general form of the binary logistic
regression is (K. E. Train, 2009):

𝑃 (𝑦 = 1, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐴𝑉 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚) =

𝑒 𝛽𝑜+𝛽𝑋
1 + 𝑒𝛽𝑜 +𝛽𝑋

(4.1)

Where: 𝑃𝑛 is the probability of the disengagement initiator was the ADS.

However, a collection of attributes can extensively influence a disengagement of
an AV. There is a possibility that all possible factors are not captured in the
available dataset, especially since the AV disengagement data provided only
shared a few key attributes. Unaccounted factors can affect the relationships
between the disengagement of the ADS and the associated factors. By
constraining the estimable parameters to be fixed when there is a variation could
contribute to inconsistent and biased parameter estimates. These factors could
include but are not limited to: differences in disengagement reporting, training of
vehicle operators and engineers, other roadway participants’ behavior, ADS
features, and roadway characteristics. In transportation literature, this issue is
denoted as unobserved heterogeneity (Esfahani & Song, 2019; F. L. Mannering et
al., 2016; K. E. Train, 2009; Wali, Khattak, & Khattak, 2018a; Wali, Khattak,
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Waters, et al., 2018a). Given the potentially inconsistent and biased parameter
estimates, we account for unobserved heterogeneity by utilizing a mixed logit
model, which is also referred to as a random parameter logit model in the literature.
In order to develop the model, we have the utility expression in general form (D. A.
Hensher & Greene, 2003):

𝑈𝑖𝑛 = 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛 + 𝜂𝑖𝑛

(4.2)

Where: 𝜂𝑖𝑛 is a random term with a mean of zero and a distribution that depends
on parameters or data. A mixed logit is a generalized form of the multinomial logit
form that allows the estimated parameters to vary across each observation. The
probability of mixed logit takes its usual form (K. E. Train, 2009):

𝑃𝑖𝑛 = ∫

exp(𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑛)
𝑓(𝛽|𝜑)𝑑𝛽
∑𝑙 exp(𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑛)

(4.3)

Where: 𝑓(𝛽|𝜑) is the density function of 𝛽 and the vector of density parameters is
𝜑. Notably, when 𝛽 is fixed, Equation 4.3 is reduced to a standard binary logit model
specification. The model used in this study accounts for unobserved heterogeneity
by allowing each estimated parameter to vary across each disengagement in the
dataset (Dong et al., 2014; El-Basyouny & Sayed, 2009).
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In this study, 200 standard Halton draws are used to maximize the log-likelihood
function, as literature reveals an increase in efficiency when using Halton draws
compared to random draws (Bhat, 2003; D. Hensher, Louviere, & Swait, 1998).
The values of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) were evaluated and compared
to determine the best fitting model (Bozdogan, 1987):

𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 𝐿𝐿 + 2𝑘

(4.4)

Where: 𝐿𝐿 is log-likelihood at convergence, and 𝑘 is the number of parameters in
the model. The marginal effect can be defined as an increase in the probability of
the dependent variable (disengagement by the system) by one unit increase in the
variable of interest (X). The mathematical formulation is (Greene, 2002):

∂E[P(yi )] dF(β′ X)
=
β = F ′ (βX)β = f(βX)β
∂Xi
d(β′ X)

(4.6)

Where 𝐸[𝑃(𝑦𝑖 )] is the expected value of the probability, 𝐹(𝛽 ′ 𝑋) and 𝑓(𝛽𝑋) are the
density and probability functions of 𝐸(𝑦𝑖 |𝑋), respectively. Models were estimated
through NLOGIT 10.0.
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Results

Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. A
human initiated the disengagements in 75% of the records. There were two
instances when the AV was disengaged by a remote operator for a planning
anomaly and software and hardware discrepancy, and these two events were
categorized as human-initiated. More disengagements occurred on streets/roads
compared to the freeways/interstates and highways. The maturity of the ADS
system at the time of disengagement varied with a minimum of the system being
in its first month of testing to a maximum of the 51st month. The mean of ADS
maturity was approximately 9.70 months (approximately 39 weeks).

Table 4.4 presents the results for the fixed and random parameter binary logistic
model. Results reveal that for the two models, all of the variables except the
perception discrepancy are significant at the 0.01% level. The table also illustrates
the marginal effects of each explanatory variable. These values are the average
effects of the given independent variable on the frequency of the ADS initiating the
disengagement while holding other independent variables at their means. For
example, compared to control discrepancy, hardware/software discrepancy is
associated with a 0.225 increase in the probability of the disengagement initiator
being ADS as expected.
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics of disengagement subset data
Variable
Location

Disengagement
cause

Maturity of testing

Variable Name
Freeway/interstate
Highway
Street/road
Control discrepancy
Environmental/other
road user
Hardware/software
discrepancy
Perception
discrepancy
Planning
discrepancy
Months of testing

Percent/Mean Frequency/S.D. Min. Max.

ADS
(N=1,433)

Human
(N=4,298)

N

%

N

3.33
15.29
81.38
6.87

191
876
4,664
394

0
0
0
0

3
3
3
5

75
438
920
53

5.23
30.57
64.20
3.70

116
438
3,744
341

2.70
10.19
87.11
7.93

11.66

668

0

5

167

11.65

501

11.66

25.70

1,473

0

5

462

32.24

1,011

23.52

20.82

1,193

0

5

158

11.03

1,035

24.08

34.95

2,003

0

5

593

41.38

1,410

32.81

9.70

9.87

1

51

-

-

-

-

Sample size: 5,731 disengagements
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Table 4.4 Fixed and random parameters binary logistic regression model results
Variables
Constant
Location b
Highway
Street/Road
Cause c
Environmental/other
road user
Hardware/software
discrepancy
Perception
discrepancy
Planning discrepancy
Maturity of testing
Month of testing
Month of testing
std.
Summary Statistics
Sample Size
AIC
LL at the null
LL at the model
McFadden ρ2
Accuracy

Fixed Parameter a
Marginal
β
Sig.
effect
-2.050
0.000
-

Random Parameter a
Marginal
β
Sig.
effect
-1.374
0.000
-

0.560
-1.220

0.001
0.000

0.100
-0.235

0.309
-1.114

0.021
0.000

0.059
-0.211

0.853

0.000

0.152

0.759

0.000

0.144

1.458

0.000

0.259

1.189

0.000

0.225

0.133

0.467

0.022

0.072

0.629

0.014

1.221

0.000

0.208

1.169

0.000

0.221

0.032

13.70

0.005

0.014

0.000

0.003

-

-

-

0.042

0.000

-

5,731
5691.7
-3214.691
-2837.865
0.117
78.638%

5,731
5668.6
-3214.691
-2825.300
0.121
89.764%

a

Base of model is human (Y = 0), b base of location is freeway/interstate, and c base of cause is control
discrepancy
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The fixed and random models were compared with one another using the summary
statistics. Through a comparison of AIC, log-likelihood, accuracy rate, and
McFadden R2, the random parameter model was found to have a better fit when
compared to the fixed parameter model. The prediction accuracy rate for the fixed
parameter model is 78.638% and increased by more than 10% to 89.764% for the
random parameter model. Therefore, the interpretation of the results will rely on
the results of the random parameter model.

Discussion

In this section, the results for the propensity of the ADS-initiated disengagements
are discussed. The results illustrate that all of the independent variables except
disengagements caused by perception discrepancies are statistically significant at
the 99% confidence level. As the model statistics resulted in a better overall fit for
the random parameter model, the discussion is based solely on this model rather
than the fixed parameter model.

Regarding the location of disengagements, the random parameter model
highlights that when compared to freeways and interstates, streets and roads are
associated with a 0.211 decrease in the probability of the ADS-initiated
disengagement. This result is reasonable as environments on streets and roads
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are complex due to the presence of varying geometry, traffic control devices, signs,
and markings. In addition to driveways, roads and streets have intersections which
are demanding to the AV and overseeing operator due to the interactions with
vulnerable road users (i.e., pedestrians, bicycles, and vehicles), lack of guiding
lane markings through the intersection, sight obstructions from stationary motor
vehicles and buildings, and unlawful vehicular movements (Meyer & Beiker, 2019).
Intersections have multifaceted movements of vehicles (e.g., turning right on red
or making U-turns) that can cause drivers to misjudge the gap or speeds of other
vehicles. This type of behavior could potentially provoke AVs to make an incorrect
decision, leading the human operator to initiate a disengagement, as they foresee
an inevitable event or feel uncomfortable/unsafe. This finding is confirmed in
previous studies on AV-involved crashes as operators frequently anticipated a
crash and would disengage to attempt to mitigate the crash (Banerjee et al., 2018;
Boggs, Wali, et al., 2019; F. M. Favarò et al., 2017). Highways are associated with
a 0.059 increase in the probability of ADS-initiated disengagement compared to
the freeways and interstates base. While this result is statistically significant, it is
not substantial as there is little difference between highways, freeways, and
interstates association with ADS-initiated disengagements. However, it should be
noted that freeways, interstates, and highways have a higher speed limit and
vehicle capacity compared to streets and roads. The reaction of the vehicle
operator must be nearly instantaneous when alerted as the speed is higher, and
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thus, the braking distance is more significant compared to the braking distance at
lower speeds.

Regarding the cause for the disengagement, the results reveal a planning
discrepancy is associated with a 0.221 increase in the probability of the ADS
disengaging the system when compared to control discrepancy. As previously
mentioned, planning refers to the system which calculates and determines the
trajectory of the AV to handle driving scenarios. The estimated marginal effects
value for planning discrepancies is reasonable as the ADS is making decisions in
the background that cannot be observed by the operator. Instead, these
discrepancies will cause the ADS to alert the driver to takeover the vehicle. Further,
compared

to

the

base

of

control

irregularities,

discrepancies

in

the

hardware/software is associated with a 0.225 increase in the probability of the
ADS-initiating the disengagement. Intuitively, this value is logical as the hardware
and software problems often cannot be seen from the surface by the vehicle
operator. Lastly, compared to the base, the random parameter reveals
environmental conditions and other road users are associated with an increase of
0.144 in the probability of the ADS-initiated disengagements. These types of
disengagements are primarily due to other road users and inadequate road
infrastructure (i.e., pavement markings and surface). Examples of these
disengagement causes are when AVs struggle to correctly identify lane markings,
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maneuver within construction zones, and grant emergency vehicles the right-ofthe-way.

Finally, the ADS testing maturity parameter highlights that as the maturity of the
testing increases by a month, the probability of a disengagement being initiated by
ADS increases by 0.014. While the standard deviation of 0.042 is relatively larger
than the mean, it represents the probability of the ADS initiating the disengagement
for 98.32% of the records but is negative (human initiating) for 1.68% of the
observations. The probability distribution can be seen in Figure 4.2 below. By
incorporating the random parameter to account for unobserved heterogeneity, the
model highlighted important information that would have caused inappropriate
interpretations if it had not been used. Dixit et al. (V. V. Dixit et al., 2016)
determined that a lack of trust in the vehicle’s ADS system can increase the
likelihood of a manual disengagement (by a human) and a reduction in the
takeover time. Thus, as the maturity of the system and the ADS technology
progresses, the operators’ confidence and reliance in the system increases.
Therefore, the result that there will be a marginal increase in the ADS-initiated
disengagement as the system advances is likely due to the operator entrusting the
system to properly handle the driving task rather than initiating the disengagement
upon a perceived risk.
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of random parameter for the month of testing explanatory
variable
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Limitations and Future Work

This study investigates the relationship between the initiator of the transition to
conventional mode, roadway classification, cause of the disengagement, and the
testing maturity of the system. Presently, limited information is provided by the
manufacturers in the annual disengagement reports as these reports only require
the date of the disengagement, initiator of the disengagement, location, and the
disengagement reason. The data and results of this study profoundly rely on the
accuracy of the information provided in the manufacturers’ disengagement reports.
As is typical with police reports in transportation engineering literature, reporting
and extracting errors may be present. However, extensive measures were used in
this study to limit such errors.

As California is the only state to publicly share disengagements that occur on its
transportation network, the results obtained in this study cannot be generalized to
other locations. However, if disengagements from different locations were
accumulated into the unique dataset used in this study, the developed models
would be improved, and this would allow a better and more general understanding
of AV safety performances. As California’s Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program
is cutting-edge by requiring permit-holding manufacturers to publish their involved
crashes and disengagements, the program has the ability to enhance the data
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being collected for the public and research purposes. An example of a potential
enhancement to the program includes the collection of the disengagement location
through approximate coordinates. This compilation would allow the analysis of the
contributing roadway and environmental factors on the initiator of disengagements.

Conclusion

California is currently the only state in the United States that requires AV testing
data to be publicly accessible. The information obtained from field testing can
provide useful insights into the wide uncertainties of AV safety performances, as
previous research has only utilized data from proving grounds (test tracks) and
simulations. Without proper intervention from the operator, disengagements have
the potential of causing a collision with other roadway users or objects. For this
reason, disengagements are considered “near-miss” crashes as the operator is
often seen as mitigating the likelihood of a crash by regaining control of the vehicle.
Previous studies (V. V. Dixit et al., 2016; F. Favarò et al., 2018) qualitatively
categorized causes that lead to disengagements and (Wang & Li, 2019a)
quantitatively examined a limited number of disengagements (N = 503) from a
limited number of manufacturers for more than one year. This study is among the
first to comprehensively examine all of the reported AV disengagements
documents, which included 159,840 observations spanning over three and a half
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million vehicle miles traveled in the autonomous mode. By manually extracting
disengagement records from the disengagement reports, a unique database was
developed. A subset of the disengagement observations was modeled to provide
a more thorough understanding of the initiator of disengaging the system (who),
the cause for the disengagement (what and why), the maturity of the system
(when), and the location of the AV of the transition (where).

The empirical results from the random parameter binary logit model provide initial
insights into contributing factors of ADS-initiated disengagements with the data
available. Streets and roads are locations less likely to be disengaged by the ADS
compared to freeways and interstates. As the surrounding built environments are
more multifaceted than freeways and interstates as there are more interactions
with other vehicles, vulnerable road users, intersections, and driveways.
Therefore, the ADS is less likely to identify unforeseen events that might arise on
streets and roads when compared to actively monitoring humans. Further, the
results reveal that compared to a control discrepancy, the ADS has a higher
likelihood of initiating a disengagement due to a hardware and software
discrepancy, planning discrepancy, and environmental and other road users.
These results are intuitive as humans cannot observe the data processing of the
ADS and any discrepancies occurring in the background of the system. Lastly, as
the ADS system advances in maturity, the findings reveal there will be marginally
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more ADS-initiating disengagements as the operator begins to trust and have
confidence in the AV system when encountering risky situations.

One finding from this study highlights the issue that ADS cannot predict or
anticipate a crash like a human. While humans contribute to more than 90% of
motor vehicle crashes, the ‘Achilles heel’ is the need for their tactical skillful
decision-making process (P. Hancock, Nourbakhsh, & Stewart, 2019). A perfect
example of this weakness is the Tempe, Arizona crash (Tempe Police Department,
2018) that involved a pedestrian fatality. The ADS of the vehicle struggled to
correctly identify the pedestrian that was traversing the road with a bicycle. An
actively monitoring human operator would have been able to respond to the
unconventional scenario faster than the machine. As presented in the results,
machines encountering uncommon situations like poor pavement markings,
emergency vehicles, and construction zones caused the ADS to initiate a
disengagement. Additional examples that would likely cause an ADS-initiated
disengagement include strollers carrying a newborn baby rolling out into the
roadway, hand gestures from a police officer, and children trick-or-treating in
Halloween costumes (P. A. Hancock, Hancock, & Warm, 2009). As AV operators,
humans often respond in the correct manner when encountered upon
predicaments, but there is an uncertainty of how AVs will perform in situations
never seen before. As these vehicles have a small market penetration, there is a
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low probability of these fringe cases, but as the market penetration grows and
thousands of AVs are utilizing the transportation network, these seldom case will
transform into more frequent occurrences.

Finally, there is a need for professionally and adequately trained vehicle operators
to actively monitor the driving environment to safely and quickly takeover control
of the vehicle when needed. Humans cannot become complacent with this
advancement of technology and need to remain “in-the-loop” and uphold a proper
situational awareness (as seen in Mountain View, Williston, Delray Beach, and
Tempe crashes) in order to resume control of the vehicle when alerted or when
they foresee an incident (Merat et al., 2014). Further, as automation is expected
to lower the workload of the vehicle operator, there is a need for appropriate
feedback from the ADS to successfully regain control of the vehicle (Cranor, 2008;
Eriksson & Stanton, 2017). As each manufacturer is expected to have its own ADS,
better operator knowledge of how the automation system functions and the
maintenance of the systems should be required (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
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CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYZING ON ROAD AUTOMATED VEHICLE
DISENGAGEMENTS OVER TIME AND BY MANUFACTURER
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This chapter presents a modified version of a research paper by Alexandra M.
Boggs, Ramin Arvin, and Asad J. Khattak. The paper (20-04895) was accepted for
presentation at the 99th Annual Meeting of Transportation Research Record in
Washington, D.C. A revision of this chapter will be submitted to a transportation
journal.

Abstract

Within the past century, automated vehicles (AVs) have evolved from a farreaching concept into a reality with AV field testing underway on the transportation
networks. With the public accessibility of the California Autonomous Vehicle Tester
Program crash and disengagement data, the comprehension of AVs safety
performances can be refined. As disengagements are the unanticipated takeover
by the vehicle operator in the event of a system failure or safe operation, these
safety-critical occurrences require a safe and instantaneous acquisition of the
vehicle and can be considered near-miss crashes. With the 2018 revision of the
California disengagement report format, the aggregation of vehicle identification
numbers and their corresponding monthly automated vehicle miles traveled can
be utilized to identify vehicles which continuously tested over a year. A unique
database was created by capturing vehicles disengagement characteristics and
examined through three Poisson panel regression model specifications (fixed
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effects, random effects, and random parameter) to assess the effects of time on
disengagement frequency at the manufacturer-level. The overall best-fit model,
fixed effects, illustrates the significant relationships between contributing
disengagement characteristics and disengagement frequency. Results reveal the
safety advancement of disengagements over time as the systems are actively
learning through testing in challenging complex environments, but potential
unconventional encounters should be explored further. Other analytical insights
highlight the need for state policies to necessitate the publishing of AV test data to
allow generalizable results of different complex environments. This study
contributes by providing a snapshot of the evolution of safety-critical
disengagements and their characteristics over time.

Introduction

The concept of automated vehicles (AVs) is not new in the surface transportation
realm as the evolution launched in the late 1930s at the New York World’s Fair
with General Motors showcasing the future of self-driving vehicles and automated
highway systems. Another milestone was achieved in the early 2000s when the
U.S. Defense Advanced Research Project Administration (DARPA) challenged 15
teams to autonomously traverse nearly 150 miles in the desert. The notion of selfdriving vehicles has gained popularity recently through the projected positive
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impacts of widespread use. These benefits include the potential reduction of motor
vehicle crashes where human factors/errors contribute in 94% of crashes (with
roadway factors contributing in about 34% of crashes and vehicle factors about
4%) (Singh, 2015), reduction in emissions through truck platooning and electric
vehicles, and an increase in mobility for underrepresented users (Alessandrini et
al., 2015; Arbib & Seba, 2017; De Winter et al., 2014; Fagnant & Kockelman, 2015;
Greenblatt & Shaheen, 2015; Johnson & Walker, 2016; Keeney, 2017; Merat et
al., 2014; Wadud et al., 2016). State-level governments are joining the movement
and enacting legislation to allow AV manufacturers to conduct field tests on their
roadways. Nevada was the first state to enact legislation on the authorization of
AV testing in 2011, with California requiring the adoption of safety standards and
performance requirements to allow for the testing of AVs in 2012. Since then, over
half of the United States have followed with AV-related legislation or executive
orders.

On September 16, 2014, the state of California adopted AV testing regulations,
which require a driver, and established the Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program
(State of California Department of Motor Vehicles). This program grants permitholding manufacturers to test on public roadways with two principal requirements:
1) manufacturers must submit a Report of Traffic Collision Involving an
Autonomous Vehicle (form OL 316) within ten days after a collision and 2)
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manufacturers must submit an annual report (Form OL 311) to the Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) at the beginning of each year that details a summary of
disengagements and automated vehicle miles traveled (AVMT). Theoretically, a
disengagement occurs when the vehicle operator takes over manual control of the
vehicle following an alert from the automated driving system (ADS) or when the
vehicle operator deems the AV is not safely executing the desired driving task per
the motor vehicle traffic laws. In 2018, the text of the regulations was amended to
allow manufacturers to test AVs that did not have a driver present in the vehicle
(State of California Department of Motor Vehicles). Additionally, in 2018, Form OL
311 was revised to standardize the reporting method among manufacturers (State
of California Department of Motor Vehicles, 2018a). Reporting fields included the
date, vehicle identification number (VIN), whether the vehicle is capable of
operating without a driver, disengagement initiated by, whether the driver was
present, location, and the disengagement reason.

Disengagements are safety-critical events that can be considered a near-miss
crash. Typically during disengagements, the vehicle operator is regaining control
of the vehicle to mitigate the likelihood of a crash occurring in the automated mode.
Through the development of a unique database by linking disengagements for
2018, AV disengagements were analyzed after aggregating them at the vehicle
level. AVs which continuously tested over the span of a year were examined
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through their VINs. Given the availability of 12-month disengagement data at the
vehicle level, this study aims to provide a more thorough understanding of the
evolution of disengagement characteristics.

Literature Review

Near-misses, which are also referred to as close calls, are studied throughout a
variety of industries, such as aviation, chemical, construction, law enforcement,
healthcare, and surface transportation. According to van der Shaaf (Vanderschaaf,
1992), a near-miss is defined as an event with an apparent significant safetyrelated impact but was prevented from developing. Research indicates that nearmisses are more widespread by a magnitude of orders than the actual incident
(Heinrich, 1941; Ritwik, 2002). Through the management of incident precursors, a
number of benefits can arise as there are three objectives of reporting and
examining these events. First, by qualitatively modeling near-misses, the results
can provide insights into the contributing factors, whether errors or failures that led
to initial failures. Because near-misses occur more frequently than incidents, a
quantitative awareness can aid in trending the safety system. Lastly, precursors to
an incident can improve the organization awareness of safety problems, especially
in organizations where incidents are uncommon, and the spread of insights can
reduce complacency (Vanderschaaf, 1992; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).
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While many states are actively allowing AV manufacturers to test in complex
environments on their public roadways, the California DMV is currently the only
state to publish crash and disengagement data on this vehicle classification. Given
the accessibility of the nearly five years of AV-related test data and the uncertainty
of AVs, researchers are utilizing this data to reveal compelling insights into their
crashes and disengagements (V. V. Dixit et al., 2016; F. Favarò et al., 2018; F. M.
Favarò et al., 2017; Lv et al., 2017; Merkel, 2018; Wang & Li, 2019a, 2019b). Dixit
et al. (V. V. Dixit et al., 2016) were among the first to highlight the positive
correlation between AV-involved collisions and AVMT, and the increased in
reaction time of vehicle operators gaining control of the vehicle as the AVMT
increased. The latter finding was believed to be contributed to the level of trust in
the ADS as the AVMT increased. Favaro et al. (F. M. Favarò et al., 2017) followed
by analyzing nearly 30 months of 26 accident reports and concluded the AVs are
frequently not-at-fault and are involved in low speed rear-end collisions. Favaro et
al. (F. Favarò et al., 2018) later provided an overview of the contributory factors of
2,616 disengagements over a three year by categorizing into four broad causes
groups: human factors, systems failures, external conditions, and others. Lv et al.
(Lv et al., 2017) further classified the disengagements but incorporated the initiator
into the disengagement categories - passive (ADS-initiated) and active (driverinitiated). Merkel (Merkel, 2018) proposed the use of two software reliability growth
models, Musa-Okumoto and Gompertz, to predict Waymo and Cruise
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disengagements by utilizing the 2017 disengagement reports. More recently,
Wang and Li (Wang & Li, 2019a) utilized multiple frequentist statistical approaches
(ordinal logistic regression, classification and regression tree model, and binary
logistic regression) to analyze 503 disengagements from August 2016 to
November 2017 and recommended that the vehicles should have 5 or more radar
sensors installed. Wang and Li (Wang & Li, 2019b) additionally analyzed 113 AVinvolved crashes through the employment of ordinal logistic regression and
classification and regression tree models to identify contributing factors that
influence AV safety.

As the annual number of AV-involved crashes and disengagements (near-misses)
have significantly increased since the inauguration of the tester program (Boggs,
Wali, et al., 2019; V. V. Dixit et al., 2016; F. Favarò et al., 2018; F. M. Favarò et
al., 2017), this detail provides a motivation to assess the effects of time on the
disengagement frequency.

An apparent gap in the literature is the in-depth

examination of AV disengagements, particularly the effect of time on
disengagements and their related attributes. Such analysis can provide insights
into the evolution and safety performances of AV technologies. With the
modification of the 2018 disengagements forms, manufacturers are required to
supply the VIN of each disengagement and AVMT per month. Given the lack of
knowledge on the time effects of disengagements and the recent standardization
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of manufacturer disengagement reports, this study aims to develop a unique
database to comprehensively examine the frequency of disengagements and their
characteristics over a 12-month span at the manufacturer level.

Methodology

As stated previously, the California DMV established the Autonomous Vehicle
Tester Program in September 2014 to authorize permit-holding manufacturers to
test on the public roadways (State of California Department of Motor Vehicles).
The requirements of this program include: 1) manufacturers must submit selfreported narratives to the DMV within ten days of an involved collision, and 2)
disengagements reports, delineating the disengagements and the AVMT per
month from December 1 to November 30, must be submitted to the DMV by the
first of the year. The publicly available crash and disengagement reports can be
accessed:

https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/testing.

Revisions which occurred in 2018 allows disengagements and AVMT to be
aggregated at the vehicle level through the VIN in addition to requiring
manufacturers to state whether the vehicle is capable of operating without a driver,
whether the driver was present, and the initiator of the disengagement.

A total of 124 AV-involved crashes and 159,840 disengagements were reported to
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the DMV from September 2014 to November 2018. As this study focuses on the
2018 disengagement reports which included the VINs, a total of 97,021
disengagements and their respected details from 30 manufacturers consisting of
464 AVs were used and developed into a unique database. The number of vehicles
used for testing varied by the company: GM Cruise – 162, Waymo – 111, Apple –
62, Uber – 29, Nuro – 13, and DriveAI – 13. The vehicles spanned over 2,000,382
miles of which 288 vehicles disengaged at least once.

Data Cleaning
Each year, the disengagement reports are required to be submitted by
manufacturers. While the disengagement reports form were revised to standardize
the information provided by the manufacturers, the data were cleaned to ensure
consistency between the manufacturers. There were a total of 1,357
disengagements that were eradicated from the database. The California DMV
fundamentally defines disengagements as an unanticipated takeover by the
vehicle operator in events which the ADS alerts the vehicle operator or the desired
driving task is not being safely executed. Given this definition, 1,255
disengagements were removed as a result of planned tests of technology that were
anticipated by the vehicle operator. Other removed disengagements include
outside of operation design domain (N = 20), unknown disengagement location (N
= 58), unknown AVMT (N = 13), and disengagements occurring in parking lots (N
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= 11). The resulting database includes 95,664 disengagements.

Data Categorization
Further, reports provided the cause for the disengagement report by describing the
event using keywords, a phrase, or a sentence. By using definitions and examples
provided by manufacturers and literature (Pendleton et al., 2017; Wang & Li,
2019b), records were categorized into six groups: control discrepancy,
environmental conditions and other road users, hardware and software
discrepancy, perception discrepancy, planning discrepancy, and operator
takeover. Examples for the irregularities in the control of the vehicle include
accelerating or braking suddenly or over or understeering. Environmental
conditions and other road users discrepancies occur when the vehicle encounters
construction, road debris, poor lane markings, emergency vehicles, blocked lanes,
or misbehaving other road users. Hardware and software discrepancies include
irregularities in the communications, software, system, hardware, or the stock
vehicle. Perception discrepancies disengagements include improper detection of
traffic signals and objects. The planning system of the AV involves the system that
plans and decides the route of the AV trajectory and anomalies include unwanted
maneuver of the vehicle, vehicle localization and planning, and motion planning.
Lastly, operator takeover transpires when the vehicle is not meeting the
requirements of the driving task or the operator feels discomfort. Overall, the
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percentage of reasons for disengagement are as follows: control discrepancy –
37%, environmental conditions and other road users – 1%, hardware and software
discrepancies – 3%, perception – 1%, planning – 2%, and operator takeover –
56%.

Resulting Disengagement Database
The final phase in the data preparation was to retain disengagement records for
vehicles which tested over the 12 months as indicated by the AVMT per month in
the reports. A total of 33 vehicles from 13 manufacturers with a total of 7,483
disengagements

comprised

the

database.

Figure

5.1

illustrates

the

disengagement frequency (represented by lines) and the AVMT (indicated by bars)
the vehicles who continuously tested over the 12-month span. As depicted, one
vehicle from Apple totaled more than 93% of the database with 6,790
disengagements. Due to the drastic and sharp reduction of disengagements but a
stable AVMT, these disengagements were removed from further analysis. Lastly,
the resulting database encompassed 32 vehicles from 12 manufacturers with a
total of 693 disengagements. Figure 5.1 presents the disengagements over the
span of a year by each of the 12 manufacturers.

As the VINs were employed to identify the AVMT, the VIN can also indicate the
year, make, model, and type of vehicle the manufacturers are using for testing. An
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Figure 5.1 Frequency of disengagements and AVMT over 12 months by
manufacturer
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extensively utilized vehicle was the four-door Lincoln MKZ sedan (N = 12 vehicles).
Nissan used 2 Infiniti Q50 sports utility vehicles and a compact Nissan Leaf, Nuro
used 3 Nissans Leafs, and Waymo used 8 Chrysler Pacifica minivans. While Zoox
only reported the last four digits of the VINs used, the vehicles can be inferred as
either Toyota Highlanders or Prius C’s as indicated by Zoox in their voluntary
safety report assessment (Zoox).

Methodology

As aforementioned, the objective of this study is to assess the frequency of
disengagements on an array of disengagement attributes over a year period.
Given the nonnegative integer nature of the dependent variable, two extensively
used forms of count data regression models are Poisson and negative binomial
(Anastasopoulos & Mannering, 2009). The Poisson panel model specification
estimates the probability of having a disengagement, Y, by manufacturer, i, is
(Greene, 2003; Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984; Kamrani, Arvin, & Khattak,
2018):

exp(−𝜆𝑖𝑡 ) 𝜆𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑃 (𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 |𝜆𝑖𝑡 ) =
𝑦𝑖 !

(5.1)
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where 𝜆𝑖𝑡 is the Poisson parameter for the manufacturer, at time, t. The Poisson
parameter, 𝜆𝑖𝑡 , is specified as (Greene, 2003; Hausman et al., 1984; Kamrani et
al., 2018):

ln( 𝜆𝑖𝑡 ) = exp(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 )

(5.2)

where 𝛽 is a vector of estimates and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a set vector of estimated coefficients on
disengagement, i, at month, t.

The primary constraint of the Poisson model specification is the mean and variance
of the data distribution must equal (𝐸(𝑛𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟((𝑛𝑖𝑡 )). In the circumstances there
is a presence of over-dispersion (𝐸(𝑛𝑖𝑡 ) < 𝑉𝑎𝑟((𝑛𝑖𝑡 )), adding an independent error
term formulates the negative binomial model results in:

𝜆𝑖𝑡 = exp(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡 )

(5.3)

where the error term, exp (∈𝑖𝑡 ), is a gamma-distributed with a mean of one and
variance of α. The main restriction of the Poisson model specification is the mean
and variance of α. With the addition of the error term, the model allows the variance
and mean to differ:
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𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑛𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝐸(𝑛𝑖𝑡 )[1 + 𝛼𝐸(𝑛𝑖𝑡 )]

(5.4)

where 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑛𝑖𝑡 ) is the variance of the number of disengagements and 𝐸(𝑛𝑖𝑡 ) is the
expected number of disengagements. Determining the appropriate count data
regression model is contingent on the estimated overdispersion parameter, 𝛼. If
the parameter is greater than zero, there is a presence of overdispersion in the
data; whereas, when the parameter is equal to zero, the model reduces to a
Poisson model specification. Additionally, the Lagrange multiplier method can be
employed to statistically test the presence of overdispersion in a Poisson model
(Greene, 2003; Washington, Karlaftis, & Mannering, 2010).

Further, unobserved heterogeneity, the existence of unobserved (unmeasured)
factors that have the potential to affect the relationships between the dependent
and independent variables, needs to be addressed through random parameters.
By neglecting unobserved heterogeneity, the yielding results can lead to
inaccurate statistical findings and conclusions. Given this methodological issue,
Greene (Greene, 2003) established a method to account for the unobserved
factors using simulated maximum likelihood estimation for the Poisson model:

𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽 + 𝜑𝑖

(5.5)
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where 𝜑𝑖𝑡 is a randomly distributed term with a specified term (typically normal
distribution with a mean of zero and variance of 𝜎 2 ). The log-likelihood function for
the random parameter model is specified as:

𝑛

𝑖

(5.6)

𝐿𝐿 = ∑𝑖 𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑛 ∫𝜑 𝑔(𝜑𝑖𝑡 )𝑃(𝑛𝑖𝑡 |𝜑𝑖𝑡 )𝑑𝜑𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡

where g(.) is the determined probability density function for 𝜑𝑖𝑡 . Maximizing the
log-likelihood function through a simulation-based method and standard Halton
draws allows the estimation to be conducted. Literature illustrates that using
standard Halton draws increases the efficiency when compared to random draws
(Bhat, 2003; K. Train, 2000). For this study, three Poisson panel models (i.e., fixed
effects, random effects, and random parameter) were conducted and estimated
through the utilization of NLOGIT 10.0.

Data

The data used in this paper are based on extensive efforts put forth in the manual
extraction of disengagement reports that were submitted to the California DMV by
the permit-holding manufacturer from December 2017 to November 2018. As
stated previously, disengagements were aggregated by the VIN at the vehicle level
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to identify vehicles, through the reported AVMT, that tested during over 12 months.
Notably, only test AVs who traveled any length (greater than zero miles) the entire
year period were retained in the database. Contributing factors from 32 vehicles
from

12

manufacturers

were

obtained

and

includes

the

number

of

disengagements, number of testing vehicles, AVMT per 100 miles, portion of
monthly disengagements locations, portion of monthly disengagements initiators,
and portion of monthly disengagement causes. In summary, the resulting database
encompassed disengagement-related variables for 12 manufacturers over a year
period, yielding 144 observations.

Table 5.1 presents the 12-month average descriptive statistics by the manufacturer
for the variables utilized in this study. As illustrated in the table, there is a variation
in the testing maturity of the system. This variable observes the number of months
the manufacturer has been actively testing on the California roadways since the
inauguration of the program. Waymo, Baidu USA, and Nissan are the companies
who have been testing on-average more than 18 months; whereas, Roadstar AI,
Aurora, and Nullmax have been testing on-average for less than a year. The more
months that the manufacturer has been testing, the more the company has been
able to learn through the data collected during the failure of the ADS, which allows
the company to take the appropriate actions and potentially reduces the number
of disengagements.
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Table 5.1 Twelve-month average descriptive statistics of variables by manufacturer
Mean (Standard Deviation) of Variables Per Month by Manufacturer
Variable
Dependent Variable
Number of
disengagements
Manufacturer-related
Characteristics
Number of vehicles
testing
Number of vehicles
disengaged
AVMT (100) of all
testing vehicles
Month of testing
Disengagement
Location
Freeway or
interstate (%)
Highway (%)
Street or road (%)
Disengagement
Initiator
Human (%)
AV system (%)

Aurora

AutoX

Baidu
USA

Nissan

Nullmax

Nuro

PlusAI

PonyAI

Roadstar
Ai

Waymo

WeRide

Zoox

13.66
(30.27)

2.67
(1.77)

7.00
(5.03)

2.00
(2.34)

5.33
(2.15)

1.75
(1.82)

16.58
(12.97)

0.75
(1.06)

1.25
(1.66)

1.83
(1.11)

3.83
(2.12)

1.08
(0.79)

2.00
(0.00)
1.58
(0.67)
12.67
(3.19)
9.50
(3.61)

1.00
(0.00)
0.83
(0.39)
8.46
(4.86)
16.50
(3.61)

2.00
(0.00)
1.67
(0.49)
14.36
(6.42)
20.50
(3.61)

3.00
(0.00)
0.83
(1.03)
3.22
(1.69)
36.50
(3.61)

1.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
2.53
(1.19)
9.50
(3.61)

3.00
(0.00)
1.17
(1.11)
14.25
(7.00)
13.50
(3.61)

1.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
9.01
(3.71)
15.50
(3.61)

2.00
(0.00)
0.42
(0.51)
6.17
(3.47)
12.50
(3.61)

1.00
(0.00)
0.42
(0.51)
5.25
(5.42)
6.50
(3.61)

8.00
(0.00)
1.75
(1.06)
213.29
(30.93)
45.50
(3.61)

2.00
(0.00)
1.83
(0.58)
8.61
(4.73)
12.50
(3.61)

6.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.74)
19.36
(11.00)
15.50
(3.61)

19.35
(25.11)
15.39
(22.08)
56.92
(37.26)

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
83.33
(38.92)

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
100.00
(0.00)

10.52
(19.36)
0.00
(0.00)
47.82
(45.50)

18.85
(19.03)
53.57
(18.85)
27.58
(19.28)

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
66.67
(49.24)

0.00
(0.00)
53.97
(20.63)
46.03
(20.63)

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
41.67
(51.49)

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
41.67
(51.49)

8.33
(20.72)
8.33
(20.72)
75.00
(35.18)

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
91.67
(28.87)

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
75.00
(45.23)

67.13
(42.92)
24.53
(38.14)

83.33
(38.92)
0.00
(0.00)

95.00
(14.56)
5.00
(14.56)

58.33
(51.49)
0.00
(0.00)

60.46
(20.27)
39.54
(20.27)

66.67
(49.24)
0.00
(0.00)

90.98
(9.08)
9.02
(9.08)

41.67
(51.49)
9.02
(9.08)

41.67
(51.49)
0.00
(0.00)

86.11
(30.01)
5.56
(12.97)

87.70
(29.39)
3.97
(10.12)

75.00
(45.23)
0.00
(0.00)
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Table 5.1. Continued.
Variable

Mean (Standard Deviation) of Variables Per Month by Manufacturer
Aurora

AutoX

Baidu
USA

Nissan

Nullmax

PlusAI

PonyAI

Roadstar
Ai

Waymo

WeRide

Zoox

9.17
0.00
0.00
14.44
0.00
0.00
0.00
(19.25)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(30.46) (0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
69.10
8.33
24.72
4.52
28.21
12.50
40.06
(36.29)
(16.67)
(33.97) (11.90) (15.84)
(31.08) (16.31)
13.40
49.31
70.28
9.52
67.90
36.25
43.33
(26.79)
(33.98)
(33.06) (28.79) (15.60)
(43.65) (18.28)
0.00
25.69
5.00
29.84
2.22
0.00
9.02
(0.00)
(26.22)
(14.46) (41.84) (5.38)
(0.00)
(9.08)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.67
17.92
7.59
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(5.77)
(31.44) (8.89)
Notes: Averaging over the time period of 12 months, AVMT = automated vehicle miles traveled

8.33
(28.87)
8.33
(19.46)
20.83
(39.65)
0.00
(0.00)
4.17
(14.43)

0.00
(0.00)
9.03
(17.21)
26.39
(33.49)
6.25
(15.54)
0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)
22.22
(38.49)
44.44
(49.92)
0.00
(0.00)
25.00
(40.51)

1.19
(4.12)
19.60
(18.53)
32.52
(22.16)
38.35
(30.32)
0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)
16.67
(32.57)
58.83
(46.87)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)

Reason for
Disengagement
Control discrepancy
(%)
Perception
discrepancy (%)
Planning
discrepancy (%)
Software/hardware
discrepancy (%)
Environmental/other
road user (%)
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Nuro

Further, the disengagement characteristics were denoted as a portion in the
dataset. Since the dependent variable is the number of disengagements, the
summation of the disengagement attributes would equal the number of
disengagements. Therefore, the percentage of the total disengagements per
month was utilized in the analysis to eliminate potential bias.

Additionally, the table demonstrates the number of vehicles testing does not
necessarily yield the number of vehicles disengaging. For example, Zoox and
Waymo and have respectively 6 and 8 vehicles testing per month, but
approximately only one vehicle is disengaging per month. Notably, manufacturers
without disengagements in particular months were designated as “0%” for the
disengagement attributes causing the summation of the category averages per
month not to equal 100% in Table 5.1. An example of this is the manufacturer Zoox
had three months of no disengagements. For those months, the portions of the
disengagements attributes were all noted as 0%. When averaging over the year,
the resulting summation equals to 75% (9 months of disengagements /12 months
of data = 75%).

As seen in Table 5.1, the resulting database disengagement reasons did not entail
operator takeover as the vast majority in 2018 were due to Apple and Uber (N
=53,794 of the 53,944). Further, the table highlights on average, the majority of the
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disengagements are on streets and roads, disengagements are initiated by the
human operator, and are caused by perception and planning discrepancies.

Results

Poisson panel regression techniques were employed to examine the relationship
between the disengagements frequency and disengagement attributes over a
period of 12 months (December 2017 to November 2018). To account for the
uneven miles of testing between manufacturers, the AVMT of the vehicles testing
was utilized as the exposure for the disengagement frequency. As illustrated in
Table 5.2, three models were considered. First, a fixed effects model followed by
a random effects model, and lastly, a random parameter model which captures the
methodological issue of unobserved heterogeneity as discussed in the
methodology section. To verify the appropriate model specification compared to
negative binomial regression, the results of the Lagrange multiplier, which tests
the over-dispersion of the data, indicate the Poisson regression is appropriate with
the data.

The models' overall goodness of fits were compared using the values of the loglikelihood and Akaike information criteria (AIC) and illustrate a superior fit of the
fixed effects model as distinguished in Table 5.2. In conjunction with the model
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Table 5.2 Fixed effects, random effects, and random parameter Poisson panel
regression model estimates of disengagement frequencies
Variable
Fixed
Random
Random
Effects
Effects
Parameter
Location (%)
Freeway/interstate
Streets/roads
Scale Parameter
Initiator (%)
AV System
Reason (%)
Control discrepancy
Software
and
hardware
discrepancy
Perception discrepancy
Timea
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
Constant
/lnalpha
Summary Statistics
Log-likelihood
AIC
Sample Size

0.021***
0.015***
-

0.021***
0.015***
-

0.017
0.020***
0.023***

0.016***

0.016***

0.038***

-0.013***
-0.005*

-0.013***
-0.005

-0.005
-0.002

-0.008***

-0.008***

0.005

0.292
0.093
-0.209
-0.008
-0.373*
0.169
-0.951***
-0.628***
-1.108***
-1.410***
-1.139***
-

0.289
0.110
-0.204
-0.004
-0.360*
0.177
-0.952***
-0.619***
-1.110***
-1.420***
-1.148***
-1.125***
0.258

0.222
-0.279
-1.172
-0.564
-1.283
-0.914
-1.655
-1.086
-2.134***
-3.161**
-1.794
-8.185***
-

-300.037
634.075
144

-364.253
766.505
144

-578.346
1194.7
144

Note: a Base of time is December 2017, *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, Balanced panel with N= 12
manufacturers, T – 12 months, and NT = 144 total observations
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summary statistics, a Hausman test was employed (Greene, 2003) on the fixed
and random effects model to examine whether the unique errors are correlated
with the regressors. Results indicate (Hausman 𝜒 2 = 8.83, p-value < 0.05) the
fixed effects model should be selected. In addition, the marginal effects of the fixed
effects model were estimated as seen in Table 5.3. These values are the average
change in disengagement frequency given a one unit increase in the respected
explanatory variable. As provided in Table 5.3, a one percent increase in the
portion of disengagements located on a freeway or interstate is associated with a
0.102 increase in disengagement frequency per month per manufacturer.

Discussion

Since the fixed effects Poisson panel regression model resulted in the best overall
fit when compared to the random effects and random parameter, the discussion in
this section will relate to the fixed effects model. Regarding the manufacturer
characteristics, the findings reveal a one percent increase in the portion of
disengagements located on a freeway or interstate is associated with a 0.102
increase in disengagement frequency per month per manufacturer; whereas, the
disengagement portion located on a street or road is associated with a 0.074
increase. During times of rush hour, interstates and freeways, especially in
California, like streets and roads, are more prone to unstable traffic flow in
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Table 5.3 Marginal effects for fixed effects model
Variable
Marginal Effect
Location (%)
Freeway/interstate
0.102***
Streets/roads
0.074***
Initiator (%)
AV System
0.076***
Reason (%)
Control discrepancy
-0.063***
Software
and
hardware
-0.024*
discrepancy
Perception discrepancy
-0.040***
a
Time
January
1.407
February
0.449
March
-1.005
April
-0.036
May
-1.794*
June
0.813
July
-4.576***
August
-3.022***
September
-5.333***
October
-6.786***
November
-5.482***
Note: a Base of time is December 2017, *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
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conjunction with lanes changes and merging from ramp junctions, which the
positive association is rational. Streets and roads consist of more challenges with
the transportation infrastructure (i.e., driveways, intersections, crosswalks, bike
lanes, and traffic signals, and other vulnerable road users (i.e., bicyclists and
pedestrians). The positive relationship between the disengagement frequency and
the portion of disengagements located on streets and roads is logical.

As depicted in Table 5.3, the portion of disengagements initiated by the AV system
is associated with a 0.076 increase in disengagement frequency per month per
manufacturer. While the AVs are testing and navigating through complex
environments, operators are required to oversee diagnostic messages surfacing
and catalog events for review. After testing, manufacturer engineers assess the
logs and then update the AV system. System updates can introduce unintentional
software bugs that can lead to an increase in the disengagement frequency.

Related to the disengagement reason, two of the reasons (control discrepancy and
perception discrepancy) were statistically significant, while software and hardware
discrepancies were marginally significant. For all of the causes of disengagements,
the association with disengagement frequency was negative. Of the three
disengagements, control discrepancy had the greatest magnitude. That is, a one
percent increase in the portion of disengagements being caused due to control
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discrepancy is associated with a 0.063 reduction in the frequency of
disengagements per month per manufacturer.

Lastly, the variable of particular interest, time, illustrated a predominantly decrease
in the number of disengagements as seen in Table 5.2 and 5.3. When compared
to the base month of December 2017, July through November 2018 depicted a
substantial and significant reduction in the disengagement frequency. As
illustrated in the marginal effects of Table 5.3, when compared to December 2017,
October 2018 (11 months later) is associated with a 6.786 decrease in the
frequency of disengagements per manufacturer. Notably, as testing progresses,
AVs are more likely to interact with unknown objects, signifying vehicle operators
should remain actively monitoring the driving environment even if the system is
advancing. This importance is highlighted in the fatal pedestrian crash in Tempe,
Arizona. An Uber Level 3 AV struck a jaywalking pedestrian pushing a bike during
nighttime. As stated in the National Transportation Safety Board preliminary report,
the AV system of Uber struggled to correctly identify the object. First, the
pedestrian was classified as an unknown object, then as a vehicle, and finally, as
a bicycle with varying expected direction of travel (National Transportation Safety
Board, 2018a). While the vehicle operator was deemed to be on a personal mobile
device and not properly overseeing the testing of the AV (Tempe Police
Department, 2018), this crash highlights the fact that AVs are still learning through
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their unconventional encounters. Further potential examples of these events
include a baby stroller rolling into the street, a child running into the street after a
ball, earthquakes, and even unfamiliar movements by people and animals (i.e.,
wheelchairs/scooters/walkers/crutches for disabled people, kangaroos, and
ostriches).

Limitations

The primary limitation of this study is the disengagement report observation
duration of one year. As this is the best information available at this time, it allows
a snapshot of the evolution of disengagements. This study results and findings
heavily depend upon the accuracy of the information noted in the submitted
manufacturer disengagement and crash reports. Additionally, extensive efforts
expended in the manual extraction of the information. As in transportation safety
literature, human reporting and extracting errors may exist in police-reports as in
the disengagement and crash reports used in this study. The number of errors was
limited by vigorously crosschecking the data with the manufacturer submitted
reports. Presently, California is the sole state in the United States to openly publish
AV-involved crash and disengagement data to the public. By capturing other states
(with different complex environments), AV field data into the analysis, a more
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thorough understanding can be obtained. However, the results yielded in this study
should not be generalized to other locations.

Conclusion

The study explores the safety critical events of ADS disengagements by
aggregating the 2018 disengagement reports at the manufacturer and vehicle
level, resulting in a total of 693 disengagements from 12 manufacturers with 32
actively testing vehicles. Count panel regression models were used to empirically
examine contributing factors of disengagements over time. The methodological
issue of unobserved heterogeneity was captured through a random parameter
Poisson panel regression model but was deemed not the overall best-fit when
compared to the fixed effects model. As illustrated, the data and methods used
can be replicated with appropriate effort.

This study contributes through the empirical analysis of new types of data for
automated surface vehicles, i.e., disengagements. Several significant findings are
revealed in the study. The frequency of disengagements is substantially
decreasing over a period of time, as indicated with the marginal effects. An
increase of 11 months is associated with a reduction of nearly seven
disengagements per manufacturer. This result highlights the safety performance
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advancement of near-misses as the systems are actively learning through testing
and are progressing. However, it should be noted that these vehicles have not
been tested through all the potentially challenging situations as noted in the
Tempe, Arizona crash (Tempe Police Department, 2018). Encounters with
unfamiliar and unique situations, such as police and construction workers hand
gestures, and lumber and ladders falling out of a truck bed should be explored by
researchers and manufacturers and incorporated into simulation. The results
suggest a one percent increase in the portion of disengagements located at streets
and roads in addition to freeways and interstates are more likely to increase the
frequency. Further, a one percent increase in the portion of disengagements
initiated by the AV system (compared to a human operator) also increases the
number of disengagements. Control, software and hardware, and perception
discrepancies are all associated with a decrease in the number of disengagements
per month per manufacturer.

Utilizing the findings from this study, the prediction of various market penetration
of AVs and their corresponding disengagements can be conducted. While the
success trips (with no disengagements) are not publicly available, the information
of disengagements (representing “failures”) can be used for future research. In
total (September 2014 - November 2018), there were a total of 159,840
disengagements with a resulting 124 crashes. For 2018 alone, a total of 32
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vehicles were continuously tested on California public roadways in 2018 and
disengaged 693 times. Using these rates, penetrations of vehicles in cities or
regions and associated disengagements can be estimated at the system level, in
a given a year. As noted, these disengagements are primarily attributed to
discrepancies in the AV system.

These results from this study highlight the safety implications of these vehicles on
the roadway and the need for state policies to require public publishing of AV test
data to allow the results to be more generalizable. Examples of states that do have
AV testing, operation, deployment, and operation programs but do not publish this
information is Nevada, Michigan, and Ohio. By incorporating more data into
statistical models, a more comprehensive depiction of these vehicles and their
safety performances can be determined. Lastly, the California DMV can enhance
safety by incorporating the identification numbers of testing AVs into the
manufacturer-reported crash reports (OL 316) to allow a deeper understanding
(i.e., disengagements and AVMT) of the details involving the AV and to be able to
track the ADS testing prior to the crash.

200

CHAPTER SIX
READINESS FOR AUTOMATION: A SYNTHESIS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF AUTOMATED VEHICLE RELATED ENACTED
STATE LEGISLATION
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A revision of this chapter will be submitted by Alexandra M. Boggs, Zachary
Jerome, Asad J. Khattak, and Elizabeth Shay to a transportation policy journal.

Abstract

With the expected growth of automated vehicles (AVs) driven in part by substantial
promised benefits, rapid technological advancement constitutes a challenge to
developing and enacting state legislation, potentially offsetting those advantages.
As of April 1, 2019, 36 states and the District of Columbia have enacted a total of
78 AV-related policies, 64 pieces of legislation and 14 executive orders, all differing
in breadth and intricacy. In the United States Department of Transportation
(USDOT) Model State Policy, the federal government outlined eight areas for
states proposing to standardize testing, deployment, and operations of AVs to
include in the legislation framework: administrative structure, application for
manufacturers, jurisdictional permission, manufacturer testing, vehicle operation,
registration and titling, law enforcement, and liability and insurance. This unique
study conducts a manual review and synthesis of enacted state-level policies
against the USDOT Model State Policy and ranks each state accordingly. The
study links legislation language using text mining analysis to highlight relevant
issues from a national perspective. This novel approach yielded insights and
revealed uneven research, development, and deployment of AV technology at the
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state level. The results suggest that states’ infrastructure readiness for AVs can
vary widely, as will the benefits from AV deployment in terms of improving safety
and mobility. Because the scope of the policies varies by states, AV manufacturers
are pressured to design AVs that adhere to policies encompassing all state
legislation. Understanding state policies may help promote a comprehensive
legislation foundation that can enhance the research, development, and
deployment of AVs.

Introduction

Throughout the history of the United States, the transportation industry has played
a pivotal role in the nation’s economic growth and defense system. Currently, the
transportation realm is undergoing a transformation with the emergence of
advanced technologies, such as partially automated vehicles (AVs) with
advanced-driver assistance systems (ADAS) and conditional AVs with automated
driving systems (ADS). Partially AVs utilizing ADAS, defined as SAE (Society of
Automotive Engineers) Automation Level 2 (in their hierarchy of 0-5 levels), are
presently infiltrating the transportation network with features like lane-keeping
assist, adaptive cruise control, and blind-spot warnings. Meanwhile, conditional
AVs (Level 3) are experiencing authentic challenges in complex environments, as
manufacturers test their vehicles on shared roadways with a professionally trained
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vehicle operator present in the vehicle.

While the net impacts of AVs are uncertain, the widespread adoption of these
vehicles is projected to deliver both benefits and detriments. Automated vehicles
are expected to increase mobility and reduce congestion and emissions, but also
exacerbate urban sprawl and vehicle miles traveled (Kockelman et al., 2016; Todd;
Litman, 2017; Wadud et al., 2016). In 2016, fatal motor vehicle crashes totaled
37,461 (National Center for Statistics and Analysis, 2017), most caused by human
error (5, 6); economic impacts are estimated in the billions of dollars. With higher
levels of automation, human impairment, distraction, and lack of skills will no longer
be instrumental in crashes, contributing to support among safety advocates for this
emerging technology.

Rapid technological advancement of ADS poses a challenge to developing and
crafting federal and state regulations and standards, potentially diminishing the
projected benefits of AVs. Some states are endorsing and authorizing their
roadways as testing grounds for AVs, attracted by new jobs, economic expansion,
and projected improvements in road safety for all users. More recently, AVs are
starting to be discussed in regional and municipal planning documents. The
National Association of City Transportation Officials, who represent 81 North
American cities, has recently published its second edition of a planning guide to
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prepare for the future of AVs with aid of a 14 member city officials task force. The
planning document states the policies and designs that should be implemented in
the cities for equal mobility by all road users (National Association of City
Transportation Officials, 2019). Chandler, Arizona is already adjusting the zoning
code for the future of AVs and the increase of rideshares by proposing
amendments that will reduce parking requirements and persuade passenger
loading zones (City of Chandler, 2018).

As outlined in the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) Fact
Sheet of Model State Policy (United States Department of Transportation) within
the USDOT Automated Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety (United States
Department of Transportation, 2017), traditional federal and states responsibilities
are retained for the deployment of highly automated vehicles (HAVs), which are
Levels 4 and 5 of automation. The federal government’s responsibilities include
establishing and enforcing safety standards, investigating and managing recalls
and remedy of non-compliances and safety-related motor vehicle defects, and
communicating and educating the public about safety issues (United States
Department of Transportation). State responsibilities are licensing operators,
registering vehicles, ratifying and enforcing roadway laws and regulations,
regulating insurance and liability of motor vehicles, and conducting applicable
inspections (United States Department of Transportation).
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While previous studies have examined the legislation contained in state-level
policies (Anderson et al., 2014; Gibson, 2017; Hubbard, 2018), there is a gap in
the literature relating to a national perspective on the comprehensiveness of state
policies and their impacts on the research, development, and deployments of AVs.
Therefore, to comprehend the readiness for AVs, the objective of this paper is to
examine state policies enacted by legislation and/or executive orders and evaluate
the policies against the USDOT Model State Policy, conducting topic extraction
with a manual review and text mining analysis. This paper aims to provide a
comprehensive understanding of the topics addressed in enacted state legislation
and to support state and federal agencies in reviewing policy challenges at the
state level and developing possible solutions. The study further contributes by
providing suggestions and considerations for future policy developments to
support a safe and smooth implementation of HAVs.

State Legislation

A comprehensive search was conducted to capture enacted policies as well as
existing literature on AV legislation. The National Conference of State Legislatures
has an AV legislation database that allows users to identify relevant legislation
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2019). As of April 1, 2019, 36 states
and the District of Columbia had enacted a total of 78 legislative actions, including
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14 executive orders and 64 congressional bills, papers, and resolutions. Extensive
efforts were devoted to describing and synthesizing each legislative policy. Text
files of the legislation and executive orders were downloaded from the databases
of the respective states and stored for visual examination and text mining analysis.

Further, as each piece was reviewed, a unique record was created noting the state,
year, legislation name, and the scope of the bill. Similar to Hubbard’s analysis
(Hubbard, 2018), Table 6.1 identifies legislation and or executive orders
addressing definitions, study or committee establishment, AV testing and
operations, vehicle operator requirements, commercial vehicle operations,
registration and titling, insurance and liability. Additionally, the examination of
policies addressing first responders, data collection, and operational design
domain (ODD) was noted. Table 6.1 illustrates the legislation and executive orders
reviewed by the state, name, year, and the addressed topic. The resulting
database reflects the scope, complexity, and challenges that safe AV policy
presents.

Figure 6.1 maps the enacted state legislation and executive orders. Nevada and
California, the first states to develop and pass legislation, currently have a total of
12 AV frameworks. Meanwhile, 21 states have passed legislation relating to AV
frameworks, while 14 states have not developed state-level policies, including
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Table 6.1 Synthesis of enacted state and federal district AV policy by topic
State
AL

Year
2016,
2018

Policy #
SJR 81,
SB125
EO 201509, 201804, 201809

Def.

Study,
Committee,
Work Force

Testing &
Operations

AR

2017

HB 1754

✓

CA

2012,
2016,
(4)
2017,
(2) 2018

SB 1298,
AB 1592,
AB 669,
AB 1444,
SB 145,
SB1, AB
87,
AB1184

✓

✓

✓

CO

2018

SB 17-213

✓

✓

✓

CT

2017

SB 260

✓

✓

✓

DE

2017

EO14

DC

2012,
2018

FL

(2)
2012,
(2) 2016

GA

2 (2017)

B19-0931,
B22-0901
HB 1207,
HB 599,
HB 7027,
HB 599
HB 472,
SB 219

HI

2017
2108

IL

2017,
2018

✓

Registration
& Title

Insurance
& Liability

First
Respond
-ers

✓

✓

✓

Data
Collection
& Privacy

ODD

✓

2015,
(2) 2018

ID

Commercial
vehicles &
platooning

✓

AZ

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

EO 17-17
EO 201801
HB 791,
EO 201813

Vehicle
Operator

✓
✓

✓

✓

208

✓

✓

Table 6.1. Continued.
Study,
Committee,
Work Force

Testing &
Operations

Vehicle
Operator

Commercial
vehicles &
platooning

Registration
& Title
✓

Insurance
& Liability

First
Respond
-ers

Data
Collection &
Privacy

ODD
✓

State

Year

Policy #

Def.

IN

2018

HB 1290

✓

✓

✓

✓

KY

2018

SB 116

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

LA

2016,
2018

HB 1143,
HB 308

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

ME

2 (2018)

HP 1204,
EO 2018-01

✓

MA

2016

EO 572

✓

✓

✓

MI

(2)
2013,
(4) 2016

SB 663, SB
169, SB
995, SB
996, SB
997, SB
998, SB 99

✓

✓

✓

MN

2018

EO 18-04

✓

✓

MS

2018

HB 1343

✓

NE

2019

LB 989

✓

✓

✓

NV

(2)
2011,
2013,
2017

AB 511, SB
140, SB
313, AB 69

✓

✓

✓

NY

(2) 2017

✓

✓

✓

NC

(2) 2017

✓

✓

ND

2015,
2017

OH

2 (2018)

✓

✓

OR

2 (2018)

SB 2005,
AB 9508
HB 469, HB
716
HB 1065,
HB 1202
EO 201801K, EO
2018-04K
HB 4059,
HB 4063

✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
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✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

Table 6.1. Continued.
State
PA
SC

Year
2016,
2017

Policy #
SB 1267,
HB 1958

2017

HB 3289

TN

2015,
2016,
(3) 2017

TX

(2) 2017

UT

2015,
2016,
2018

SB 0598,
SB 2333,
SB 1561,
SB 676, SB
151
HB 1791,
SB 2205
HB 373, HB
280, SB
056

VA

2016

HB 454

VT

2017

HB 494

WA

(2) 2018

WI

2017,
2018

EB 2970,
EO 17-02
EO 245, SB
695

Def.

Study,
Committee,
Work Force

Testing &
Operations

Vehicle
Operator

Commercial
vehicles &
platooning

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Registration
& Title

Insurance
& Liability

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Data
Collection &
Privacy

✓

ODD
✓

✓

✓

✓

First
Responders

✓

✓
✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Notes: Def. = Definitions and ODD= Operational Design Domain
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✓

Figure 6.1 Enacted state and federal district AV policy by branch

Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. Notably, the fact that these states do not have enacted legislation does
not mean AVs are prohibited on their transportation network. As long as the AVs
abide by the present federal (i.e., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards) and
state regulations (traffic laws) for conventional vehicles, this classification of
vehicles can share the roadways. Governors in Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin have
issued AV-related executive orders. As depicted in Figure 6.1, many states have
enacted bills initiated only in the legislative branch, whereas few states have
issued only executive orders. Illinois, Maine, Wisconsin, and Washington have
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frameworks from both the legislative and executive branches of state government.
With rapid transportation innovation, early-adopting states have enacted new
legislation to adapt and expand previously enacted AV frameworks. Examples of
these include Nevada, California, Florida, Tennessee, and Michigan. Note that
more legislation does not necessarily mean a better framework.

Methods

The analysis for this study consists of (1) a comprehensive review of the legislative
cases, with an overall ranking of each state based on the USDOT Model State
Policy; and (2) extraction of key topics through a statistical pattern learning
analysis. For both, we were interested in the extent to which each state has
addressed policy issues relating to AVs. Because each state has different
motivations when related to AVs, this study does not focus on the effectiveness of
each policy. Instead, we are primarily interested in understanding how different
states have chosen to address AVs in legislation. To evaluate the comprehensive
undertakings by each state in developing policies through the use of this guidance,
we developed a Policy Activity Score. In this score, each state is awarded points
in each of the eight framework areas of the Model State Policy. The point system
is as follows:
0 = area not considered or not mentioned at all
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1 = area is mentioned, but there is little to no policy framework development
2 = legislation shows evidence of a developed framework for addressing
this area
3 = the state has developed a complex framework for regulating this area

Policy Activity Score
USDOT’s Model State Policy was developed for states proposing to standardize
testing, deployment, and operations of HAVs (United States Department of
Transportation). The model framework includes eight main areas:
1. Administrative structure and processes states can set up to regulate the
use of public roads for HAV testing and deployment
2. Application by manufacturers or other entities to test HAVs on public
roads
3. Jurisdictional permission to test
4. Testing by the manufacturer or other entities
5. Drivers of deployed vehicles
6. Registration and titling of deployed vehicles
7. Law enforcement considerations
8. Liability and insurance.

Both aspects of this study evaluate state legislation according to the above criteria
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from the USDOT Model State Policy. We developed a Policy Activity Score, which
ranks states based on the extent of their policy activity in each area of the Model
State Policy, using questions developed from the literature and the authors’
knowledge base (American Association of Motor Vehicles Administration, 2018;
Eno Center for Transportation, 2019; Governors Highway Safety Administration,
2018). Through a methodological review, a state’s score was developed as a
grading rubric to identify and record evidence of each state’s legislation on the
following topics and equations. The framework for the Policy Activity Score is
explained below in greater detail.

1. Administrative Structure


Has the state created a committee, task force, or commission that
evaluates AV developments in the state and make recommendations
for policy?



Is there a process for regulating AV testing on public roadways and
private centers?



Has the state clearly defined AV terminology?



Does legislation clearly communicate what permits are needed for
AV activity?



Are there administrative structures for DMV licensing?

2. Testing on Public Roads
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Does the state require permits for AV activity? If so, what are the
requirements? Is there self-certification of the technology?



What are the street classifications and built-environment where AVs
are allowed to test? Are AVs excluded from residential areas?



What are the allowed weather conditions of AV testing?



What requirements apply to manufactures allowed to test their
vehicles on public roads (i.e., insurance bonds, list of vehicle
identification numbers, license plates, training of vehicle operators,
self-certification of technology, crash data)?



What are the requirements for manufacturers to test vehicles without
an operator on public roads?



Which public roads are available for AV testing?



Does the state require a safety and compliance plan?

3. Jurisdictional Permission


How does an entity establish permission to test?



Are local governments allowed to regulate AV activity?



What is the process when local governments do not authorize testing, but
state governments do? How do testing entities learn about this process?



When does an entity need permission to operate a vehicle with automated
technology?

4. Manufacturer Testing
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Is it clear that the state does or does not encourage AV development
in their state?



Where can manufacturers and other entities test?



Does the state sponsor test facilities? Alternatively, are they in the
private sector? Are they allowed only at universities?



Is there a distinction between a testing vehicle and an operational
vehicle?

5. Drivers/Operation


What are the driver license requirements at different levels of
automation?



What is the driver responsible for at the different levels of
automation?



What are the seat position requirements for an operator or a remote
operator?



What are the restrictions for operational domains, and what are the
requirements for domain expansion?

6. Registration/Titling


What training is required for DMV licensing personnel?



Do AVs require visible labels such as license plates or stickers? Do
they specify SAE level of automation?



Are there different requirements for test vehicles and operational
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vehicles?


As conventional vehicles are being retrofitted with ADS technologies,
is the vehicle title recorded reconstructed or “branded”?

7. Law Enforcement


Is there training for law enforcement on AVs?



How will law officers know when a routine driving task is completed
by automated systems rather than humans?



What are the consequences of distracted operation? At which level
of automation does distracted operation not apply?



How will police officers enforce distracted driving without knowing the
level of automation?



How will law enforcement track criminal behavior such as
cybersecurity attacks and carjacking?

8. Liability/Insurance


What are the insurance requirements for AVs?



What are the operator’s responsibilities? How does this change
among levels?



How does a vehicle transfer from a testing to an operating or
commercial vehicle?



Who is the responsible party through automation levels? Is the
operator responsible for a fully at-fault automated vehicle crash?
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Text Analysis
We employed statistical pattern learning analysis in QDA Miner and WordSTAT to
extract key topics among the collection of 78 legislative documents. Mapped
proximity/conception distances among these topics revealed interrelationships.
This method analyzes state legislation as a whole (that is, as a collection of state
legislative actions viewed at the aggregate national level) rather than at an
individual level, to determine areas of policy that have been explored more by
government officials than others. Further, a frequency analysis identified common
keywords, which were used to extract 35 topics through a factor analysis. Related
words were joined through an inclusion dictionary, and common words
unnecessary for the text analysis were placed into an exclusion dictionary. These
topics were organized in the eight areas mentioned in the USDOT Model State
Policy framework and questions were reviewed manually to evaluate the state
legislation holistically. As our study is based on data from legislation, the data was
obtained from the legislative documents and are of high quality, owing to the
comprehensive nature of our efforts and the reasonableness of text mining results.

Results

As stated above, the USDOT Model State Policy provides guidance to state
governments in setting forth or modifying regulations to authorize testing,
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deployment, and operation of HAVs. Notably, the Policy Activity Score does not
construct any inferences regarding the effectiveness of these policies for
promoting the research and development of AVs, but rather, reflects the attempt
to develop policies for regulating testing, deployment, and operation of AVs.

Table 6.2 includes the 36 states—and District of Columbia—that have enacted AV
legislation. More frequent legislation does not necessarily mean a higher policy
activity score or an increase in AV activity. Some legislation is not comprehensive
or does not specifically address the areas outlined in the Model State Policy while
others comprehensively address multiple areas with a limited number of policies.
An example of a state with a high policy activity score but a limited number of
policies is Ohio. As depicted in Table 6.2 with a total of 62 points, the vast majority
of states address or mention the administrative structure, as many states
established a joint workforce or committees to study various aspects (safety,
economic, emissions, best-practices, revising laws and regulations) of authorizing
AV testing, deployment, and operation of AVs in their state.

California, Ohio, Nevada, and Arizona, four prominent locations for AV testing in
the United States, have the most in-depth frameworks in this area, with established
committees, designated agencies, and permit holding manufacturers authorized to
test on the roadways. The scores also highlight inadequate collaborative
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Table 6.2 Legislation enacted and policy activity scores by state

Total

Liability/Insurance

Law Enforcement

Registration/Titling

Drivers/Operation

Manufacturer Testing

Jurisdictional
Permission

Public Road Testing

Policy Activity Score

Admin. Structure

Total

State

Legislation

No.

Executive Orders

Legislation
Enacted

1
California
16
0
8
8
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
Ohio
15
2
0
2
3
2
2
3
2
1
1
1
3
Nevada
13
0
4
4
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
3
Arizona
13
3
0
3
3
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
3
New York
13
0
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
6
Michigan
11
0
6
6
2
2
1
2
1
1
0
2
6
Illinois
11
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
8
Tennessee
10
0
5
5
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
8
Florida
10
0
4
4
2
1
1
1
2
1
0
2
8
North Carolina
10
0
2
2
2
0
2
1
1
2
1
1
8
Washington
10
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
0
1
12
Connecticut
8
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
1
1
0
1
13
Maine
7
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
0
0
0
1
13
Wisconsin
7
1
1
2
2
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
13
Colorado
7
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
2
1
0
1
13
Minnesota
7
1
0
1
2
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
13
Nebraska
7
0
1
1
2
0
0
0
2
1
0
2
18
Oregon
6
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
18
Massachusetts
6
1
0
1
2
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
20
Utah
5
0
3
3
2
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
20
District of Columbia
5
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
20
Georgia
5
0
2
2
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
20
North Dakota
5
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
20
Texas
5
0
2
2
1
0
1
0
2
0
0
1
20
Kentucky
5
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
2
1
1
0
26
Louisiana
4
0
2
2
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
26
Vermont
4
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
28
Alabama
3
0
2
2
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
28
Pennsylvania
3
0
2
2
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
28
Arkansas
3
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
28
Indiana
3
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
32
Delaware
2
1
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
32
Hawaii
2
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
32
Idaho
2
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
32
Mississippi
2
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
36
Virginia
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
36
South Carolina
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Total
14 64 78 62 17
22
33 41 27 15 30
Note: Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming do not have a score due to lack of
enacted legislation at the time of our analysis
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approaches between states and their law enforcement practices. New York
requires the direct supervision of AV testing under New York State Police and in a
manner approved by the superintendent. Because first responders are
unaccustomed to responding to and working AV-involved incidents, some states,
such as California and New York, require manufacturers to submit an interaction
plan between law enforcement and first responders to ensure safe interactions.
Proper training and development of law enforcement and first responders will aid
in on-scene performance.

The manual review of the legislation also extracted other information regarding AV
policies at the state level. There are differences in legislative goals between
executive orders and policies originating in Congress. Governors of states
regularly use executive orders to form exploratory committees or to establish the
state's openness to AV activity. Congresses use their legislative power to regulate
autonomous technology in more detail. Overall, 20 different legislative actions
required the formation of a committee or the submission of a report that explored
the impacts and policy needs of AV legislation. Testing of AVs has been promoted
in the executive and legislative branches, with five legislative actions that have
established or promoted state-sponsored testing centers or programs that
encourage AV development.
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Components of legislation and executive orders included defining ADS elements
to provide clarification and consistent vocabulary. Frequently defined terms include
automated driving system, drive, dynamic driving task, fully autonomous vehicle,
minimal risk condition, operational design domain, person, operator, and SAE
levels of automation. Of note, some states have defined terminology that is
inconsistent with SAE and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA).

Given the potential fuel efficiency gains of automation (Wadud et al., 2016), states
are modifying the allowed following distance when traveling in a platoon. In
Arkansas, Kentucky, Indiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina legislation,
requirements for vehicle platooning were the only component addressed in any
bill. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin addressed platooning in addition to other
ADS elements. Michigan’s legislation was more detailed by establishing the
minimum threshold for vehicles over 5,000 pounds, which must maintain 500 feet
of headway when in the rural corridors. The platooning legislation in Wisconsin is
similar to Michigan but allows a gross weight of 10,000 pounds, with a following
distance greater than 500 feet. Indiana allows vehicles to have a following distance
of 300 feet when platooning, and California allows a minimum of 100 feet. Another
platooning issue addressed is the number of vehicles permitted in a platoon;
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Florida allows a maximum of two vehicles, while Arkansas and Michigan legislation
allows for an unlimited number of vehicles in a platoon.

Outlined in the majority of legislation is the AV operational design domain (ODD).
As explicitly stated in California, Colorado, Florida, and Texas legislation, AVs are
allowed to operate on roadways as long as the vehicles meet state and federal
requirements. A limited number of legislation specifies the authorized roadway
classification (i.e., local roads, freeways, interstates) and built environments for
testing AVs. However, fully automated AVs are prohibited on limited-access
highways in Connecticut. Kentucky notes platooning should not occur on highways
in business or residential districts.

An obvious difference among the states is the role of the vehicle operator.
Colorado and Tennessee require the operator to be seated in the “driver’s seat,”
with Tennessee potentially charging the operator with a class A misdemeanor if
one is not present during high or full automation mode. The District of Columbia
requires that a human driver be ready at any moment to take control of the AV.
Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, and Nevada do not require a human
operator; North Carolina mandates a human in the car only for a passenger who
is under the age of 12. Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas exempt AV operators
from possessing a valid driver’s license.
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Some states (e.g., California, Michigan, Ohio, Nevada, North Dakota, and Texas)
are recognizing in legislation that data should be collected from AVs, to convey
more about pre-crash events. As ownership of the data is not stated in legislation
text, legislatures will need to determine the regulation and protection of the data.
Emergency responders attending to a crash will respond differently to AVs than
conventional vehicles. States like Vermont and California require a report to
address safe emergency response practices.

Text Mining
There are several key statistical values for analyzing topic extraction in a
supervised learning technique. Higher eigenvalues (factors most widespread in the
text collection) suggest a stronger relationship among the keywords in that specific
topic (Jolliffe, 1986). The frequency value indicates the total occurrence of the
selected keywords in the collection of policies, while cases are the number of
legislative documents that mention the keywords. This study evaluates these
measures in order to determine trends in the literature. Table 6.3 presents the
extracted topics from the text mining analysis. The topics have been sorted into
eight broader areas, as outlined in the USDOT Model State Policy framework;
some topics are relevant and were inserted into multiple categories. An example
of this special condition is the factor of “automated driving.”
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Table 6.3 Results of text mining via factor analysis procedure for topics extraction
Area

Topic
State or Local
Agencies

Transportation
Authority
Existing Law
Regulations

Admin. Structure

National
Highway Traffic
Safety
Administration
Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety
Standards
Task Force
Dynamic Driving
Automated
Driving
Pennsylvania
Turnpike
Commission
Rules, Statutes,
and Titles
Bill Would
Require; Funds
Advisory
Committee;
Appointed by
the Governor
Submit A Report

Testing

Jurisdictional
Permission to Test

House of
Representatives;
President of the
Senate
Submits an
Application
Local Ordinance

Business or
Residence
District

Keywords
Fund; Date;
Agencies;
Enforcement;
Liability; Evidence;
Days; Authority;
Existing; Law;
Requires;
Chapter; NRS;
Pursuant;
Adopted;
National;
Administration;
Traffic; Highway;
Safety;
Federal; Standard;
Applicable;
Task; Force;
Dynamic;
Automated;
Driving; System;
Engaged;
Pennsylvania;
Commission;
Highly; Work;
Statutes; Title;
Rules;
Program; Bill;
Fund; Require;
Member;
Appointed;
Advisory;
Committee;
Governor; Serve;
Report; Submit;
Recommendation;
House; Senate;
Representative;

Approval;
Application;
Ordinance;
Paragraph;
Subdivision;
Adopted;
District; Business;
Space; Traveling;
Roadway;
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Coherence

Eigenvalue

Cases

%
Cases

0.423

2.66

116

51

65.38%

0.324

1.76

81

30

38.46%

0.320

1.58

154

50

64.10%

0.389

1.92

189

36

46.15%

0.388

3.85

346

71

91.03%

0.352

1.54

149

45

57.69%

0.303

1.82

133

21

26.92%

0.424

1.86

820

63

80.77%

0.384

2.33

117

19

24.36%

0.343

1.56

64

34

43.59%

0.348

1.7

155

36

46.15%

0.403

3.26

573

40

51.28%

0.347

1.95

105

42

53.85%

0.356

1.67

115

26

33.33%

0.320

1.52

64

25

32.05%

0.379

2.4

148

39

50.00%

0.411

2.52

112

42

53.85%

N

Table 6.3. Continued.
Area

Topic
Testing Project

Manufacturer/Other
Entity Testing

Economic
Development
Operation

Valid Driver
License
ADS Operated
Vehicle
Active Human
Operator

Drivers/ Operation

System Failure
Truck
Platooning
Technology
Task Force
Dynamic Driving
ADAS
Technologies

Communication
Device
Installed
Equipment
Automated
Driving
Operational
Design Domain

Keywords
Save; Project;
Manufacturer;
Participating;
Development;
Economic;
Mobility;
Research;
Technology;
Operation;
Testing; Safe;
Road;
Autonomous;
License; Valid;
Driver;
ADS; Notification;
Operated;
Defined;
Active; Human;
Drive; Operator;
Monitoring;
Installed; Control;
Failure; Event;
Platooning; Truck;
Study; Test;
Task; Force;
Dynamic;
Lane; Assistance;
Braking;
Emergency;
Parking; Crash;
Combination;
Including;
Monitoring;
Systems;
Communication;
Wireless; Device;
Present;
Equipment;
Automated;
Driving; System;
Engaged;
Domain; Design;
Operational;
Specific; Limited;
Condition; Speed;
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Coherence

Eigenvalue

Cases

%
Cases

0.354

2.29

193

37

47.44%

0.373

1.88

306

61

78.21%

0.436

2.11

804

65

83.33%

0.381

2.75

173

51

65.38%

0.388

2.16

155

47

60.26%

0.527

1.41

430

66

84.62%

0.334

1.79

53

26

33.33%

0.365

1.42

288

59

75.64%

0.303

1.82

133

21

26.92%

0.528

5.10

315

68

87.18%

0.364

2.21

121

29

37.18%

0.311

1.46

54

34

43.59%

0.424

1.86

820

63

80.77%

0.522

4.48

200

58

74.36%

N

Table 6.3. Continued.
Area

Topic
Registered
Owner;
Law
Enforcement
Agency
Operational
Design Domain

Registration/ Titling
of Deployed
Vehicles

Hardware and
Software
Vehicle
Requirements

Vehicle
Information
Installed
Equipment
State or Local
Agencies

Law Enforcement

ADS Operated
Vehicle
Registered
Owner; Law
Enforcement
Agency
Instrument of
Insurance

Insurance and
Liability

State or Local
Agencies

Keywords
Owner; Agency;
Registered;
Parking;

Domain; Design;
Operational;
Specific; Limited;
Condition; Speed;
Performing;
Software;
Capable;
Steering;
Authorized;
Compliance;
Laws; Applicable;
Capable;
Make; Year; Data;
Present;
Equipment;
Fund; Date;
Agencies;
Enforcement;
Liability; Evidence;
ADS; Notification;
Operated;
Defined;
Owner; Agency;
Registered;
Parking;
Bond; Surety;
Proof; Amount;
Insurance; Form;
Evidence; Prior;
Fund; Date;
Agencies;
Enforcement;
Liability; Evidence;
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Coherence

Eigenvalue

Cases

%
Cases

0.396

3.4

119

33

42.31%

0.522

4.48

200

58

74.36%

0.37

1.74

86

36

46.15%

0.291

1.36

219

60

76.92%

0.331

2.07

54

35

44.87%

0.311

1.46

54

34

43.59%

0.423

2.66

116

51

65.38%

0.388

2.16

155

47

60.26%

0.396

3.4

119

33

42.31%

0.584

10.67

236

45

57.69%

0.423

2.66

116

51

65.38%

N

The “Instrument of Insurance” factor has the highest Eigenvalue, at 10.67. The
second highest Eigenvalue was “ADAS technologies,” with a value of 5.10. The
“National Highway Traffic Safety Administration” extracted topic appeared in more
than 91% of the collection—not surprising, as the agency regulates AVs at the
federal level. From the text mining analysis, it is evident that truck platooning
technology is important for the states—mentioned in over 75% of the policies.

Data and information property rights, liability, and ownership is an important topic
that is missing from the topic extraction as these keywords did not emerge from
the texting mining analysis. Some states have provided guidance and regulation
on the issues, but it must be explored in more detail. California’s Senate Bill 145
requires manufacturers to provide a written statement to the purchaser as to what
information the AV will be collecting. Minnesota’s EO-04 protects individuals and
industry data under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act. Future state
policy needs to identify the new data sources AVs are providing and who has rights
to those properties.

A concept map was developed through multidimensional scaling to depict the
keywords proximity to one another and their interrelationships (Provalis). The
distance between the words represents the probability the two words co-occur. In
essence, words near each other in the figure are likely to appear near each other
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in the legislation. The concept map in Figure 6.2 complements the text mining
analysis and allows the rapid identification of key topics discussed in the state
policies. Notably, the prevalent cluster in the middle of the map is the frequent
terms states defined within the policies, and this cluster serves as a bridge to the
administrative structure, drivers and operators, registration and titling, and
insurance and liability

Discussion

States are approaching the advancement of AVs with four different policy or
legislative methods (Eno Center for Transportation, 2019; Governors Highway
Safety Administration, 2018). The first is a reactive approach, which 14 states are
currently utilizing, where the state either attempts to craft legislation and fails to
enact, or does nothing and watches to see how the nation evolves with the
innovation. States expressing interest in AVs, but not addressing testing and
deployment in enacted regulations, represent the second approach (i.e.,
declaration of developing working groups in Arizona, Virginia, and North Dakota).
The third approach is for states to affirm the allowance of AV testing through a
framework; examples of this approach are California and Nevada. The last
approach is when states enact legislation that allows HAVs to be deployed on the
transportation network beyond the testing aspect. Presently, five states allow this:
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Figure 6.2: Concept map of keywords
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California, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, and Tennessee.

The perception of AV safety is a major challenge for states that wish to encourage
AV development. When crafting and enacting legislation, states need to be mindful
on the degree of safety that should be upheld, as overly restrictive regulations will
drive manufacturers to less-restrictive states. States with higher Policy Activity
Scores may be attempting to answer policy issues at a faster rate than others.
However, states like Arizona, which through executive orders have expressed their
willingness to allow less restrictive AV testing, have opened themselves up to other
legal challenges. The first ADS-related crash occurred in Tempe, Arizona in March
2018, where a Volvo XC90 was retrofitted with Uber ADS technology. As denoted
in the National Transportation Safety Board preliminary report of the crash
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2018a), Volvo’s City Safety automated
emergency braking system was disabled, with the ADS incorrectly identifying a
pedestrian illegally traversing the roadway with her bike until seconds before the
impact. Later, the Tempe Police Department concluded that the professionally
trained vehicle operator was distracted on her mobile device (Tempe Police
Department, 2018). Since then, a $10 million lawsuit was filed by the family
members of the killed pedestrian against Arizona’s Governor, Doug Ducey, for
allowing AVs on the roadways before it was safe to do so (Stern, 2019).
Unsuccessful policy development will make legislatures chase policy in the future
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by reacting to public outrage. Legislatures crafting AV-related policies have to
recognize the direct and indirect impacts of testing on their roadways.

Even so, there are difficulties in determining the safety of AVs through simulation
and testing on the roadways (Kalra & Paddock, 2016). Automated vehicles would
need to drive in automation mode for hundreds of years to establish safety in terms
of fatalities and injuries, under current testing standards (Kalra & Paddock, 2016).
California disengagement and crash reports are publicly available, and
researchers are exploring the data to reveal insights on the safety performances
of AVs (V. V. Dixit et al., 2016; F. Favarò et al., 2018; F. M. Favarò et al., 2017; Lv
et al., 2017; Merkel, 2018; Wang & Li, 2019a, 2019b). These findings include being
predominantly rear-ended by conventional vehicles at intersections, increased
takeover time with increased AV miles traveled, and contributing factors of
disengagements. While other states (e.g., Nevada, Ohio, and Michigan) that
require these data are not providing public access to this data, government officials
must recognize and acknowledge the benefits of such to the research and
development community.

The USDOT Model State Policy lacks a framework area on data property rights
and protection. Within the legislation, there were limited collaborative efforts on
data ownership, protection, and privacy addressed among the manufacturers,
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vehicle owners, government officials, and researchers. In addition, states’ views
fluctuate on the liability of surface motor vehicle crashes, with 12 states and Puerto
Rico having no-fault automobile insurance laws while other states use monetary,
verbal, and other thresholds. Because automobile insurance is regulated at the
state level, discussion is lacking in enacted state legislation on the liability and
insurance of personally owned AVs at each level of automation. Further, state
policies need to adapt their drivers licensing requirements to the new technology
to ensure that humans understand how to interact with the technology and will
properly and actively monitor their surrounding environment at each level of
automation. This issue is important given that personally owned Level 2 vehicles
currently are on the transportation network. As illustrated in the Williston, Florida;
Mountain View, California; Tempe, Arizona; and Delray Beach, Florida crashes
involving AVs (National Transportation Safety Board, 2017, 2018a, 2018c, 2018d),
drivers are over-relying on the ADS and ADAS, which could potentially be
attributed to improper consumer education about the vehicle, as highlighted in
literature (Abraham, Seppelt, Mehler, & Reimer, 2017; Forster, Hergeth, Naujoks,
Krems, & Keinath, 2019; McDonald et al., 2016). Lastly, technology will
continuously change. Therefore, the administrative structure and framework for
AVs should be as close as possible to the current surface transportation system in
order for AVs to have a smooth transition into the network.
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As noted previously, an increase in the number of legislative actions does not
necessarily correspond to a better AV testing framework. When policymakers are
crafting and developing legislation, states must choose whether their legislation
will be preventative or reactionary. As seen with the Tempe, Arizona fatal crash,
less restrictive policies will bring manufacturers to test on the roadways but may
elicit pushback from the public. States should pursue measures within their power
that encourage testing of AVs and intelligent transportation systems technologies
(i.e., vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-infrastructure), but bear in mind the safety and
privacy of the public. Enacted legislation illustrates the broad spectrum of views
for AV infrastructure. Pennsylvania and California are enacting legislation to
fiscally prepare for AVs connectivity to infrastructure, whereas the majority of
states do not mention infrastructure needs for future AV development. Additionally,
because AVs have to take into account highly localized information and their
movement is based on vision-based systems, there is a need for uniform and wellmaintained infrastructure (i.e., pavement markings and signs) on the transportation
networks throughout the United States.

Presently, manufacturers are competing to mass-market the first Level 4 vehicles,
while holding their software coding as proprietary information. Because the federal
government has not enacted legislation—but is expected to do so in the
reauthorization of Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act in 2020, the
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federal government must develop safety standards and enforce compliance of
these vehicles as stated in the USDOT Model State Policy (United States
Department of Transportation). Congress should pass legislation to direct NHTSA
to certify the technologies in different levels of automation, similarly to how the
Federal Aviation Administration has the power to mandate certification of all
commercial airplanes. The European New Car Assessment Program (Euro
NCAP), which is similar to NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program (NCAP), have
initiated testing of ADAS technologies of Level 2 vehicles (Euro New Car
Assessment Program, 2019).

In 2018, the USDOT released Automated Vehicles 3.0, Preparing for the Future of
Transportation, which called for establishing performance-based safety standards
(United State Department of Transportation, 2018). As such, manufacturers would
have to illustrate through a “sophisticated obstacle-course-based test regimes”
that their vehicles can effectively manage the traditional driving events in addition
to unconventional events. Later in 2018, NHTSA publicized an advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking for a pilot project for Levels 4 and 5 vehicles that also refer
to performance-based standards and testing (National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 2018b; Peng & McCarthy, 2019).
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Conclusion

This study is among the first to conduct a comprehensive review and synthesis of
enacted legislation to develop an overall ranking of each state’s legislation on the
topics established in the USDOT Model State Policy. Questions were developed
to analyze and review legislation based on the eight framework areas recognized
in the USDOT Model State Policy. Systematic text mining analysis was used to
extract key topics relating to state policies from a national perspective. The results
from this paper contribute to the transportation policy realm by uniquely identifying
uneven AV research, development, and deployments in existing legislation at the
state level through text mining analysis extraction of key topics. The uneven
policies imply that the states’ infrastructure readiness for AVs can vary widely, as
will the benefits from AV deployment in terms of improving safety and mobility. A
deeper understanding was obtained on how state policies can affect the research,
development, and deployment of AVs in the future, as illustrated in the public
accessibility of California AV testing field data. The findings in the study may be
useful for aiding federal and state government officials in creating legislation and
adapting existing legislation. Notably, the text analytics and content analysis
methods used in this study are discussed in sufficient detail that others can
potentially replicate the results.
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This comprehensive review and text mining analysis suggest there is a need for
consistent standards and shared definitions, especially when addressing different
levels of automation in surface transportation. These definitions are inconsistent
with NHTSA and SAE, and can cause confusion for manufacturers and the public.
Additionally, policies at the state-level should consistently address customary
subjects such as registration and titling requirements, and insurance and liability.
However, with the emergence of these highly technological vehicles and the
uncertainties that arise, topics on first responders, data collection and privacy,
commercial vehicles and platooning, vehicle operator requirements, certification of
vehicle technology, infrastructure and ODD necessitate a thorough knowledge of
these topics and their potential impacts prior to enacting legislation. With such
variation in the legislation, manufacturers are burdened with designing AVs which
abiding by the legislation for each state (Brodsky, 2016). While each state’s built
environment, landscape, and weather conditions in the United States are unique
and should be utilized for testing, a manufacturer may choose to test in only a
limited number of locations or design the test AVs for the more restrictive states
(Brodsky, 2016).

While this study does not advocate for specific government policies or planning
actions, it provides information that can enhance AV research, development, and
deployment, and the related infrastructure planning needs. As AVs disrupt the
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transportation system and challenge transportation policy, the findings in this paper
can aid with developing a clear and effective AV policy framework for state
governments. Automated vehicles and corresponding technology will drastically
alter the regulatory landscape and human behavior, making it necessary to
establish a policy foundation for the impending AV transition to prevent a
patchwork of state legislation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
STATE POLICIES AND AUTOMATED VEHICLE DATA
IMPLICATIONS
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Topics for Automated Vehicle-Related State Policies

As presented earlier in this dissertation, state policies are the drivers of automated
vehicle testing, deployment, and operations. Presently, California is the only
transparent state in the United States to publicly share automated driving safety
performance data (crashes, disengagement, and automated vehicle miles traveled
data). As California’s testing environment is not generalizable to other locations in
the United States, it is vital that states promote transparent and safe testing of
automated vehicles. Inconsistent or “patchwork” state legislation related to
automated vehicles poses a threat to the readiness to automation and potentially
the expected benefits of automation. Therefore, comprehensive, not exhaustive,
recommendations were developed and should be utilized by government officials
when developing automated vehicle-related policies. The questions that should be
answered in legislation are in Chapter 6 and are recalled below.
Administrative Structure


Has the state created a committee, task force, or commission that
evaluates AV developments in the state and make recommendations
for policy?



Is there a process for regulating AV testing on public roadways and
private centers?



Has the state clearly defined AV terminology?
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Does legislation clearly communicate what permits are needed for
AV activity?



Are there administrative structures for DMV licensing?

Testing on Public Roads


Does the state require permits for AV activity? If so, what are the
requirements? Is there self-certification of the technology?



What are the street classifications and built-environment where AVs
are allowed to test? Are AVs excluded from residential areas?



What are the allowed weather conditions of AV testing?



What requirements apply to manufactures allowed to test their
vehicles on public roads (i.e., insurance bonds, list of vehicle
identification numbers, license plates, training of vehicle operators,
self-certification of technology, crash data)?



What are the requirements for manufacturers to test vehicles without
an operator on public roads?



Which public roads are available for AV testing?



Does the state require a safety and compliance plan?

Jurisdictional Permission


How does an entity establish permission to test?



Are local governments allowed to regulate AV activity?
241



What is the process when local governments do not authorize testing, but
state governments do? How do testing entities learn about this process?



When does an entity need permission to operate a vehicle with automated
technology?

Manufacturer Testing


Is it clear that the state does or does not encourage AV development
in their state?



Where can manufacturers and other entities test?



Does the state sponsor test facilities? Alternatively, are they in the
private sector? Are they allowed only at universities?



Is there a distinction between a testing vehicle and an operational
vehicle?

Drivers/Operation


What are the driver license requirements at different levels of
automation?



What is the driver responsible for at the different levels of
automation?



What are the seat position requirements for an operator or a remote
operator?



What are the restrictions for operational domains, and what are the
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requirements for domain expansion?
Registration/Titling


What training is required for DMV licensing personnel?



Do AVs require visible labels such as license plates or stickers? Do
they specify SAE level of automation?



Are there different requirements for test vehicles and operational
vehicles?



As conventional vehicles are being retrofitted with ADS technologies,
is the vehicle title recorded reconstructed or “branded”?

Law Enforcement


Is there training for law enforcement on AVs?



How will law officers know when a routine driving task is completed
by automated systems rather than humans?



What are the consequences of distracted operation? At which level
of automation does distracted operation not apply?



How will police officers enforce distracted driving without knowing the
level of automation?



How will law enforcement track criminal behavior such as
cybersecurity attacks and carjacking?
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Liability/Insurance


What are the insurance requirements for automated vehicles?



What are the operator’s responsibilities? How does this change
among levels?



How does a vehicle transfer from a testing to an operating or
commercial vehicle?



Who is the responsible party through automation levels? Is the
operator responsible for a fully at-fault automated vehicle crash?

Fiscal Budget


How will the state fiscally supply adequate infrastructure needed for
automated vehicles (i.e., taxes)?

Automated Vehicle Data Collection

The emergence of automated vehicles (and later connected vehicles) is expected
to bring forth safety improvements to the transportation network. In this Big Data
era, these improvements are projected to be due to the vast amount of real-time
data being collected and used. While human error is estimated to drastically
reduce with higher levels of automation, there will continue to be crashes as
conventional vehicles systematize with automated vehicles.
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As discussed previously, the dissertation took advantage of California’s
revolutionary Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program data. While the data utilized in
this study is informative in terms of the insights gained from field testing, there are
areas for enhancements. Government officials looking into creating a state
automated vehicle testing program should consider potential new data that can be
obtained and processed from automated vehicles. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, the
four main components of automated vehicle operations include the operator,
vehicle, roadway, and environment. Safety performance data that should be
considered into a testing program when an automated vehicle is involved in a crash
or disengagement include:
Vehicle


Make



Model



Year



Vehicle identification number



SAE International automation level (0-5)



Stock vehicle features



ADS version



Description of previous ADS update



Automated vehicle miles traveled after update



LIDAR and camera recordings
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Figure 7.1 Potential data sources for automated vehicles
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System engagement



Alerts and warnings



Test vehicle routes per year (success trips)



Automated vehicle miles traveled



A thorough description of crash and disengagements (require law
enforcement to be involved in every crash)

Operator


Training and performance in training



In-vehicle video recording



Past automated vehicle involved-crash



Degree of driver engagement



Operator eye tracking



Seat position of operator or remote operator



Other passengers in vehicle and corresponding role



Interaction with system

Environmental


Atmospheric conditions in crash/disengagement



Pavement conditions in crash/disengagement



Lighting conditions in crash/disengagement
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Roadway


Coordinates of crash/disengagement



Interactions with vulnerable road users



Authorized operation design domains
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
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As Norman Bel Geddes predicted in 1940, automated motor vehicles are emerging
on to the transportation network to eliminate the driver error, which is estimated to
contribute to more than 90% of traffic crashes in the United States. There has been
a wide uncertainty of the future of the transportation realm, as previous research
has only examined automated vehicles through simulation and test tracks (proving
grounds).

Conceptually, this dissertation comprehensively reviews and analyzes the factors
that are associated with these vehicles. Past literature related to the safety of
connected and automated vehicles was reviewed to examine the estimated safety
benefits and harms, in addition to addressing research needs to more
comprehensively understand this effects of this technology. California’s
Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program allows the public to access permit-holding
manufacturers’ automated vehicle data, which includes the automated vehicle
miles traveled and disengagements per month by the vehicle identification number
and crash reports. As this data is the only public field testing data available in the
United States, it provides a starting point in understanding the trends and causes
of involved crashes and disengagements. Using the crash data available, the
contributing roadway and built-environment factors associated with rear-end and
injury crashes were determined. Using the disengagement data available, factors
associated with the initiator of the disengagement were provided. By examining
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disengagements over 12 months and by the manufacturer, the tendencies of the
frequency of disengagements were determined. Finally, the dissertation examined
the role of state policies on automated vehicle testing, operation, and deployment,
which illustrated state policies are the drivers of such activities. Currently, many
states, such as Arizona, California, Michigan, Nevada, and Ohio, are allowing
automated vehicles to test on the public roadways, but California is the only
transparent state to require manufacturers to publicly submit automated driving
safety performance data to the Department of Motor Vehicles.

A summary of the findings in this dissertation is below, followed by the implications
and areas for future research.

Chapter 2 conducted a comprehensive search of automated vehicle safety
research. The literature review examined the following subjects relating to
automated vehicles: automated and connected vehicle and technology, traffic
safety, public behavior, and travel behavior published papers since the year 2000
as technology is rapidly advancing and changing. By employing a supervised
machine learning framework on the collection of research papers, the results
unveiled major themes and interrelationships before manual extraction of empirical
evidence aided in developing safety research needs with the uncertainty of the
future of connected and automated vehicles.
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Chapter 3 utilized the data reported in the California Department of Motor Vehicles
Autonomous Vehicle Tester Program, which allows manufacturers to test highly
automated vehicles on public roads in California. Through the use of the
manufacturer-reported crash reports involving an automated vehicle (OL 316), this
chapter aided in the understanding of roadway and environmental contributing
factors in automated vehicle crashes. A unique database of 124 manufacturerreported crashes with supplementary data on the roadway and built-environment
attributes were developed and employed for a series of key analyses. With the
prominent type of automated vehicle-involved crash being rear-end and a marginal
being injury-involved crashes, a full Bayesian empirical approach was conducted
to mitigate the limited frequency of crashes and understand the interactions of
automated vehicles and human-driven conventional vehicles in complex urban
environments. Implications of the results were discussed as well as low-speed
automatic-emergency braking, the organic behavior of automated vehicles, and
the opportunity to expand the pre-crash data recordings with rich data from
automated vehicles.

Chapter 4 uses the disengagement data of the California Autonomous Vehicle
Tester Program to identify the associated risks. Disengagements are the
deactivation of the automated driving system when the system identifies a failure
of the autonomous technology and alerts the human operator or when the vehicle
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operator disengages the system for safe operation. These instances are
essentially a “near-miss,” assuming if the vehicle operator did not take over manual
control, the vehicle would be involved in a collision. This chapter examines the
159,840 disengagements of 464 vehicles from September 14, 2014, to November
30, 2018, as reported by the manufacturers. A unique database was developed to
analyze the correlates of disengagements. A fixed and random parameter binary
logistic regression was employed in addition to the marginal effects to understand
who is disengaging the system (i.e., system or operator) with the disengagement
causes, location, and testing maturity of the system. By quantitatively examining
the entire dataset, the results and implications of this study were discussed and
allows a better understanding of the environment of the failures.

Chapter 5 examines disengagements of automated vehicles who tested for 12
months, as evident from the automated vehicle miles traveled and the vehicle
identification number. Initiating in 2018, the Department of Motor Vehicles in
California required manufacturers to report the disengagements and automated
vehicle miles traveled by the vehicle identification number. A unique database of
disengagement and crash characteristics were created. Twelve companies with a
total of 32 vehicles and 693 disengagements over a year were analyzed. Rigorous
statistical analytics were employed through Poisson panel model specifications to
analyze the disengagement characteristics and the frequency of disengagements.
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Analytical insights on the disengagement frequency can support the direction of
policies on automated vehicles.

Chapter 6 conducted a comprehensive review of enacted state automated vehicle
policies. With the rapid technology advancement in adaptive driver assistance
systems and automated driving systems, these systems pose a threat to
automated vehicle safety as the government tends to be reactive compared to
proactive. Outlined in the United States Department of Transportation Model State
Policy, federal and state governments retain traditional responsibilities with the
deployment of automated vehicles. This chapter reviewed the enacted state
policies through a text mining analysis and manual extraction, and a policy activity
score of each state was determined and awarded based on the extent of
completeness as provided in the model policy. From a national level perspective,
insights and uneven research development and deployment of automated vehicles
among states were obtained and followed with a thorough discussion of the
legislation needs of the state government to promote a safe emergence of highly
automated vehicles into the market.

This dissertation contributes to the transportation safety literature and the overall
understanding of automated vehicles by systematically examining automated
vehicles in different areas - literature, state policies, and automated driving system
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safety performance data. Actionable items of the research and development,
government and automated system technology industries were recognized.
Identifying areas of research needs is fundamental for the transportation industry
as connected and automated vehicles are a disruptive technology. By harnessing
the available field test data, risk factors that stimulate crashes and
disengagements were identified. By highlighting insights and uneven research
development and deployment of automated vehicles at the state level, policy
needs were discussed to promote the safe and beneficial deployment. Implications
of the data that should be collected in state testing operations were also noted in
detail. As the technology is emerging and the available data is limited, this
dissertation serves as a starting point in understanding automated vehicle safety.

Future Research

As California is currently the only transparent state, future research in automated
vehicle crashes and disengagements should examine other states for more
generalizable results. The field testing conducted in California was primarily
conducted in Santa Clara and San Francisco Counties, which are highly urbanized.
Future data collection should be conducted in varying environments. Additionally,
as 61% of automated vehicle-involved crashes were determined to be rear-end
with the conventional vehicle repeatedly striking the automated vehicle, future
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research should examine the driving volatility (i.e., acceleration, deceleration, jerk)
of automated vehicles and conventional vehicles in a mix traffic environment.
Specifically, this future research area would examine the driving behavior of
automated vehicles to determine the potential implications that might arise due to
the difference in kinematics. As with automated-involved crashes, future research
should examine the roadway and built-environment contributing factors to
disengagements given that the locations, specifically the coordinates, are
provided.
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